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Domination and subjugation of countries, regions, peoples and minority
populations is not a new phenomenon in global politics. In fact, this practice
traces its origins many centuries past, where powerful rulers and their countries
invaded and conquered their weaker neighbors, thus controlling and transforming
the latter's political, social, cultural and economic destinies. In the late
seventeenth century Europe, for example, Poland, a territorially large, but
extremely weak country was invaded, partitioned and annexed by her wealthy and
powerful neighbors, Prussia, Russia, and the Austrian-Hapsburg empires.
In the modem era, this phenomenon has continued unabated, especially
with the creation of strong and powerful nation-states. This new creation brought
with it the emergence of governments, political regimes, and other formal and
informal institutions which undermined the traditional societies, clans, tribal
linkages, and regional loyalties in the dominated territories. In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries respectively, with accumulation of enormous wealth, military
superiority and technological expertise, the industrialized countries explored,
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conquered, and dominated the "less developed" countries of Asia, Latin America
and Africa, exploiting their human and natural resources for their advancement. In
Africa, the Berlin Conference of 1884, resulting in the scramble and partition of
Africa, marked the official beginning of European colonial rale in Africa. This
event also marked the beginning of "center - periphery" relations between Europe
and Africa.
Two major characteristics of the global interstate system include: a
hierarchical set of relations of dominance and dependence perpetuated by the
"developed" countries over the "less developed" countries, and the prevalence of
inequality between these two entities. Secondly, there has been strong resistance
by subjugated peoples and regions in the past half century, against domination and
inequality. Scholars have utilized concepts such as center-periphery, core-
periphery, patron-client relations; as well as models such as dependency and world
system theories, and thoughts from the "Annals School" to describe and analyze
this asymmetrical and unequal relationship between dominant and subordinate
entities. Regardless of what concept or approach one uses to explain this
phenomenon, an irrefutable fact remains, that a superordinate and subordinate
relationship prevails between the advanced industrial states and countries of the
Third World in terms of power and exploitation of natural and human resources.
This circumstance according to Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall has
resulted from a state-based world system, which has generally operated according
3
to the logic of "capital imperialism," in which the core or center regions have
accumulated resources or wealth by exploiting the periphery regions.1 Johan
Gaining in "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" further notes that the world
consist of "center" and "periphery" nations, and within each nation there are
center(s) and periphery(s). He focuses on the relationship between the advanced
capitalist society viz- a- vis the "less developed" countries.2 Also reflecting on the
phenomenon, Edward Shils in "Center and Periphery" in The Logic of Personal
Knowledge, examines center-periphery dynamics in two industrialized countries,
France and Italy. Shils maintains that urban centers in these industrialized
countries have exerted political and economic dominance over the out-skirt areas.3
In a similar vein, Hans Antlov in Exemplary Center and Administrative Periphery:
Rural Leadership and the New Order in Java, explores center-periphery relations
in the context of the Third World, focusing on Indonesia. Like Shils, Antlov
argues that urban centers in Indonesia have assumed roles as centers due to the
'Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, Core/Periphery Relations in Pre
capitalist Worlds (Boulder: West view Press, 1991), 7.
2Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory ofImperialism," Journal ofPeace Research.
No. 2 (1971).
'Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery", in The Logic ofPersonal Knowledge:
Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 117-
130.
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fact that these areas serve as the political seat of government or major center(s) of
commerce."
The "center" is viewed as a place of great activity, especially one to
which people are attracted from surrounding districts or enclaves. In political
terms, the center is seen as the place where power emanates, and consequently
those who manage to occupy themselves with the center, are those who wield
power. In this regard therefore, centrality is conflated with power. The core,
Thomas R. Shannon, has pointed out, is still the location of the most
technologically advanced, capital-intensive, and high-wage production. Shannon
contends that the core has continued to retain its capitalist system of political
economy, and is still organized into a system of competitive nation-states.5
The term periphery on the other hand, is derived from the Greek suffix
"peri," meaning around, about, or to bear. In contrast to the center or the core, one
can logically infer that to be labeled "peripheral," means to be perceived or viewed
as powerless, unworthy of interest or attention. The term periphery, client states,
colonies etc., have been used generally to describe countries of the Third World,
that were under European or imperial domination. Although these former
European colonies gained political independence, thus assuming statehood, and
4Antlov Hans, Exemplary Center. Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership and
the New Order in Java (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1995).
Thomas R. Shannon, An Introduction to the World-System Perspective (Boulder,
Colorado: West view Press, Inc., 1996), 85.
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international recognition as sovereign entities, in essence, the same vertical
relationship with their former colonial overlords remained unchanged. The
periphery maintained its traditional export of raw materials to the center or core
region, and in return, she received finished or manufactured products at exorbitant
prices. Furthermore, the periphery was bound to cooperate with, and to obey the
rules set out by the center, especially its major financial institutions such as the
colonial office, and presently, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).6 According to some scholars, the periphery has experienced tremendous
political, economic, cultural, and social turmoil in recent years,7 as these countries
aspire to become modern, following metropole or center-like economic
prescriptions.
As a sound method of analysis, center-periphery relations is vital in our
study and understanding of the historical developments of East and West
Cameroon, and how this relationship can best be enhanced to facilitate the task of
nation building. The main factors in the study of the relations between the center
and the periphery include, geographic, politico-social, economic, and to some
extent psychological. Frank Bealey has characterized the periphery's attitude
towards the center in the following statement:
6Ibid., 94.
'Selective readings and interpretation ofChase-Dunn (1984), Chilcote
(1977,1986), Frank (1981), Amin et al. (1982), Feinberg (1983), and Wallerstein (1979a).
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a state of mind, a feeling of remoteness from where decisions are made
and where cultural activity is flourishing, where 'all the money has
gone,' or 'is made' and where all national standards and values are
sanctioned and authoritatively allocated.8
Statement ofthe Problem
When the United Republic of Cameroon was created in May 1972, after much
internal and external political maneuvers, many observers doubted the viability of
this nascent state. The concerns of these skeptics were not entirely baseless, given
the unique makeup of the country. The merger of the two entities from an
economic and political standpoint, represented a "mismatch." East Cameroon was
economically more developed than West Cameroon, its population was four times
greater than West Cameroon, and it occupied four-fifths of the land area.
Moreover, on January 1, 1960, East Cameroon gained her independence from
France and was recognized as a sovereign nation (La Republic du Cameroon).
Southern Cameroons (West Cameroon) on the other hand, never gained her
freedom from British Trusteeship. In fact, on February 1, 1961, through a United
Nations organized and supervised plebiscite, Southern Cameroons voted to join
independent East Cameroon to form what was later known as the Federal Republic
of Cameroon. Integration, therefore, left West Cameroon not only weak and
malintegrated, but its economy was further distorted. These realities placed West
7
Cameroon in a multifaceted and tenacious dependency relationship, vis-a-vis
East Cameroon. The new United Republic of Cameroon would be shaped by these
circumstances, dictated largely by East Cameroon, with blessings from France.
The unitary system and the advent of centralized rule, we should add, diluted any
structural basis for West Cameroon solidarity, hence diminishing the geopolitical,
economic, and cultural influence this region had experienced under British rule.
Cameroon is the only country in Africa, and perhaps the world, to have
experienced a triple foreign presence in less than a century. This history and
legacy have no doubt impacted decisions and policies of the polity since re
unification and formal political integration in 1961 and 1972 respectively.
After twenty-four years of relative peace, political stability and robust
economic growth (1960-1984), post-independent Cameroon was struggling
politically, economically, and socially to maintain unity. With the exception of
internal disturbances by pro-Communist party movement, the Union des
Population Cameroon (UPC), before and shortly after independence, as well as the
April 1984 military coup against Paul Biya's regime, Cameroon has not faced any
severe internal challenges or threats to its stability. This, however, is not to
suggest that Cameroon is a tranquil nation devoid of internal multi-ethnic and
religious conflicts, clashes, or cleavages that have torn other nations or regions
"Frank Bealey, The Blackwell Dictionary ofPolitical Science: A User's Guide To
Its Terms (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999), 48-49.
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apart. On the contrary, the country's mosaic of ethnic, religious, and regional
differences, unequal resource and infra-structural distribution are some of the
areas where the country has experienced occasional inter-group dissatisfaction,
skirmishes and political pressures. Mack Delancey has indicated that inter-group
rivalry and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims as well as between the
Bamilekes of the west and other southern groups have been noticeable. He
maintains that the Bamileke's desire for rich arable land and their drive for
economic and entrepreneurial prosperity has often placed them (the Bamilekes) in
constant conflict and occasional violence with other groups.9
As already indicated above, although there is general discontent among
Cameroonians over a wide array ofpolitico-social, economic, cultural and regional
issues, the most lethal threat to the country's cohesion and unity is from the
Anglophone minority, outnumbered by a ratio of five to one by Francophones.
Anglophone, in the past decade, have expressed their frustrations and anger at the
government in Yaounde for continued indifference to their problems including:
charges of discriminatory practices of the government in the allocation of
industries and gross neglect in the economic sector of the former British
Cameroons. They argue for example that despite international studies and
recommendations that the Tiko and Victoria seaports in the Anglophone region
'Mark W. Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence (Boulder: West
view Press, 1989), 98.
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were economically more cost effective to operate; the government decided
instead to expand the shallow and overcrowded port of Douala in the Francophone
area. Anglophones have also complained that they are being treated by
Francophones as second-class citizens, regarded as inferiors, and have been
subjugated and marginalized by their Francophone counterparts since
reunification. Sammy Kum Buo, in "How United is Cameroon" notes that "the
relationship between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon is plagued by
mutual suspicion and petit hostilities," and further argues based on evidence from
the country, that Anglophones, since the union in 1972, have not held powerful
portfolio positions such as defense, finance, foreign affairs, or territorial
administration.10 Furthermore, under the pretext of bilingualism, a
disproportionately large number of Francophones were dispatched to the
Anglophone zones as Directors, Commissioners, and Cadres in government
offices, schools, and other public sectors. According to some Anglophone
observers, some of these officials sent to West Cameroon lacked both the
academic qualification and professional competence compared to some of their
Anglophone counterparts, but they were nevertheless, made heads of departments.
According to a retired political figure, Francophones exhibited arrogance and
disregarded the cultural values of the local authorities, chiefs, and quarter heads.
'"Sammy Kum Buo, "How United is Cameroon?" Africa Report. November-
December 1976, 18.
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He pointed out that while Anglophones were generally receptive to their
Francophones counterparts in West Cameroon, Francophones generally did not
treat Anglophones transferred to East Cameroon with the same respect. Some
Anglophones transferred to East Cameroon resigned their positions, some after
three months because of the unfriendly and hostile work environment.
Discriminatory policies and practices of East Cameroon was mirrored in the
educational system of the country, especially in the Yaounde University and other
institutions of higher learning such as the medical school, which are supposed to
be bilingual institutions. As Delancey has stated, Anglophone students often
found themselves quite at a disadvantage as these institutions tend to be staffed
predominantly by Francophones; and more significantly, the curricula were
usually designed to interface with the Francophone secondary school curriculum
and educational philosophy than with the Anglophone." Again, despite the
rhetoric of bilingualism, East Cameroon's chauvinism permeated Anglophone
zones. In May 1985, the Anglophone intellectuals and businessmen presented a
signed manifesto to the president, Paul Biya, protesting what they claim is the
"humiliating and revolting colonial status that is gradually but systematically
being imposed on the English-speaking Cameroonians by the administration."
These elites demanded a new constitutional framework in the country, which
would safeguard and guarantee the rights of all Cameroonians, as well as the
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establishment of a "quota system" in government, especially in state
corporations and the private sector.12 These demands, in a sense, reflected a clear
departure from the system under Ahidjo and perhaps was a precursor to other
protest activities that would ensue in the years to come.
Given the above circumstances, one is bound to ask some pertinent
questions such as, why, despite the perceived unequal treatment and
marginalization of West Cameroon by the East, has the former not opted to or
taken drastic steps to break from East Cameroon? Secondly, why has the
momentum among West Cameroonians suddenly risen in the past few years,
starting in 1983, and especially in 1992-1993, concerning their problem? What
exogenous factors, if any, have contributed to or hindered Anglophones in their
efforts? What are other alternatives available to be explored by both sides to avert
any potential secession by the Anglophones, which may result in a ripple effect,
causing other disgruntled groups in the Francophone region to demand greater
leverage from the government? Answers to these questions will undoubtedly
provide more insight into the discussion on center-periphery relations in
Cameroon.
"Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence, 1989,93.
12111
"Memorandum Presented to the Head of State and Chairman ofthe Cameroon
People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), by a Joint Committee ofthe Elite ofthe
Northwest and Southwest Provinces resident in Littoral province," Douala, Cameroon,
May 7, 1985, pg. 1.
12
Clearly, from evidence in the literature, a problem exists in the
relationship between West and East Cameroon, which needs further research,
analysis, and explanation. Some factors that have caused Anglophones to revisit
this issue with more determination include: leadership change, economic
difficulties in the country, and the role of democracy and multiparty system in the
country. Strangely enough, despite these problems, Cameroon has remained
resilient to some of the problems which have sparked intrastate conflicts and
cleavages that have resulted in genocide in other developing countries such as
Rwanda, Somalia, the Sudan, former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Liberia.
The West Cameroon "factor", as we view it, has resonated with increased vigor,
raising new concerns and questions regarding Cameroon's cohesion and unity.
Also, as the content and context regarding the major debates has significantly
shifted among West Cameroonians, from internal equity and political transparency
to re-instituting the federal system as it existed prior to 1972, and outright calls by
others, especially militants for secession from the union. This situation illustrates
the dilemmas of unity in states composed of "nations." While East Cameroon
continues to pursue policies viewed by West Cameroonians as detrimental to the
political, and economic interest of West Cameroon, discord between Northwest
and Southwest provinces has hampered any attempts for solidarity, and has
prevented any cohesive action by Anglophones to pressure East Cameroon for
more political concessions. This problem, Charles F. Doran has acknowledged, is
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not peculiar to one country like Cameroon. He maintains that other countries
such as Canada face similar difficulties of a single unified polity composed of two
founding peoples.13
Main Proposition
In this study, therefore, the following questions will be investigated.
Did unification of East and West Cameroon, in 1972, mark the beginning of
dominant/subordinate relations between the two entities? and did partition of
Cameroon into seven (7) administrative units (provinces), especially the division
of West Cameroon into two separate units: Northwest and Southwest Provinces,
serve as a divisive calculation aimed at weakening rather than enhancing West
Cameroon's solidarity? In addition, we will explore if democracy and multiparty
politics in the country, which emerged in the early 1990s, increased political
awareness of Cameroonians on some key issues, at the same time, magnifying
regional and ethnic differences along party lines. Similarly, the study would seek
to uncover if deterioration in the country's economy, especially the prevailing
imbalances in resource and infrastructural development between East and West
Cameroon, served as a major catalyst fueling Anglophone agitation's, and calls for
separation from East Cameroon. Finally, the study will seek know if lack of
solidarity among West Cameroonians has impeded, rather than enhanced the
13Charles F. Doran, "Thoughts on the Different Tomorrow," in The Annals ofthe
American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science (1995), 9.
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region's ability to speak in "one voice," thus exert political pressure on the
government in Yaounde for meaningful changes in West Cameroon.
This study will explore if unification of East and West Cameroon, in
1972, marked the beginning of "center-periphery" relations between the two
regions, with East Cameroon serving as the dominant entity and West Cameroon
as the subordinate entity. It will also attempt to uncover if this unequal
relationship between the two regions is the result of policies instituted by the
political elites in East Cameroon, with support from some West Cameroon
politicians in the government and assembly. In nutshell, the study will attempt to
investigate if political, economic, and infrastructural imbalances between the two
regions, plus perceived treatment of Anglophones as "inferiors" or "second class"
citizens is a major catalyst propelling some Anglophones to advocate for
separation from East Cameroon.
In sum, the endeavor to study dominant-subordinate relations between
and within states in Africa, particularly in a multi-ethnic country such as
Cameroon, it is expected that factors such as the prevailing economic conditions in
the country, the current political dynamics, including the degree of political
transparency, and political participation will play a key role in shaping the
discussions of political events. Furthermore, resource and infrastructural
distribution as well as cultural and social realities of the citizens in the dominated
15
region have influenced the attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs of the subjects in the
dominated territory.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
Two salient features of the contemporary international system include
asymmetry and inequality. These characteristics define the relationship between
the advanced capitalist states and countries of the Third World. Dependency
theory, among other theories, has been used extensively by scholars and other
analysts to examine the unequal bargaining relationship prevalent between the
developed and less developed countries. Dependency theorists argue that a major
impediment to Third World development has been the exploitation of resources by
the developed countries, and the deterioration in the terms of trade for primary
products, resulting in economic chaos in the latter. K. J. Holsti has noted that the
relationship between societies from a dependency perspective is hierarchical,
unequal, and exploitative.14 Mainstream and progressive analysts have utilized the
dependency concept to interpret or explain issues relating to development and
underdevelopment Perspectives of dependency have revealed contrasting forms
of dominance and dependence among nations of the capitalist world as well as
within the developing countries. Two important scenarios about this perspective
should be made clear. The first is that the dependent nations may develop as a
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reflection of the expansion of the dominant nations; and secondly, the dependent
nations may be underdevelop as a consequence of their subjective relationship
with their developed counterparts.15
A non-Marxist approach, which emphasized underdevelopment,
emerged from economists linked with the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America (ECLA), led by Argentinean economists Raul Presbisch. The
focus of the ECLA approach for developing or Third World Nations was to build a
strong bourgeoisie, which is supportive of national interests in the developing
countries, especially in Latin America. Also, Furtado, another member of ECLA,
argued that national development could only be achieved by autonomy in the less
developed countries. This inward strategy of achieving development through
national autonomy can eventually lead to state control and planning of the political
economy. The ECLA approach revealed or uncovered that the developing
countries were structured into dual societies—one advanced and modern and the
other backward and feudal, and that the world was divided into two spheres, the
metropole or the center and the periphery. The group argued that under
14K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 6th ed (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992), 72.
13Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a
Paradigm Reconsidered (Boulder, West view Press, 1994), 236.
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unrestrained competition, the metropole or center appropriates most of the
economic benefits in the world to the disadvantage of the periphery.16
Andre Gunder Frank, a prominent underdevelopment and dependency
theorist, argued that the vehicle through which national and regional metropolises
exploit and appropriate surpluses from the economic satellites or peripheries was
through commercial monopolies rather than feudalism or pre-capitalist economic
means. Clearly, Frank's dichotomy of metropolis and satellite conforms to or
supports the ECLA's notion of center and periphery relations and the
contradictions inherent in this relationship.17 Theotonio Dos Santos challenged
Frank's thesis of surplus extraction as the major reason for underdevelopment.
According to Dos Santos, "rather than focusing on 'satellitization' as the main
cause of underdevelopment, attention should be geared toward a certain type of
internal structure, conditioned by international relationships of dependence."18
Before moving any further with this discussion, it is important for us to
examine or define dependency. Theotonio Dos Santos defines dependency in the
following:
"Ibid., 230-238.
"Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development ofUnderdevelopment." Monthly
Review 18 (September 1966), 17-31.
'"Philip J. O'Brien, "A Critique ofLatin American Theories ofDependency." In
Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth ed. Beyond the Sociology ofDevelopment
(1975), 71.
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By dependency we mean a situation in which the economy of certain
countries or regions is conditioned by the development and expansion
of another economy, to which the former is subjected. This relation of
inter-dependence between two or more economies and between these
and world trade assumes the form of dependence, when some countries
(the dominant ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion,
which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate
development."
Dependency theory, in a nutshell, examines the relationship of unequal
bargaining and exploitation perpetuated by the dominant classes, regions, or
countries over subjugated classes and regions, and the implications for the latter's
development and growth. It should, however, be stressed that this definition is not
limited to the relations between the developed and less developed countries, as
most scholars have pursued in the past. Internal dependency within the
developing countries loomed shortly after these countries gained independence, as
post-independent elites in the developing countries maintained and strengthened
the hierarchical post-colonial structures left behind by their former colonial
authorities. This superior-subordinate relationship within the developing countries
manifested itself in the political, economic, cultural as well as in communication
domains, and has been termed neocolonialism.
The edifice of exploitation within the developing countries takes the
form of paternalistic leverages such as rewarding certain regions, ethnic groups,
and personalities with high political offices or other forms of rewards such as
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building of schools, roads, health centers, etc. The perpetuation of the pattern of
neglect and inequality within the developing countries is macro-managed by elite
classes and can be regarded as the contemporary equivalent of a formal colonial
apparatus.
Johan Gaining has put together a coherent synthesis of the dependency
model, from a center-periphery perspective. Gaining argues that elites of the
center or metropolis draw bounty from the periphery of their own state system,
through taxes and other royalties, in order to nurture and support co-opted elites of
client or "peripheral" states or regions. He maintains that elites of those client
states or regions, who depend upon the elites of the center for assistance join in
exploiting and suppressing their own peripheral populations. In the case of
Cameroon, most West Cameroonians believe that some pre-unification and post-
unification political elites sold out Anglophone Cameroon to East Cameroon
leadership for their personal and political gains.
Dos Santos has identified several types of dependencies aimed at
broadening our understanding of this polemic concept The first type of
dependence, which we are all familiar with, is colonial dependency. This type of
dependency characterizes the relationship between Europeans and their former
colonies, hi this relationship, monopoly of trade complements monopoly of land,
"Theotonio Dos Santos, 'The Structure ofDependency." American Economic
Review 0 (May 1970), 231.
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manpower, and other resources such as the mines of the colonized regions. The
second type of dependency identified by Dos Santos is financial-industrial
dependency, which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. It is
characterized by domination of capital by the hegemonic centers and investment
of capital in the peripheries for commodities such as cocoa, coffee, rubber, etc.
which would be consumed in the metropole. Another category of dependency
identified by Dos Santos is the "new dependency." This concept emerged and
gained grounds after World War II and centered primarily on investment by
Multinational Corporations (MNCs). The new dependency seeks to demonstrate
that the relationship of dependent countries vis-a-vis the dominant countries
cannot be changed or altered without significant internal structural change and
important changes in external relations with the dominant countries. The new
dependency theory acknowledges that the structure of dependency deepens, thus
plunging further dependent countries to underdevelopment. This anomaly creates
serious problems for the dependent people as they deal with and conform to
international and internal structures influenced and dictated by Multinational
Corporations as well as the international commodity and capital markets, and other
bilateral institutions like the World Bank and IMF.20
""Philip J. O'Brien, "A Critique ofLatin American Theories ofDependency." In
Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth ed. Beyond the Sociology ofDevelopment
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 7-85.
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Dependency theory has been subjected to severe criticism by other
theorists. Some supporters of the Marxist view charge that the dependency theory
is weak for its overemphasis on external or exogenous factors for the problems of
the periphery rather than the focus on internal dynamics such as the exploitative
nature of the local elites. Secondly, many approaches have emerged, each
purporting to interpret and explain Third World realities based on their
exploitation, marginalization, and domination. This has resulted in confusion and
contradiction in espousing the tenets of the theory.
Some analyst who have employed the dependency theory in an attempt
to analyze and explain development and underdevelopment, have often ended up
dealing with the issue of foreign penetration into the political economies of the
Third World. Chilcote contends that foreign influence both in the political and
economic domain has played a key role in local development, in reinforcing the
dominant position of the ruling classes at the expense of the marginal or
subjugated classes.21 Elaborating on this issue, Chilean economist Osvaldo Sunkel
writes:
Foreign factors are seen not as external, but as intrinsic to the
system, with manifold and sometimes hidden or subtle political
financial, economic, technical, and cultural effects inside
the underdeveloped country... Thus, the concept of
"dependencia" links the post war evolution of capitalism
internationally to the discriminatory nature ofthe local process
"Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories ofComparative Politics: The Search for a
Paradigm Reconsidered. 236.
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of development, as we know it. Access to the means and bene
fits of development is selective; rather than spreading them, the
process tends to ensure a self-reinforcing accumulation of
privilege for special groups as well as the continued existence
of a marginal class.22
Despite the different approaches and directions dependency theorists
have embraced, we should be cautious not to be overwhelmed by elaborate
interpretations or analysis which focus attention almost exclusively on advanced
capitalist states vis-a-vis the less developed countries. Doing so will obscure
severe internal cleavages in the developing countries, where some regions or
ethnic groups have dominated and placed their fellow citizens in dependent
circumstances.
Significance of the Study
A study of center-periphery relations in the context of Africa
particularly as it pertains to Cameroon is significant for several reasons. First, it
dispels the myth held by some scholars mat this type of hierarchical and
asymmetrical relationship only exists between the developed and less developed
countries. Second, it reveals mat domination and exploitation of resources by the
dominant actor, whether the metropole in the developed country over the less
developed countries, or Yaounde and East Cameroon over West Cameroon,
remains pervasive and unaltered. Third, researchers and scholars who have dealt
^svaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 'Dependencia.'" Foreign Affairs 50 (April
1972), 519.
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with center-periphery analysis either from a global or regional perspective, point
to ethnicity in Africa and other less developed countries as a major drawback to
peripheral development This approach arguably is shallow and inadequate, since
there are other salient factors which combine with the ethnic factor to undermine
development and progress in Africa. As the case of Cameroon demonstrates,
although ethnicity is one of the key elements responsible for lack of solidarity
among West Cameroonians to bring pressure to bear on the dominant East
Cameroon other relevant factors also exist, including ideological differences,
political, social and economic circumstances.
Furthermore, past studies on Cameroon including, Kofele-Kale Ndiva's
"Ethnicity Regionalism and Political Power: A Post Mortem of Ahidjo's
Cameroon," Mark W. Delancey's Cameroon: Dependence and Independence, and
Mario Azevedo's "The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon" all failed to produce any
credible framework for examining and analyzing the impact of unification on
West Cameroon solidarity. This failure, one can only speculate, must have been
because these and other scholars treated and viewed West Cameroon as a
homogeneous entity, devoid of internal discord and separate interests.
By contrast to these, and other studies, however, evidence reveal stark
differences between Northwest and Southwest provinces (West Cameroon). The
prevalence of discord among these peripheral units only reinforces one of Johan
Galtung's three theses in "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." According to
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Gaining, a key element of center-periphery relations is the prevalence of
disharmony of interest within the periphery, while there is relative harmony of
interest between the periphery and the center. In the case of Cameroon, therefore,
while there is residual harmony of interest between Northwest and Southwest
provinces (periphery), disharmony is interest between these two Anglophone
regions appears to be relatively great. Likewise, although residual disharmony of
interests prevails between Buea and Yaounde as well as between Bamenda and
Yaounde, there is, nevertheless, relative harmony of interest between Bamenda
and Yaounde, and Buea and Yaounde, more than there is between Bamenda and
Buea (the Anglophone Provincial Headquarters).
In diagram form, the reformulated model looks like our presentation
in diagram 1. We have summarized this information as follows:
1. Harmony of interest between Yaounde and the provinces:
a. There is relative harmony of interest between Yaounde, the capital, and the
provincial headquarters, Bamenda and Buea, buttressed by both economic and
political imperatives.
b. The struggle for limited resources from the central government, and
perceive "adverse" threats for non-compliance may explain this harmony of
interest between the entities.
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c. There is however, residual disharmony of interest between these
provincial headquarters and the national capital, driven largely by the concerns
local constituencies.
2. a. Disharmony of interest or conflict of interest prevails between the two
Anglophone provinces ofBamenda and Buea.
b. Successive Francophone regimes have designed and executed policies to
keep the two provinces at odds with each other.
c. Historical, cultural, political, and economic circumstances account for this
anomaly.
d. Residual harmony of interest nevertheless, prevails between Bamenda and
Buea. Both regions were under British Trusteeship as Southern Cameroons,



















This study also hopes to stimulate and provoke interest among West
Cameroonians to engage forcefully in research and pubUcation on the region.
Most ofthe works written thus far, with a focus on West Cameroon, has been done
by foreign scholars, whose grasp and understanding of the cultural realities of the
people appears to be narrow, and to a limited extent, by Anglophone
Cameroonians. We hope the new perspectives brought forth by this study will
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create a desire for more research in such topics as "Political Balkanization and
its impact on West Cameroon solidarity," "Political Parties in West Cameroon,"
Multiparty Politics and Unity in Cameroon," "Politics of the Coastal/Forest and
Grassfield People of West Cameroon," etc. This study, by critically examining
center-periphery relations, reveals other salient factors responsible for discord and
lack of progress and development in the periphery other than ethnicity, as has been
espoused by some western scholars.
In summary, therefore, whatever directions this study of center-
periphery relations in Africa may take in the foreseeable future, it seems likely that
it will build on, or perhaps take into consideration the contributions of this study
on Cameroon.
Methodology
The purpose of this study is to empirically explore the relationship
between former East and West Cameroon, and how contemporary political,
economic, and social circumstances have enhanced/undermined this relationship.
The view espoused in this study is that re-unification in 1961, and most
importantly integration of these separate political entities in 1972, marked the
beginning of unequal (dominant-subordinate) relations. The conventional
viewpoint held by some scholars and observers is mat the merging of the
Francophone and Anglophone cultures in Cameroon has been successful,
compared to other integration attempts in Africa and other developing countries.
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This viewpoint needless to say, has led most scholars to focus on the factors that
have combined to make the Cameroon union a reality. Credible, however, as
some of these observations may be, it fails to underscore the inherent disparities
between the Francophones and Anglophones. Secondly, it fails to examine the
chasm among the Anglophones themselves, especially between Northwest and
Southwest provinces.
Study Design
This study will utilize a combination of primary and secondary sources
of data to examine and analyze the political, economic, and social developments
in the two Cameroons before and after independence, using surveys, interviews
and other sources of data. The secondary source of information will comprise of
the historical and descriptive approaches. The descriptive approach will attempt to
familiarize us with the scope and major framework of the study, providing useful
insights of the circumstances leading to the abolition of the federal system, and the
creation of a unitary form of government by Ahmadou Ahidjo. This, will include
the president's penchant for personal power, his dream of forging a national
consensus in a multi-ethnic country, and disarray among West Cameroon political
leaders. It will also describe succinctly the strategies the government had used in
the past and even today, to maintain and reinforce the dominant role of
Francophones over Anglophones in the country. The historical aspect of the study
will provide a brief account of Cameroon's history and will complement the
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descriptive approach. It will lay out chronological events beginning with early
European trade activities, German control of Cameroon in 1884, its defeat by
France and Great Britain, division of Cameroon by the League ofNations and later
the United Nations. This approach will also focus briefly on the system of
governance introduced by France and Britain, and assess the overall ramifications
it has had on the relations of East and West Cameroon. These approaches will, no
doubt, serve as the catalyst in my exploration, analysis, and conclusions on center-
periphery relations in Cameroon.
Data Collection Method
The primary source of data for this study were gathered through a
survey of individuals who were apt to have broad, or some knowledge on the
prevailing subject matter. The investigation was also not limited to individuals
with "better education" or persons considered "more articulate." The fear was that
such individuals often share common ideas or ideological orientations, which may
taint, or present a distorted picture of the study. The goal of utilizing this method
(survey) was to examine the views, attitudes, and opinions of respondents,
regarding the unequal relationship of the two regions.
The subjects of the survey were Cameroonians, residing in Cameroon
and the United States of America. The survey was conducted between February
and June of 1999, and 200 questionnaires were distributed to respondents.
Subjects were drawn from the Francophone and Anglophone sectors of the
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country. Of the 200 questionnaires sent out, 174 were completed and returned,
constituting a response rate of (87 percent). Twenty six (26) of the retrieved
questionnaires were discarded because respondents were 17 years of age, and
perceived to be unaware of political dynamics of the country. Furthermore,
documents from the Census Bureau in Cameroon, the Cameroon Ministry of
Planning and Economic Development, as well as Newspaper reports in Cameroon
and around the world will be utilized in this endeavor. Similarly, information
from publications of bilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and country profile reports from the
United States Department of State, and the Department of Commerce were
utilized. The secondary sources of data and information were drawn from several
diverse sources including academic or scholarly writings such as books, journals,
magazines, periodicals and other unpublished materials.
Review of Related Literature
Studies on dominant/subordinate relations have been explored
extensively in numerous literatures dealing with dependency, development and
underdevelopment theories. Some of these works, however, have focused on the
"general nature" of this uneven relationship rather than addressing circumstances
and/or situations dealing with specific countries or regions. Thomas R. Shannon's
An Introduction to the World-Svstem Perspective. Ronald H. Chilcote's Theories
of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Steven L. Spiegel's
Dominance and Diversity, Samir Amin's Unequal Development: An Essav on
the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism Johan Galtung's "A Structural
Theory of Imperialism," and Andre Gunder Frank's "The Development of
Underdevelopment."23
Some of the works just cited above are not specifically restricted to
dominant-subordinate framework, but rather espouse the same general theme of
domination, subjugation and exploitation exhibited by the developed countries
over their less developed counterparts. These works also share the view that
countries and/or regions which are economically, militarily and technologically
more advanced use these capabilities to impose their will on their weaker partners.
Other works which have specifically focused on this subject with
reference to individual countries include Hans Antlov's Exemplary Center,
Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership and the New Order in Java Robert A.
it ^u, maSR Shannon' An Introduction to the WnrlH-Svstem Perspective Ronald
H Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm (Boulder CO
West view Press, 1981); Steven L. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity Th* Tnt^'
Qerjjrc^ (Boston: Little Brown, 1972); Samir Amin. Unequal Develnnmgnf An
ormations f Prihl Cili
^ , 72) p!^
on me Social F o e ipheral apitalism, Trans. Brian Pearce (New York
Monthly Review Press, 1976); Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," in
Transnational Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political
&!QSpmy, by George Modelski (ed) (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company
1979); Andre Gunder Frank, 'The Development of Underdevelopment," Monthly
Review. 18 (September 1966). v ""*
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Young's The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, and Charles F.
Doran and Ellen Reisman Babby's Being and Becoming in Canada.24
The purpose of this review is to examine various studies, which have
explored and analyzed either directly or indirectly East and West Cameroon
relations. It seeks to focus on past research which have dealt with political,
economic and social discontinuities in Cameroon, and how these realities manifest
themselves in East and West Cameroon relations. Milton Krieger, in "Cameroon's
Democratic Crossroads, 1990-94." The Journal of Modern African Studies,
examines a range of political, cultural, economic and ethnic issues relating to
Cameroon's transition to democracy. Krieger highlights the "Anglophone factor"
as the incendiary spark to opposition movement in Cameroon. He argues that
despite this major breakthrough by Anglophones to shape or redirect political
discourse in Cameroon, Anglophones have continued to serve a subordinate role in
the Republic. Krieger argues that disunity among the Anglophone (Northwest and
Southwest) provinces remains a major huddle for this region's to overcome in
order to successfully influence the Francophone government in Yaounde.25 He
24Hans Antlov, Exemplary Center. Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership
and the New Order in Java (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1995); Robert A. Young, The
Secession ofQuebec and the Future ofCanada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1998); Charles F. Doran and Ellen Reisman Babby, "Being and Becoming in
Canada," The Annals of American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science (March
1995).
"Milton Krieger, "Cameroon's Democratic Crossroads, 1990-94 " The Journal of
African Studies. 32, 4 (1994): 618.
further discusses factors responsible for political transition in the country, using
economic deterioration as the motivating factor. He attributes Cameroon's
economic decline to two major factors: (1) ethnicity and (2) clientelism.
Although these factors have contributed to the country's economic woes, they are
not the only factors. Evidence from other works reveal that exogenous factors
such as decline in commodity prices in The World Market, the recession of the
1980s, increase in prices for manufactured products, and debt burden combined to
accelerate Cameroon's economic decline.
The author also fails to mention or discuss the role of the coup d'etat of
April 1984, and its political and economic ramifications for the country.
Furthermore, Krieger and other scholars have pointed to the events in Eastern
Europe as the catalyst for democratic movement in Africa and especially in
Cameroon. This view or perspective fails to mention that Paul Biya, the country's
leader, embarked on democratic principles and reform shortly after he took office
in 1982; and seven years before the "wave of democracy" started blowing
throughout Eastern Europe and Africa.
Similarly, Jean-Germain Gros, in "The Hard Lessons of Cameroon,"
Journal of Democracy explores factors that have combined to undermine
Cameroon's democratic transition and future prospects for democracy. He
contends that in order to understand Cameroon's political transformations, one has
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to examine its postcolonial history, social structure and political dynamics.26
Gros charts Cameroon's political history stretching back to the conference of
Berlin in 1884, which ceded "Kamerun" to Germany as its protectorate. He
discusses the defeat of Germany in World War I and the break-up of Cameroon by
the League of Nations into two entities, French and English, with the former
controlling 80% of the territory and the latter 20%. He contends that this
bifurcated colonial legacy and efforts to cushion the problematic legacy through a
federal structure was a failure. The author highlights the difficulties of
Cameroon's dual colonial legacy in the following statement:
One cannot understand the militancy ofthe SDF, the
party that has been most closely identified with Anglo
phone Cameroon, without grasping mat what it wants is
not merely a change in the government but a far-reaching
federalist reform of the regime. Yet progress toward this
goal is impeded by the reluctance of President Biya's
Franco phone opponents seriously to consider federalism,
which they fear might lead to the eventual breakup ofthe
country.27
Gros succinctly contrasts the political and administrative systems of British and
French in Cameroon in the following:
In addition to their language, the British left behind their traditions of
Westminster-style bicameral parliamentarism, administrative
MJean-Germain Gros, 'The Hard Lessons ofCameroon," Journal ofDemocracy.
"Ibid., 115.
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decentralization, vibrant local government, and a relatively open
society. By contrasts, the more prosperous and populous East
Cameroon had a classically 'Gallic' orientation, with a strong
executive, a centralized bureaucracy, and less tolerance for open debate
and dissent.28
The author further argues that Cameroon's abandonment of the unitary
system in favor of a multiparty system gained grounds in 1989 and was not a
direct initiative by the government. He contends the birth of this movement was
the result of Duala chief; Yondo Black, who championed this campaign by filing
legal papers with the goal of creating a new political party besides the CPDM.
The government counteracted this move by arresting Black and his collaborators
who were charged with "attempting to destabilize the government by fomenting
ethnic tension."29 Black's initiative propelled the formation of the Social
Democratic Front, SDF Party. Again, this move was challenged by government
security forces to break up this rally.
Gros maintains that Cameroon's uneasy transition to multiparty
democracy can best be understood by examining the circumstances and events that
emerged in postcolonial Cameroon. He offers the following factors as
impediments to transition to multiparty democracy: (1) the long and violent
internal war especially against the UPC, which made secrecy official and brutality




multiparty democracy was over reliance of civilian leaders on the military,
especially on French military experts, for protection. (3) The uneven terms of
integration between the former federated states of East and West Cameroon.
According to Gros, these inequitable terms of unification made allegiance of the
Anglophones questionable. He further maintains that over centralization of the
political and administrative system, an unchecked presidency, a fractured
opposition hobbed by parochial goals of the opposition leaders and a distracted
international community not able to press the cause for democratic reform in
countries like Cameroon, all contributed to sluggish transition to multiparty
democracy.30 The author sees Cameroon as likely to descend into the vortex of
Somalia, Sudan, and Yugoslavia-style warfare. This conclusion presumes that the
Anglophones will unite and fight for their separate entity. It fails, however, to
recognize the chasm between the two Anglophone provinces, Northwest and
Southwest, which would make such a purpose unattainable.
Frank Stark, in "Federalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and Reality,"
carefully examines federalism in Cameroon from inception in 1962 to its demise
in May 1972. He forcefully and convincingly argues that in order to understand
the intricacies of the federal structure as it existed in Cameroon, one has to
understand the forces and circumstances behind the drive for reunification from
both East and West Cameroon, and also from the international community. He
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begins by pointing out mat the federal system was an illusion, given the inherent
economic imbalance that prevailed between East and West Cameroon. East
Cameroon, the author contends, was economically advanced, compared to West
Cameroon, due to French aid to the region. West Cameroon, on the other hand,
relied on the but more importantly their determination to Cameroon Development
Corporation (CDC) for its revenue.31
He further argues that West Cameroon's economy was wedged between two
aggressive business oriented groups, the Ibos from Nigeria who dominated trade in
Southern Cameroon (West Cameroon), as well as the Bamelikes in the French zone. He
maintains that the Bamelikes' desire was not only to expand their trade interest in
Southern Cameroons escape French colonial rule in East Cameroon.
Stark correctly points out that the Bamelikes' business desire in Southern
Cameroon was also the engine behind the reunification movement with East Cameroon in
1948, especially in cities like Kumba and Tiko. The reunification theme, Stark adds, was
adopted by the anti-French revolutionary party, the UPC, and also resonated with Dr.
E.M.L. Endeley's party, the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) which used the issue to
drive the anti-Nigerian sentiments in Southern Cameroon. According to the Catholic
newspaper, L'Effort Camerounaise. the idea of federalism or federal structure in East
Cameroon emerged in 1958, following the resignation of Prime Minister of East
"Ibid., 117.
31Frank Stark, 'Tederalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and Reality," in Kofele-
Kale Ndiva's An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon
Republic Since Reunification (Boulder. CO: West view Press, 1980), 102.
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Cameroon, Andre Mbida. Mbida, the paper contends, appealed to the French
government to "divide the French Cameroons into a federation like British Nigeria or
Switzerland."32 The paper criticized and opposed the idea of fragmenting French
Cameroons, stating that it would be "costly and totally against French political tradition."
It also argued that this system would lead to ethnic divisions in the territory.
Southern Cameroon's leadership embraced the idea to a federal system as
illustrated by J. N. Foncha's remarks: "Reunification would take place on a federal place,
on a federal basis, after Southern Cameroon's secession from Nigeria."33 The author
further argues that pressure from the United Nations Trusteeship Council and other
African leaders, forcing Foncha to hold a plebiscite no later than March 1, 1961 either to
join Nigeria or Cameroon Republic as a condition for reunification, gave a
disproportionate edge to East Cameroon since it was an independent state. Furthermore,
pressure from other African leaders on Foncha and Endeley left the leaders with very
little or no time to carefully work out the terms of reunification with East Cameroon.
Frank Stark's work clearly lays out the foundation for examining and analyzing intra-
Cameroon relations based on the three perspectives just discussed (East Cameroon, West
Cameroon, and the International Community).
Kofele-Kale Ndiva, in "Ethnicity, Regionalism and Political Power: A Post-
Mortem of Ahidjo's Cameroon," examines the major contradictions which have
combined to influence the distribution of resources in the country, wealth, status and
"L'Effort Camerounaise. 29 Juin 1958,4.
33Ibid, 19 and 26 April 1959.
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power.34 This inquiry focuses on almost two decades of leadership under Cameroon's
premier leader Ahmadou Ahidjo. The Cameroonian society can best understood if one
examines three key images. One of the images, he points out, reveals a society cleared
along ethnic/regional axis, particularly between the North and South.35 The second image
identified by Azarya, Nelson, and Prouzet is one of a society divided along religious
domains between the Muslim North and Christian South. This thesis maintains that
although the Muslim North is fearful ofthe Christian South, they have used their position
and power to monopolize power.36 The last image, according to observers, portrays
Cameroon's reality manifested by her varied colonial experiences-German-Francophone
and Anglophone contradictions. According to observers, this image has been the most
lethal to Cameroon's internal cohesion and national unity for 20 years.37 As some
scholars have forcefully stated, the union between these two colonial realities—
^ofele-Kale Ndiva, "Ethnicity, Regionalism and Political Power: A Post-
Mortem ofAhidjo's Cameroon," in The Political Economy ofCameroon: Michael G.
Schatzberg and I. William Zartman ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 54.
33Victor Azarya, Dominance and Change in North Cameroon: The Fulbe
Aristocracy (New York: Sage Publications, 1976), 72; Mongo Beti, Main Base sur Le
Cameroun: Autopsie D'une Decolonisation (Paris: Editions F. Maspero, 1977), 270;
Harold Nelson D., Area Handbook for the United Republic ofCameroon (Washington,
DC: U. S. Department ofthe Army, American University, Foreign Areas Studies
Division, 1974), 335; Michael Prouzet, Le Cameroun (Paris: Librairie Generate de Droit
et de Juris Prudence, 1974), 377.
"Azarya, 1976, Nelson, 1974, and Prouzet, 1974.
"Jacques Benjamin, Les Camerounaise Occidentaux: La Minorite an un Etat
Bicommunautaire (Montreal: Les Presses de L'Universite de Montreal, 1972), 250; S. K.
Bou, "How United is Cameroon?" Africa Report (New York...), 17-20; Ndiva Kofele-
Kale, "Cameroon: Checks and Balances," West Africa (December 1983): 2871-3872;
Harold D. Nelson, Area Handbook for the United Republic ofCameroon. 1974.
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Francophone and Anglophone—was a mismatch, "a union of unequals with seeds of its
own eventual destruction embedded into it from the moment of birth.38 This tension and
suspicion of domination and marginalization by Francophones is borne of the perception
by Anglophones that East Cameroon purposefully wants to assimilate Anglophones into
Francophone culture by obliterating all remaining vestiges of the English-speaking
personality."3* According to Kofele-Kale, the origins of this perception stretches back to
the 'Very nature of reunification itself, that is, the negotiations leading to it and the
eventual outcome." Kale further argues that the subordinate and marginal role of
Anglophones was not only a perception, but a constitutional reality, as he elaborates:
During the first decade of reunification, the Constitution contained
a glaring contradiction: on one hand, it prescribed French and
English as the country's official languages (Article 1:4) only to allow, on the
other hand, until the provision was eventually dropped, that the French text
was the authentic one (Article 44 ofthe 1972 Constitution).40
Although much attention has focused on the disparity between Anglophones
and Francophones, Cameroonian economist, Ndongko Wilfred, reminds us that this
problem is not peculiar to only West Cameroon. Wilfred argues that economic
depravation is a shared problem by several regions in the republic, especially in the North
and Eastern provinces. He, nevertheless, points out that this should not suggest that
"Jacques Benjamin, 1972, and Frank Stark, "Persuasion and Power in
Cameroon." Canadian Journal of African Studies. 14,2 (1980): 273-293.
Kofele-Kale, 1986, 55.
""Wilfred A. Ndongko, 'The Political Economy ofRegional Economic
Development in Cameroon," in An African Experiment in Nation Building: The
Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification. Ndiva Kofele-Kale (ed) (Boulder,
CO: West view Press, 1980), 227-250.
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Anglophone complaints about the relative backwardness of their region brushed aside.
He adds that West Cameroon, in the final analysis, is Cameroon's breadbasket and the
source of considerable oil wealth.40
Mack W. Delancey in Cameroon: Dependence and Independence, offers a
succinct construction of the Cameroonian society from the colonial epoch to
independence in 1960. Delancey examines the nature of Cameroon's triple colonial
experience under the Germans, French and British, as a backdrop to analyzing the
country's political, economic, social and cultural realities. He maintains that Cameroon,
like most other African countries at independence, faced similar problems, including:
inherited colonial, political and administrative institutions, which were incompatible with
the indigenous realities of the Cameroon people. The country also faced other problems,
including the lack of industry, underdeveloped infrastructures, low per capita income,
ethnic divisions throughout the territory, and her economy was dependent on a few
agricultural exports such as palm oil, cocoa and timber.41 Unlike in other African
countries, in Cameroon, it was a two-front struggle. First, there was internal struggle by
the government against the UPC, an anti-French movement which was against French
interference in Cameroon's affairs, and advocated independence and reunification where
nationalist struggles were against foreign domination for independence, in of the two
Cameroons. Second, was the struggle for independence from colonial rule.
40Mack D. Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence (Boulder: West
view Press, 1989), 1.
41Ibid., 99.
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Delancey also examines Cameroon's delicate political dynamics and the
implications for national unity. He discusses the schism between East and West
Cameroon as central to avoiding political destabilization. He also offers plausible
explanations for Cameroon's economic successes in the 1960s and 1970s and its decline
in the late 1980s. He argues that leadership change and the subsequent coup to topple
Paul Biya, the President, combined with mismanagement and external factors, account
for the country's economic decline.
Despite Delancey's excellent analysis, he falls short on his discussion on the
West Cameroon issue, aware that it is one of the most important issues in Cameroon
politics. He devotes just half a page on the Anglophone discussion, but nevertheless,
provides useful insights.42
Victor T. LeVine, like other prominent scholars of Cameroon has carried out
extensive research and published numerous books, articles, and monographs on the
political, economic, social and cultural issues in Cameroon. In his text, The Cameroon
Federal Republic. LeVine examines the evolution, challenges, and success of
Cameroon's Federal System, which emerged after reunification of the former French and
British-controlled territories (La Republique du Cameroon and Southern Cameroons) in
1961. He argues that Cameroon's federal structure succeeded as a stable system
compared to other African federations like Ethiopian-Eritrean, Mali, and Nigeria, which




The author also maintains however, that, despite Cameroon's success, the
system was riddled with some major problems and difficulties, especially in the disparity
in size, population, and economic growth between the relatively small former British
Southern Cameroons and the ten-times-larger former French Cameroons.43 Gwendolen
M. Carter, in her foreword ofthe text, illustrates this fact in the following observations:
No one would suggest that the Cameroon Federal Republic
is without serious strains and problems. No African-
controlled country is without such difficulties. But
Cameroon has successfully survived as a functioning
federal entity, in a period when many apparently more
fortunately endowed states have not.44
LeVine also examines Cameroon's complex political, economical and social
realities, which as he observes, reflects the country's exceptional social and ethnic
diversity.
In another text titled, The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence.
LeVine focuses on the processes, forces and factors that combined in defining the
political, social and cultural community of the Republic of Cameroon. In the first section
of the text, LeVine focuses on geography and socio-political influences in the country
during the pre-mandate period. In the second phase of the book, he devotes attention to
Cameroon's political metamorphosis under the League of Nations and later the United
Nations Trusteeship. The author admits that the locus of the text is on the French
Cameroon, however, he examines the rise of nationalism in the British Cameroons which
Victor T. LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1963).
Toreword by Gwendolen M. Carter, in Victor T. LeVine's The Cameroon
Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), vii-viii.
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is an integral component in understanding Cameroon's political reality. The author
also explores a range of other issues including "political" tribal or economically
functional groups to political parties.45 The author criticizes this study in the following
statement:
It may be argued with considerable justice, that greater attention
should have been given to such matters as economic
development. The impact ofthe French cultural presence in
the Cameroon, the personalities ofthe more important
Cameroonian leaders, and the growth and influence oftrade
unionism.4*
LeVine's texts without a doubt, offers succinct account of Cameroon's
political history, and the text serves as a foundation to our understanding of the country's
contemporary political realities.
Another individual whose scholarly contribution has significantly shed light
on Cameroon's politics is Rubin Neville. In his text, Cameroon: An African Federation,
he examines the development of the modern states in Africa with particular focus on
Cameroon. The author specifically explores the processes and circumstances which
combined in giving birth to the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Neville examines the
policies and institutions which emerged during the federal system and how these were
effectively utilized to bond East and West Cameroonians together.
The author offers a concise account of the early history of Cameroon,
reflecting on the interactions with the Bornu and Fulani empires and later, the Europeans
^Victor T. LeVine, The Cameroons: From Ma
Angeles, CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 1964), ix.
*Tbid., viii.
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through trade. Neville further examines the influence and impact of foreign presence
in Cameroon, focusing especially on the League of Nations, the United Nations, the
Germans, French and British. He argues that policies of these organizations and
countries had significant impact on the development of national consciousness in
Cameroon. Neville draws our attention to the problems and challenges in French
Cameroon perpetuated by the UPC before and after independence, as well as the
movement for unifying the former territories. Finally, the author surveys and scrutinizes
Cameroon's Federal Constitution, adopted after the Foumban and Yaounde conferences.
He argues that this constitution which was a reflection of constitution of La Republique
du Cameroon, was anything but federal. Neville's piece provides a sound background
through which contemporary political issues can be discussed and analyzed, especially on
the Southern Cameroon's issue.
Of all the works that have dealt with politics, particularly the fusion of the
former French and British Trust territories, Willard R. Johnson's work stands out
distinctly. In his text. The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary
Society. Johnson provides«a succinct account and analysis of the integration of the two
Cameroons (East and West), formerly under French and British Trusteeship. The author
begins by examining and discussing the concept of integration, focusing especially on the
processes that combined to yield success in Cameroon, as well as the effects of
integration on West Cameroon. Johnson forcefully and convincingly argues that
Cameroon, unlike other African or developing countries with heterogenous ethnic
affinities, was able to reunite because of the determination of its leadership and also
desire of the citizens. He, nevertheless, points out some of the major challenges faced by
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the country, including the stark uneven rates and levels of development in the two
regions, as well as ethnic rivalries and religious competition.47 Added to this myriad of
internal discontinuities, Johnson further notes that Cameroon had to deal with alien
colonial legacies ofFrance and Great Britain.
Besides the inherent problem of inequality identified by the author as a major
challenge faced by West Cameroon as a result of integration, he nevertheless, expresses
concern about lack of solidarity and unanimity among West Cameroonians. This
anomaly, he points out, is rooted in economic and modern social development disparities
between the coastal/forest people (Southwest) and the grassfield people (Northwest), with
the former endowed with abundant natural resources. Johnson acknowledges that despite
the difficulties, the case of Cameroon remains unique in Africa where the leadership
successfully combined nation-building and state-building to operate successfully.48
Despite Johnson painstaking efforts in researching, analyzing and discussing
political integration in Cameroon, it should be pointed out that the work, nevertheless,
has some flaws. He devotes considerable amount of time and space to discuss and
elaborate on his theoretical literature on political integration and conflict theory. This,
author himself acknowledges as a flaw in his foreword.49 He identifies the widening
economic and social gap between Southern Cameroonians (Southwest and Northwest),
but fails to offer or suggest any amicable solutions in dealing with this problem.
47Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a




Furthermore, he offers no real alternatives in dealing with internal discontinuities in
the country such as ethnic rivalry, religious competition and regionalism. As a final note,
it should be pointed out that the title, notwithstanding, this text's narrative and analysis,
does not extend beyond 1970, when the "real" integration of East and West Cameroon
occurred in 1972. This was two years after publication ofJohnson's excellent text.
Nicolas Van de Walle's "Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with
an illustration from Cameroon," focuses on politics and the economy as major levels to
political reform in Africa, particularly in Cameroon. Van de Walle's piece is also an
important contribution to the growing body of literature on Cameroon's economic
malfunction which began in the mid-1980s, resulting in protests and demand for political
reforms in the 1990s. This article further constitutes a wider theoretical and comparative
examination of the political economy of development and decline in Africa.30 He
maintains that Cameroon's transition from one-party rule to multiparty democracy was
triggered by continued economic difficulties, and attributes this dismal economic
performance on two key factors including external exigencies and internal
mismanagement. Implementation of austerity measures to revamp the economy through
the infamous IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) exacerbated
citizens frustrations.
Van de Walle's fundamental premise, however is that, Cameroon's economic
decline and subsequent demands for political reform cannot be understood outside the
'"Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with an
illustration from Cameroon," in Jennifer Winder (ed.) Economic Change and Political
Liberalization in Africa (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994),
130.
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political process including public policy matters.31 He argues that sharp decline in
commodity prices and rapid depreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the French Franc,
resulting in a 45 percent deterioration of the country's terms of trade in 1987-1988,
remains one of the major causes of the crisis.52 Internal corruption, misappropriation of
funds, the conflict between Ahidjo and Biya in 1983, and the resultant coup d'etat of
April 6, 1984, all combined as major factors in Cameroon's economic decline. The
author points out that through Biya emerged victorious in the power/struggle, the price
for victory was, however, enormous and far-reaching. He argues that Biya had to divert
the country's merger resources to appease those who stood by and supported his regime,
particularly the army.33
Another important element responsible for Cameroon's economic decline and
demands for political reforms is the prevalence of what the author terms
"Neopatrimonialism." Van de Walle points out that in this regime, the leader makes no
distinction between his own private property and that of the public or state.34 He points
out that the leader develops a sophisticated network of patron-client relations in which
the client provides loyalty and support for the regime, in return to access to state
resources. This strategy, Van de Walle contends, has been used extensively by most






Cameroon, prevent factional and/or ethnic divides. It also helped in maintaining
political stability and predictable economic growth. However, with dwindling state
resources, these leaders, including Paul Biya of Cameroon, could not operate these
patron-client networks effectively. This resulted in defections of top elites who joined
with other citizens to demand for reforms.
The author argues that Cameroon's transition from one-party rule to
multiparty democracy was stifled by a host of factors including a weak or absence of civil
society. He reveals this in the following: "In Cameroon, there are simply no civil
associations with significant organizational power."53 He blames this absence on the
country's premier leader, Ahmadou Ahidjo, for destroying these organizations during his
reign in the past two decades.
Van de Walle is perhaps the only scholar who has attempted to factor the
coup d'etat of 1984 in Cameroon as a major contributor to the country's economic crisis.
Despite this effort, however, he failed to expand on, or elaborate on the extent the
struggle had on the psyche of the country or the role it played in preventing foreign
capital in Cameroon. Furthermore, his emphasis and description of neopatrimonal
regime adds a new perspective to our analysis and understanding of the economic and
political crisis in Cameroon, as well as Africa.
Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle in "Popular Protest and Political
Reform in Africa," also share the view that demands for democratic reforms in Africa
and other developing regions was not engineered solely by economic circumstances, but
35Ibid., 151.
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also by other external exigencies.56 They maintain that the end ofthe Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union played a lead role in precipitating demands for political
reforms in the Eastern European states. This "wave of change", they argue, transcended
the political and geographical borders of Eastern Europe to Africa, where citizens
demanded transparency, accountability, and participation in the political process from
their various governments.
Joseph Takougang, however, disagrees with Bratton and Van de Walle's
thesis with regards to Cameroon. In his article, "Cameroon: Biya and Incremental
Reform, Takougang forcefully and convincingly argues that before the "wind of change"
started blowing across Eastern Europe and Africa, President Biya ofCameroon had put in
motion the democratic process when he assumed power in November 1982." Takougang
further argues that through Biya's speeches, it was evident that the leader was prepared to
depart from his predecessor's autocratic grip on power. He points out, for example, the
leader's determination to create a more liberal and "democratic" society in which
tolerance, individual freedom, and free exchange of ideas would flow.38
The author discusses Biya's early presidency, contrasting the leader's style
with his predecessor. Although Takougang acknowledges early on that Biya was the
driving force behind the democratic process in Cameroon, he, nevertheless questions the
^Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political
Reform in Africa," Comparative Politics. 24 (1992):419-442.
"Joseph Takougang, "Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform" in John F. Clark
and David E. Gardinier eds. Political Reform in Francophone Africa (Boulder, CO: West
view Pres, 1997). 162.
MSee Paul Biya, Communal Liberalism (London: MacMillan, 1987), 36-38.
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leader's motives. He argues that Biya's interest in espousing democratic ideals were
self-seeking, using this strategy to consolidate his hold on power than introducing
genuine democratic reforms.59 He adds that Biya's democratic initiatives were more
symbolic than real particularly in the 1980s. The author notes that ideological differences
among the various opposition groups in Cameroon hindered any efforts by these groups
to force Biya's regime to institute more meaningful changes in the country.
Although he mentions the "Anglophone factor" as a major challenge to
Biya's regime, he falls short of elaborating on this issue, neither does he tell us much
about internal dynamics among the Anglophones, (Northwest and Southwest). Overall,
his piece provides a concise overview of Cameroon's political transformation from 1982
to 1996.
Definition ofkey Concepts
Our goal in this section is to define some ofthe key terms, which we have used in the
study. This is not an exhaustive examination of all the concepts, but rather, an attempt to
shed light on some ofterms we employed in the study, to enhance our understanding of
the subject matter.
Colonialism
Kwame Nkrumah defines colonialism as the policy by which a foreign power
binds territories to herself through political ties with the goal of advancing its economic
interest.60 Colonialism brought under its umbrella a large number of distinct cultures,
^Joseph Takougang, "Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform," 168.
"Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms ofKwame Nkrumah (London: PanafBooks LTD,
1967), 34.
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tribal linkages, and in some cases nationalities under the control of a superior central
authority. European colonialism, as Christopher Clapham has indicated, imposed
European dominance on exotic societies. The overall basis of colonialism was
technology, and the principal motive was economic.61 Colonialism established territories
and territorial boundaries where none existed. This system also set up political and
administrative units which were hierarchical in nature. The political and administrative
structures were designed to compliment each other in the colonies. While the
administrative system was highly centralized and authoritarian, force was the basis for
political order.62 Colonialism also introduced in the colonies colonial economy as well as
alien social attitudes, institutions, and forms of communication between the center and
the periphery. This system achieved its dual goals of external penetration perpetuated by
the developed world, and internal dependence ofthe Third World on the industrialized or
Western world. Colonialism is blamed for some ofthe major problems in the developing
countries including regional and ethnic conflicts, economic dependency, administrative
systems, which are centralized, authoritarian, and repressive. All these characteristics are
evident in Cameroon today and are the basis of some of the internal skirmishes,
cleavages, and confrontations in the country.
"Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison,




Imperialism is defined as "a relationship of effective dominance or control,
political or economical, direct or indirect of one nation over another." It is a system that
splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony
of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest or conflict of interest.63
This iniquitous system has generated intense hatred and conflicts, resulting in brutal
assault of one nation against another. Imperialism, and now, Neo-Colonialism has
employed several propaganda strategies designed to exploit differences in ethnic,
cultural, religious and political ideology among dominated subjects.
Neocolonialism
In the 1980s, the last vestiges of colonialism ended in Africa, with Zimbabwe
gaining its independence. In its place, however, a new form of domination emerged,
known as neo-colonialism. As its name suggests, neo-colonialism is a new form of
colonialism, in which the former colony in essence is independent, but in reality, its
economical and political matters are shaped directly from outside.
This system of domination and control is based on the principle of breaking
former large colonial territories into small or petty non-viable states, which are not
capable of independent development. As expressed by the dependency school, neo
colonialism has now replaced the direct exploitation and control of former colonies
"Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory ofImperialism," in Transnational
Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political Economy, by George
Modelski, ed. (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979), 158.
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(imperialism). It serves as an indirect source of control and exploitation for capitalism,
using indigenous Third World middlemen, compradors, petit bourgeoisie, or elites, to
achieve its goals of cheap labor, natural resources, and access to markets. This form of
colonialism has established a hierarchical structure of few rich states and numerous
impoverished states, generally referred to as Third World or LDC.
The goal of neo-colonialism is to encourage reliance of less developed states
on the former imperial power for defense, economic prosperity, as well as national
security. Typically, the economic and financial systems of these states, particularly
former French colonies in Africa have been linked directly to France. This system,
needless to say, has necessitated the establishment of welfare state in the Third World.
The increasing independence of the imperialist system on neo-colonialist exploitation on
an international scale through the division of labor, renders its existence so precarious,
and makes its future very uncertain. As Nkrumah puts it, neo-colonialism has no
permanent friends its only companions are its interests.
Neocolonialism's impact on Third World countries is severe and far-
reaching. A major consequence of this system is that foreign capital is used for the
exploitation of the people and resources rather than for their development. Investment
under this system increases, rather than bridge the gap between the poor and rich, hence,
allowing the masses to be exploited beyond the "safe limits of exploitation." According
to George Ayitteh, African despots use neo-colonialism to enhance their own personal
gains and goals.64 This is the worst form of imperialism, Nkrumah remarks, 'To those
"George B. N. Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
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who practice it, it means power to exploit and oppress without the responsibility to
those exploited, and to the victims it means exploitation without redress."63 In the case of
Cameroon, West Cameroonians believe French capital has been used extensively to
exploit the resources of the region, especially oil and timber, without developing these
areas.
Internal Colonialism
Colonialism, as we alluded to earlier, was a direct external political system of
domination by the Europeans and other Western countries over people ofthe Third world
or developing countries. Mexican sociologist Pablo Gonzalez Casanoa has postulated
that "internal colonialism" prevails in nations today, especially in countries of the Third
World. He argues that the same conditions of traditional colonialism continues to
exacerbate itself in these countries, including monopoly and dependence perpetuated by
the metropolis over the outskirts, and creating in "his words, a deformation of the native
economy and decapitalization." Furthermore, internal colonialism has a major impact on
the relations ofproduction and social control. It has increased internal exploitation of the
subordinate groups by the dominant groups plundering resources. Internal colonialism
has contributed to poverty, backwardness, and accentuated low productivity. I t has
further marginalized certain portions of societies, creating massive unemployment, poor
communication networks, and stirred internal differences to achieve certain predictable
political outcomes. Internal colonialism, in my view, is the major reason Anglophones in
^wame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism the Last Stage ofImperialism (London:
PanafBooks Ltd., 1965), xi.
Cameroon are demanding alternative solutions to their current predicament, vis-a-vis
Francophones.
Nation and State
The term nation-state have often been used loosely as synonyms, in most
instances, linked to the word "country." In ordinary conversations, individuals use the
words "country", "state", and "nation" to refer to the same thing. However, to political
scientists, a "nation" and a "state" have more succinct meanings.
Nation
A nation, according to Shively, is "a large group of people who are bound together and
recognize a similarity among themselves because ofa common culture; in particular
common language in creating nationhood."64 Karl Deutsch and Walker Connor define a
nation as:
A named human population sharing a historical territory, com
mon memories and myths oforigin, a mass, standardized public
culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and com
mon legal rights and duties for all members ofthe collectivity.67
The above definition summarizes long and complex discussions of the many
definitions ofa "nation." Nations are often times, though not all the time, connected with
political boundaries ofthe state.
1995 30 PhilHpS Shively» P0WCT md Choice: An Tntmdiintkm to Political
p i<S?Py^ nd S°™1 Communication 2nd ed. (New York: MIT
Press, 1966) Ol 1 and Connor Walker, "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic
group1S • • Ethnic and Racial ShiHi»« i:4 (i978)f 377.400.
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State
A state, on the other hand, is "a political unit that has ultimate sovereignty;
that is, a political unit that has ultimate responsibility for the conduct of its own affairs."68
A composite definition of this term will include the following elements: (1) A state is a
set of institutions which possess the means of violence and coercion; (2) These
institutions are in principle responsible for and control a geographically bounded
territory, often called society; and (3) The rule-making decisions within the territory are
monopolized by the state.69
Although there appears to be an overlap between these two concepts in terms
of common territorial boundaries and citizenship, some clear differences can be
descended. While a nation defines and legitimizes politics in terms of common culture,
memories, myths, language, and history, a state is viewed as containing the legal and
institutional elements. The state has autonomous public institutions which are
differentiated from other social institutions, through exercise of legitimate violence
against its people.
Nationalism
This is a combination of social and psychological forces that sprang from
unique cultural and historical factors to provide unity to a given people, through a sense
of belonging. Nationalism brings together people who possess common cultural,
linguistic, racial, historical and geographical characteristics or experiences. It is a
. Phillips Shively, 30.
""John A. Hall, "State" in Joel Krieger ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of
the World. (New York Oxford University Press, 1993), 878.
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relatively modern concept, which emerged with the creation of the modern nation-
state. According to W. Phillips Shively, the passionate identification with the state is
called "nationalism." Shively lucidly maintains that like any passion, nationalism can
make people noble or base. Nationalism, he adds, is undeniably convenient for
governments, regardless whether it makes people noble or ignoble.70 Many reasons have
been advanced why governments appeal to nationalism, including obedience and
allegiance to a single government of the state, and fighting for, or defending the state
against its enemies. Governments also encourage nationalism in heterogeneous societies
possessing different ethnic, religious, racial, and historical backgrounds. From a
geopolitical perspective, nationalism may be seen as an ambiguous ideology, which can
be aggressive and expansionist within and outside the borders of the state. This concept
can serve as a peace-keeping mechanism as well as integrating culturally differentiated
groups in a nation-state.71 Thomas Hylland Eriksen succinctly notes that:
While nationalism emphasizes equality and human rights with
its polity, it paradoxically appeals to particularism, refusing
noncitizen or culturally deviant citizens full human rights and,
in extreme cases, refusing them membership in the community
ofhumans.72
70W. Phillips Shively, Power and Choice: An Introduction to Political Science (4th
ed.) (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 27.
"Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Ethnicity and Nationalism, in H. B. McCullough
(ed.) Political Ideologies and Political Philosophies 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thompson
Educational Publishing, Inc., 1995), 176.
"Anthony Giddens, "Nation-States and Violence" in A. Giddens Social Theory
and Modern Sociology (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), 166-182.
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Eriksen further states that in circumstances where the nation-state has succeeded
ideologically, its populations had become nationalists and their way of life also grown
with the demands of nation-state and supported this growth.
Conversely, where nationalism fails to convince the inhabitants, the state has
resorted to violence or threat of violence to prevent fission (that is, the potential to
disintegrate or secede from the state).73 Ethnic and region minorities have in the past
been absorbed by the dominant society through assimilation or outright annihilation. In
the case of Cameroon, the strategy of the dominant society was to assimilate the two
Anglophone Provinces of Northwest to the Western Province and the Southwest to the
Littoral Province.74
Nationalism was instrumental in the struggle for freedom against imperialist
and colonialist presence in most developing countries, especially in Africa. Today, it
appears it is a divisive mechanism especially since the end of the Cold War and the
collapse ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989.
Plebiscite
This is a voting process by qualified citizens of a state to decide on some
important public question. This vote allows citizens in a political unit to determine their
autonomy or affiliation with another country. In the case of Cameroon under United
Nations Trusteeship, the question was whether the British Cameroons, that is, Northern
and Southern Cameroons wanted to join independent Nigeria or Cameroun Republic. On
n ,• • '3Th°maS.HyIIand Erikson, "Ethnicity and Nationalism," in H.B. McCullough ed
Political Ideologies and Political Philosophic <i qqs) i 7g_j 70
MTheBuea Declaration: All Anglophone Conference (Buea, April 2-3,1993), 17.
February 11, I960, Southern Cameroons voted overwhelmingly to rejoin Cameroun
Republic while Northern Cameroons vote decisively to join Nigeria.
Federalism
A federal system ofgovernment is a system made up of a number of regional
governments which have democratic and pluralist poUtical systems that provide their
citizens access to participation as well as opportunities at the national and state levels." It
is, according to Pierre Elliot Trudeau, a compromise and a fact. A compromise in the
sense that if national consensus on all matters are not attainable, the area of consensus is
reduced in order that consensus on some other things or issues can be reached.
Federalism is also viewed as a fact or quasi-treaty, principally because the terms of a
compromise reached cannot be changed or altered unilaterally by one party.74 Self-
determination, according to advocates, is the crux of the federal system. Proponents
plausibly argue that in nations with heterogeneous makeup, a federal system will serve to
protect citizens, minority groups as well as regions from central tyranny. They further
argue that this system will increase participation of citizens in the political process,
encourage innovation, and strengthen community identity and values." Opponents of the
federal system argue that the system is plagued with many pitfalls, including slowness to
d iv ^f^ P- Nathan- "Federalism" in Joel Krieger ed. The Oxford rnmnanmn t0
Politics ofthe World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 296
v IT]61"? E?iOt TrudeaU-<CNational ™d Federalism" in H. B. McCullough, ed
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respond to new opportunities and challenges and difficulties that arise due to decision-
making and implementation by the government.
The objective of federalism is to reconcile unity and diversity especially in
societies with multi-ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds. Cameroon's adoption of
a federal system from 1962-1972, was principally to balance the interest of Anglophones
with their Francophone counterparts as well as serve the interest of various ethnic entities
in the country.
Ethnicity
Ethnicity refers to a subjective perception of common origins, historical
memories, ties and aspirations. Ethnic group pertains to organized activities by persons
linked by a consciousness of a special identity, a sense of peoplehood, and has its
foundations in the combined remembrance. This concept has played both positive and
negative roles in different societies. It has served as a unifying or cohesive mechanism in
some, and in others like Rwanda, Somalia, and former Yugoslavia, it has become an
explosive and divisive issue. Cameroon, as I stated earlier in the study, is perhaps the
most ethnically diverse country in Africa with about 250 different ethnic groups speaking
different ethnic tongues. Although Cameroon has not witnessed wide scale ethnic
skirmhes as other countries mentioned above, there is no denying that this potential exist,
and may explode at any given period. In the early days after independence, ethnic
struggles between the Bamelikes and the Bakossi, the Kirdi of the north and the Fulbe,
and the Bamelikes and the people of Douala are just some examples. Ethnicity plays an
important role in the political and economic decision making of leaders in Africa,
particularly in Cameroon. One strategy used by leadership in Cameroon to wield the
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diverse ethnic population together, especially during president Ahidjo's reign, was
through ethnic balancing. According to Milton J. Esman, this strategy required the
appointment of members of an ethnic entity, considered 'left out', and also contained
provision of jobs, contracts, appointment to high and visible political positions and
infrastructural investment etc.78
When a regime is dominated by a single ethnic group such as the Betis in the
current administration in Cameroon, advantage flows disproportionately to the other
constituencies in the country, resulting in some instances to alienation and rebellion.
Although Ahidjo filled most of the key strategic ministerial and security positions with
people from his ethnic background, he nevertheless incorporated members of other
affinities in the government. He craftily utilized a combination of consociational devices
as proportionality in the allocation of benefits and resources to other ethnic groups and
regions in the country. Through this strategy and the use of state apparatus of violence,
Ahidjo was able to contain ethnic hostilities during his twenty two years in power. On
the other hand, there is wide perception that Biya's inability to reach out to other ethnic
groups as his mentor did, has resulted in bitterness, frustration, and disgust among many
ethnic groups not only in West Cameroon, but in the Francophones zones. This may be a
possible reason why some Francophones joined the opposition Social Democratic Front
(SDF), an Anglophone political party to oust Biya from power in 1992. It is not
surprising, therefore, for most Cameroonians to blame president Biya and his Beti
members for the economic catastrophe in the country.
7*Milton J. Esman, Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and
Strategies (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press Inc., 1991), 28-29.
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Patron-Client Relations
This is a reciprocal exchange of two key factors with disproportionate or
unequal exchange powers. This form of political exchange, according to April and
Donald Gordon, became a useful tool for post-independent African leaders. With secured
economic resources, African leaders including Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon and later
his successor Biya, used patronage as the means of distributing limited resources in a
discretionary manner. These leaders, like their counterparts in other African countries,
swapped political favors such as jobs, award of lucrative government contracts, issue of
import-export licenses, tax exemptions, appointments to high political and governmental
offices, etc., to clients to muster support for the regime. They also utilized other
mechanisms such as building schools, hospitals, roads, providing free government
houses, automobiles, and making access to monetary resources available to clients79. This
relationship assured the patron of loyal support and tied the clients firmly to the leader.
As Catherine Boone has observed, this system of control served to consolidate the regime
by offering access to government resources in exchange for political acquiescence.80 The
success of these regimes depended on continued availability of economic resources. But
"April and Donald Gordon, Understanding Contemporary Africa. 68-69.
"Catherine Boone," State and Ruling Classes in Post-Colonial Africa: The
Enduring Contradictions ofPower." Paper presented at the 33rd Annual meeting ofthe
African Studies Association (Baltimore, November 1-4,1992), 37.
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as Hyden and Bratton have noted, continued economic deterioration in Africa and
Cameroon, slash back in foreign aid, imposition of economic austerity measures, and
market reforms by the World Bank and IMF, all combined to undermine patronage
politics in authoritarian regimes by starving its participants ofresources.81
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
Structural Adjustment Programs or (SAP) as it is commonly referred to, is a
conscious strategy by the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the
International Monetary fund (IMF) to socially transform societies in the Third World,
particularly Africa. This program, ties loans needed by developing countries to offset
deficits to draconian conditions. From a macroeconomic perspective, adjustment implies
the adoption of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies to achieve external stability.
According to John Gershman, SAP encompasses political and economic implications,
and represents the substance of the now-infamous package of neo-liberal economic
policies.82 The key objectives of this program include: reduction in budget deficit by
laying off government employees, freezing of wages, lowering oftaxes on higher income
"Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa. 1992,47.
MJohn Gershman, 'The Free Trade Connection,"in 50 Years is Enough: The Case
Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, by Kevin Danaher, ed.
(Boston, MA: 1994), 25-26.
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ecipients, elimination of foreign exchange controls and import licenses, devaluation of
currency to lower real costs, and prices to sell more exports.83
Decline in Cameroon's economy resulted in the government accepting the
stringent and draconian recourse by the Bank and Fund, with French encouragement.
Cameroon, therefore, joined the other African countries in the ritual dance of Structural
Adjustment Programs in 1987. This program has had perhaps more negative toll on
Cameroonians economically, socially, culturally, and politically than its intent to
ameliorate the economy. On a positive note however, this program has encouraged
Cameroonians to work for themselves rather rely exclusively on the government, as was
the case in the past. Structural Adjustment Programs plus the wave of democratization
that swept through Eastern Europe, and later in Africa, are without a doubt, major factors
in the transformation of politics in Cameroon Anglophone pressure on the government in
Yaounde.
Governance
Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton define governance as the management of regime
relations, that is, the rules that set the framework for the conduct of politics.84 The World
Bank defines governance as "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's
affairs." The Bank specifically views extensive personalization of power, the denial of
fundamental human rights, widespread corruption, and the prevalence of unelected and
raAnn Seidman and Frederick Anang, ed. 21st Century Africa: Towards a New
Vision of Self-Sustained Development (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1992),
26-27.
"Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa, ed.
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), x.
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unaccountable officials as important setbacks to progress in Africa. The Bank further
contends that good governance results in less unpredictability and uncertainty in policy,
administration as well as guarantees the rule of law, transparency and accountability to
representative bodies.85 As shown above, the term generally refers to the running of a
government or other organizations or entity. With increasing problems in the developing
countries in recent years, especially in Africa, this concept has been elevated in academic
circles, especially in literature relating to development. Statist theorists have argued
persistently that political and economic problems in Africa are basically problems
relating to poor governance.
The issue of governance attracted the Bank's attention and other
industrialized countries like the United States only after dramatic changes took place in
the world, beginning in 1989, in Eastern Europe. Thomas Gallaghy and John Ravenbill
argue that the Western industrial democracies used governance to foster political
conditionalities, thus promoting democracy in countries with authoritarian regimes.86
Like other African countries, there is no denying that the problem ofpoor governance has
contributed immensely to the difficulties in Cameroon. However, exclusive focus on
governance as suggested by some African scholars and statist theorists, as the most
significant factor responsible for Africa's economic decline, including Cameroon, misses
the point altogether. This exclusive focus on governance I might add fails to reveal the
"'World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989), 60-61.
wThomas M. Gallaghy and John Ravenhill, Hemmed In: response to Africa's
Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 478.
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link between African economies vis-a-vis the industrialized countries and the impact
decisions taken by these countries have on Africa, especially Cameroon. Although we
acknowledge the problem of poor governance as a road-block to African progress, it is
not [the] only problem.
Organization of Study
This study consists of eight chapters, organized as follows: Chapter I
introduces us to the study, with an overview of dominant-subordinate relations from a
global perspective, followed by emphasis on Cameroon. The chapter comprises the
statement of the problem,, main proposition, the theoretical and conceptual framework,
significance of the study as well as methodology. Furthermore, study design, data
collection, review ofrelated literature and definition of concepts are examined.
Chapter II presents a brief overview of Cameroon's historic past, its
geographic characteristics, cultural and societal features, as well as religion. The chapter
also examines Southern Cameroons relations with the British, as well as her role and
influence as part of Nigeria. The chapter further reviews events leading to re-unification
ofFrench and British Cameroons, and formation ofa federation.
Chapter III examines political integration of the two Cameroons- East and
West Cameroon, and how this move re-reinforced domination of the former over the
latter. It explores various elements used by the "center" to dominate the "periphery".
Chapter IV looks at leadership succession, Ahidjo-Biya, and steps taken by
Ahidjo to ensure a smooth transition. Attention is given to leadership styles of Ahmadou
Ahidjo and his successor, Biya, and also the rift between the two leader, and their
implications for the country.
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Chapter V explores Biya's attempts to reform Cameroon, the challenges
and opportunities he encountered in this process. The internal and external factors are
scrutinized, including the Anglophone Phenomenon.
Chapter VI examines the factors or circumstances responsible for
Cameroon's economic decline, and attempts by the government and donors, particularly
the IMF and World Bank, to reform the country's economy. Focus on Structural
Adjustment Program is explored, as well as its political, economic, and social
implications for the country, especially for Anglophones.
Chapter VII deals with discord in Anglophone Cameroon, particularly,
between the grassfield people of Northwest and the coastal/forest people of Southwest
provinces. The chapter looks at natural, political and economic factors, and how these
have converged to hinder, rather than enhance solidarity among the Anglophone
minority.
Chapter Vm presents a summary of the study, including the findings,
conclusions drawn and some suggestions for further research
CHAPTER n
OVERVIEW OF CAMEROON
This chapter provides an overview of Cameroon's early history, beginning
with Portuguese explorations in 1472, to German proclamation and annexation in 1884.
The chapter also examines the physical characteristics ofthe country, its people, and their
activities. A glimpse of the country's intricate political evolution is discussed, with
attention to its triple colonial heritage as well as the role and influence of the League of
Nations and United Nations in its early development. Considerable attention is paid to
British activities in British Cameroons, and argues in the end that, Southern Cameroons'
peripheral or substate status was the outcome of British disinterest in the region.
Furthermore, the chapter illuminates political developments in Southern Cameroons, as
part of the colony of Nigeria, as well, the as events leading to reunification of the two
Cameroons. This chapter serves as the foundation to our analysis and understanding of
center-periphery relations in contemporary Cameroon.
Cameroon has undergone major geopolitical transformations in the past one
hundred and fifteen years, stretching back to the Conference ofBerlin in 1884. Decisions
reached at this conference to partition and annex Africa had major implications for each
country, and the continent as a whole. As the case of Cameroon demonstrates, the
presence of three European powers in the territory—the Germans, the French, and the
British within a period of seventy-six years (1884-1960), transformed the physical
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geography of the territory as well as the social, cultural, and ethnic interaction patterns
ofthe people.
Geography
Cameroon is strategically and conveniently located at the junction or
crossroad of two distinct zones in Africa. This triangle shaped nation stretches
northwards from the Bight of Biafra to Lake Chad and the fringes of the Great Sahara
Desert. It also occupies the area between the western coastline and the equatorial states
ofthe south.1
Cameroon is bordered on the north by Chad, east by Central African
Republic, west by Nigeria, and south by Rio Muni, Gabon, Congo, and Equatorial
Guinea. The country serves as the gate-way to some of its landlocked neighbors, Chad
and Central African Republic. With the exception of Nigeria on the western side, and
Equatorial Guinea on the south-western edge, Cameroon is virtually in the midst of
French-speaking colonies. Melville Herkovits has succinctly stated that Cameroon is not
only the melting place of northern, western, and central geographic regions, it is also the
confluence of the great African culture areas: Guinea coast, Western Sudanic and the
Congo.2 The skewed shape of Cameroon, reflects the country's intricate political history,
which had been shaped and reshaped over the centuries, first, by the Europeans, including
'Neville Rubin, Cameroon: An African Federation (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1971), 4.
Melville Herkovits," People and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa," The Annals.
Vol. 298 (March, 1995), 11-20; The Human factor in Changing Africa (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 51-112, passim.
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the Germans, French, and British, as well as by internal struggles among competing
ethnic and religious groups.
Cameroon has a land area of (475,442 sq. km) or (183,569 sq. miles), with an
estimated population of 14,262,000 inhabitants.3 The country is geographically
diversified, with sharp contrast in its topography, vegetation and climatic conditions.
Victor T. LeVine has distinguished five geographic zones in the country, including the
western mountain region, the coastal forest plain, the inland forest plateaux, the
Adamawa plateaux region, and the Savannah of the north.4 The variation in rainfall,
humidity, as well as the topography of the region determines to a large extent, the
economic and agricultural activities of the inhabitants. Furthermore, Cameroon's
ecological and geographical conditions have all combined to produce what Mark
Delancey has characterized as "a great variation of cultures within the country."
Delancey contends that Cameroon is "a microcosm" of Africa, an 'Africa in miniature,'
in which one finds all the major cultural types in the continent.3 This configuration of
diverse geographic, demographic, religious, ethnic and regional differences combine to
account for the complex political development ofthe country. Any analysis of Cameroon
in terms of its geopolitical, social, and cultural, and economic development without focus
on ethnicity, religion, and issues of regionalism will make such an analysis, skewed and
unsatisfactory.
3F. Jeffress Ramsay, "Cameroon" in Global Studies: Africa (seventh ed),
(Connecticut: McGraw Hill, 1997), 72.
"Victor T. LeVine, The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence. 3.
5Mark W. Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence. 95-96.
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Society and Culture
Cameroon is a heterogeneous country, with a mosaic of ethnic affinities.
There are an estimated 250 different ethnic groups in the country, speaking about 80
different languages besides English and French as the official languages. Interestingly,
no one of these ethnic groups claims absolute majority, or assumes a dominant role as
minority. Some of these ethnic groups as Delancey has suggested, were invented by the
colonial rulers through ignorance, to facilitate their colonial administrative process. He
further argues that other ethnic groups emerged largely as a result of urban migration,
economic competition, and social change within the society.6 Some of the dominant
political ethnic groups include: the Fulbe of the north, comprising of the Moslems.
However, a majority of the northern population is neither Fulbe nor are they Moslems.
This largely non Fulbe ethnic population is called "Kirdi," who have suffered Fulbe
domination and exploitation. In the southern regions there are also competing ethnic
entities such as the Bamilekes. Population density, entrepreneurial abilities, and
economic motivations of this group has pushed them out of their region (western
province), to seek economic and agricultural fortunes in other areas of the country. This
has resulted at times in serious conflicts with opposing ethnic groups, especially the
Bakossi ethnic population in the Southwest province of Cameroon. The Bamilekes have
also had confrontations with the people of Douala, and had been linked according to
sources, to the UPC movement, a pro-communist and anti-French organization, before,
and shortly after independence. Other influential ethnic groups that have played key
'Ibid., 96.
roles in the politics of Cameroon include the Fang group; which includes the Ewondos"
Betis. the Eton, and the Bulu. The Fang-Beti people according ,„ Eyongetah Tambi and
Robert Brian, occupy the Sanaga region, extending to Gabon.' The Betis currently
control the government ofCameroon, with Paul Biya, the president, as their leader. Other
ethnic groups in the country play relatively minor roles in influencing political power in
Cameroon.
Religion
Cameroon also has a heterogeneous religious population, which has not only
played a key role in the pohtics of country, bu, has, on some occasions stirred conflict,
and confirmation especially with the Ahidjo government. Three major reHgioui
categories exist in Cameroon, including Islam, Christianity, and the local, or indigenous
belief systems. Uneasiness between the Moslem north, and Christian south has been
contemious for a while. Ahmadou Ahidjo, the president, who was from the Moslem
north, had major confrontations with some southern Christians, especially with Andre
Mbida, the firs. Prime Minister ofEast Cameroon. Jus, as no particular ethnic group has
total dominance in the country, so ,00 no religion claims dominance. According ,0 Ndiva
Kofele-Kale, the membership of the major foreign religions c», across several ethnic
lines- Crawford Young has eloquently stattd that 'Wigion in Cameroon is not the
primary basis of politically relevant collective identity." Despite some residual flares7"
with the government, religion in Cameroon has not generated the phenomenon of
'Islamic brotherhood' that one finds in other countries like Senegal and Nigeria," nor has
it provoked, according to Cruise O'Brian and Donald B., the kind of intense political
rivalry among groups that one witnesses in countries like India." Despite these
observations, i, should be pointed out that north-south hostilities continue to permeate
Cameroon society on religious basis. Some evidence exists to support confrontations in
the country, on north -souft basis. The replacement ofAndre Mbida, a staunch Christian,
and Catholic, from the south, by Ahidjo, a Muslim leader, attest to this fact Also, the
suppression ofa southern radical movement, the UPC, with French assistance, by Ahidjo,
only reinforced and added substance to Prouzefs position of the seriousness of north-
south disaffection." The deportation of the editor of a Catholic newspaper, L
e, in !962, for criticizing the leadership and his regime exacerbated the
already tense atmosphere between a northern Muslim president, against the southern
Catholic church. The government of Ahidjo charged the editor, who was a Catholic
^ (Madis°"
(CambridiCMCABf?™an:Muslim Brotherhoods and th.
Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1970).
Press, 197.T """ ^"»"*» "f *■»■* ««»* Clarendon
priest ofpublishing stories and materials considered harmful to the state " Besides the"
differences alluded to earlier between the north and south on religious grounds, there
were other areas of disparity between the north and south. Economically, educationally,
and in regards to infra structural development, the north was less developed. Delancey
has noted that this region received less attention from the colonial rulers for many
reasons, which include: its distance from the sea, and because the region was ho, for
European settlement The area's backwardness a, independence, resulted in a movement
by the northern leadership to remain under colonial rule, while the south moved forward
with independent" I should point out however tha, some areas in the south were
equally depressed and underdeveloped as the north. The Easten, region continues to lag
behind the rest ofthe nation today, in economic and infrastructure development.
Regional disparity in the context of this study, does not dwell so much on
north, south, east, or west basis, but between the former Eas, Cameroon and former West
Cameroon. The concerns raised by the Anglophone minority ofunequal treatment by the
Francophones has inflamed debates among some Anglophone miUtams and elites to
secede from the union. This circumstance is perhaps, one of the biggest challenges
facing the government in Yaounde, and continues to P.ague the relationship of the two
entities.
"Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence anH TnHT^fnrr 98
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History and Political Developments
Before the Germans ventured into Kamerun with formal political rule in
1884, many other European interests had penetrated the territory, and interacted with the
indigents through trade. The Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Dutch had established and
managed important trading operations for more than two and a half centuries before the
Germans proclaimed the territory as their protectorate. In 1472, Portuguese explorers
penetrated the interiors of Cameroon through the Wouri River in Douala. The explorers
were surprised by the abundant variety of "prawns" in the river, and named it "Rio dos
Cameroes," literally meaning "river of prawns." It is believed the current name
Cameroon (British), Cameroun (French) or Kamerun (German) originated with the
discovery ofprawns.
The Berlin Conference of 1884 which was the springboard for European
imperialism in the Third World, especially Africa, resulted in the scramble and ultimate
partition of Africa. Present day Cameroon was declared a permanent German
protectorate and named Kamerun. German rule in Kamerun lasted about thirty years,
from 1884 to the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914. Pierre Englebert has noted that
although German presence in Kamerun lasted a generation, it was arguably within this
period that significant framework for the country's infrastructures for modern economy
was laid out.15 The defeat of Germany by joint Anglo-French forces in World War 1,
ended German control of Kamerun, as well as other German possessions in Africa.
"Pierre Englebert, Africa South ofthe Sahara. (London: Europa Publications
Ltd., 1993).
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Kamerun was provisionally divided among the allied victors, Britain and France, by
the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. Both powers gained international
recognition as supreme authorities over their respective spheres of influence. This
arrangements was confirmed with little or no alterations by the League of Nations
Mandate in 1922. Kamerun was considered by the League as a class "C" Mandate,
which means the territory was subject to minimal supervision by the League. According
to Edwin Ardener, the British sphere or Mandate was called "Cameroons" while the
French Mandate was known or designated as "Cameroun".16 At the close of World War
11, not withstanding the League of Nations inability to prevent war and promote world
peace, the League collapsed and was replaced by the United Nations in 1946, and the
League of Nations Mandate Territories were converted into United Nations Trust
Territories. Emmanuel Konde has noted that despite the change of organization, the
Trusteeship remained under the administration of the British and French, who
"maintained the nomenclatures in their respective spheres of influence."17 Under the
United Nations Trust, four-fifths of the territory was allocated to French administration,
as French Cameroun, and one-fifth of the territory, consisting of two long contiguous
areas along the border east of Nigeria was allocated to Britain as Northern and Southern
Cameroons. (See map showing political subdivision of Cameroon, Appendix D). Some
names have been used interchangeably in the past to refer to these territories such as
16Edwin Ardener, "The 'Kamerun Idea'" West Africa (June, 1958), 553, and "The
Political History ofCameroon." Today 18 (August, 1962), 341.
17Emmanuel Konde, The Bassa ofCameroon: An Indigenous African Democracy
Confronts European Colonialism (Acton, MA: Tapestry Press Ltd., 1998), 10.
British Cameroons, Southern Cameroon, West Cameroon and Anglophone Cameroon,™
referring to the British sphere, while French Cameroun or La Republique du Cameroun,
East Cameroon or Francophone Cameroon referring to the French sphere In the post war
period, growing anti-colonial sentiments throughout the Third World, particularly in
Africa, made control of these territories relatively difficult to administer Britain and
France eveMually adhered to the United Nations Charter, which promised self
determination for all inhabitants of the Trust Territories. Jean-Germain Gros has argued
that "Cameroon, technically, was never a French or British colony, however, he adds, for
all practical purposes, Cameroon was a colony with two masters, with the superior
resource endowment going to French Cameroon.™ French Cameroon became an
autonomous state in 1957, and on January 1,1960, gained its independence from France.
France, however, continued to develop East Cameroon more so ton any of its other
colonies in Africa. Political developments in British Southern Cameroons were strikingly
different than those in East Cameroon. On February 11, ,961, the people of Southern
Cameroons voted in a referendum, for union with independent Refublh rf^^
while Northern Cameroons decided to join Nigeria. Great Britain took very little interest
in Southern Cameroons affairs and treated the territory as a "step child » The territory
was linked to and ruled from Nigeria for nearly forty years, prior to the referendum.
British policy of incorporating Southern Cameroons to Nigeria was driven largely by
financial and adminis^ive imperative, I, is no, surprising, therefore, mat while East
Cameroun developed politically and economically, Southern Cameroons regressed
"Jean Germain Gros, Journal ofTW^,, vol 6 no 3> Ju,y ,995
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further because decisions affecting her growth and development both politically and
economically were made in Nigeria, mostly by Nigerian representatives.
British Tutelage and her Benign Neglect ofBritish Cameroons
Affirmation of Great Britain's preponderance over Northern and Southern Cameroons
was followed by the hegemon's request to the League of Nations that her sphere of the
Cameroons be administered as part of her Nigerian colony. This request, according to
Willard Johnson was granted, and the Cameroons became an integral part of Nigeria in
1922.19 As Emmanuel Chiabi rightly puts it, the sub-state status of the Cameroons
became apparent, and its political development and other activities intertwined with those
ofNigeria. He further argues that the enforcement ofthe Nigerian system ofgovernment
in the Cameroons in 1923, by a British order, "marked the genesis of the Cameroonian-
Nigerian relations."20
Several reasons have been advanced to explain British disinterest in the
political and economic development of Northern and Southern Cameroons. Foremost of
these include, Britain's original loss of Cameroon to Germany on July 12, 1884, when
German consuls out paced British officials and signed treaties with the Kings of Douala,
proclaiming Kamerun a German Protectorate. Professor Lovette Z. Elango argues
"Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a
Fragmentary Society. 94.
20Emmanuel Chiabi, 'The Nigerian-Cameroon Connection: A Study ofthe
Relationships and its Effects on Anglophone Cameroon," Journal of African Studies. 13,
2 (Summer 1986).
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convincingly that British ambivalence in the territory was because it was acquired as
"compensatory diplomacy."21
Great Britain's logical argument to the United Nations visiting mission to the
Cameroons for incorporating or integrating the Cameroons to Nigeria was that the
territory was sparsely populated without any tribal or political homogeneity.22 The
British also argued that Cameroon's social and economic advancement could be assured,
only if it was administered as part of Nigeria. As Eyongetah and Brain have noted,
Bntish's lack of interest was because the territory was a narrow strip divided into two
separate areas which were not economically viable to stand on their own.23
Evidence from studies suggests that British policy of incorporating the
Cameroons as part of her Nigerian colony was driven largely by financial and
administrative imperatives. The colonial office in London argued that it would be costly
to administer the Cameroons as a separate entity, especially as the territory had no
revenue generating resources to support itself. As Chiabi and other scholars have
suggested, Southern Cameroon's decision to join Cameroon Republic instead of Nigeria
had some serious implications for the region's relations with the United Kingdom.
Britain did not only withdraw its subsidies for the region, but failed to support Foncha
and Southern Cameroonians during the crucial Foumban Constitutional Conference in
1960. British's refusal to mediate on behalf of her former Trust Territory, despite earlier
21Lovett Z. Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon. 1914-1916
(Limbe, Nivia-Group, 1987), 77.
22'T'
Eyongetah and R Brain, A History ofthe Cameroon, 99-100.
id., 100.
81
promises to do so, only reinforces the argument that she had no interest in Southern
Cameroons.24
Marginalization ofBritish Cameroons
Integration and administration of British Cameroons from Nigeria had
profound and far-reaching consequences for the territory. Britain's decision to rule the
Cameroons from Nigeria defined, not only the sub-state status of the region, as Chiabi
has characterized it, but also shaped the political, economic, and social dynamics of the
region.25 As we noted earlier, financial and administrative difficulties by the colonial
government resulted in "indirect rule" of Northern and Southern Cameroons from
Nigeria. Although this system proved successful in Northern Cameroons, in Southern
Cameroons it was hard to implement the system. As a consequence, "Local Authorities"
were created using traditional chiefs, (Fons ofthe grassfield zones).
In 1942, Chief Manga Williams of Victoria was chosen by the colonial
administration as official representative of Southern Cameroons to sit in the Nigerian
Legislature. His role, we should add, was not to advocate Southern Cameroon's separate
assembly, but to support the colonial administration's decisions on behalf of Southern
Cameroons.
"Emmanuel Chiabi, The Making ofModern Cameroon: A History of Substage




In 1946, the Richards Constitution was passed. The "obnoxious bill" as
many Africans referred to it, represented a major set-back to Southern Cameroons.26
According to Neville, the "Richards Constitution" represented a backward step for
Southern Cameroons, as it deprived the region of its lone representative (Manga
Williams), in the Federal Legislature in Nigeria." The constitution further called for the
partition ofNigeria into three distinct regions, with Southern Cameroons placed under the
Eastern Regional House. Although the provisions of this constitution provided no
opportunity for Southern Cameroons' recognition for a separate house, it nevertheless
served as a "push" and galvanized Cameroonians to "seek a way out of Nigerian
politics."
Notwithstanding the inadequacies of the Richards Constitution, Sir John
Macpherson introduced his constitution in 1951, which superseded the Richards
Constitution. Under the new constitution, the number of representatives allocated to
Southern Cameroons increased from one to thirteen. Leadership scuffle in the Eastern
Regional House of Assembly, especially in the National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroons (NCNC), offered another chance for Southern Cameroons issue to be raised
in the Assembly.
Although political infighting among the Nigerian leadership awakened
Cameroon's nationalists to re-examine their status within a politically divided Nigerian
institution, Chiabi notes, division among Southern Cameroon's leadership also
26James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1963), 281.
"Rubin Neville, Cameroon: An African Federation. 75.
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intensified.28 While some members of Southern Cameroons wanted a '"separate
region' from Nigeria, others argued for "equal representation in the Central Nigerian
Legislature and Council of Ministers."29 The division and lack of solidarity among
Southern Cameroons leadership will have profound consequences, in 1961, on the issue
of reunification with Cameroon Republic or continuing as part of Nigeria. Lack of unity
among Anglophones political elites will manifest itself once again in 1972, on the issue
of unification with East Cameroon. These issues will be dealt with later in the section
and again in chapter three.
In 1953, Dr. E. M. L. Endeley was elected as Southern Cameroon's
representative to the Eastern House of Assembly in Nigeria. His election was seen as a
milestone, and an important step in Southern Cameroon's politics. In October 1954, the
region was granted her own House ofAssembly. Chiabi cautions, however, that although
Southern Cameroons was "technically not part ofEastern Nigeria, the region continued to
be part of Nigeria, but with a semi-federal or "quasi-federal" status."30 This quasi status
meant the federal legislature ofNigeria still had control over Southern Cameroons affairs.
Furthermore, despite domination of the Southern Cameroons Assembly by colonial
administrators, some positive outcomes should be illuminated. Cameroonians were
allowed to make laws that affected their region. The people were also empowered to
raise taxes as well as legislate on matters deemed vital for the territory. The creation of a
Emmanuel Chiabi, The Making ofModem Cameroon: A History of Substage
Nationalism and Desperate Union 1914-1916, 8.
29Ibid., 53.
30Ibid., 55.
bicameral legislative system with a House of Chiefs and a Lower House with elected"4
officials, marked perhaps the beginning of participate democracy in Southem
Cameroon*. These developments, Rubin has observed, culminated in the granting of
election powers to Cameroonians based on universal adult suffrage."
Formation and F.thno-Repini.,,1 ronftonrati,™ in w
Early poKtical movements in Southem Cameroons is credited to Dr. E. M L. Endeley. In
1949, Endeley launched his Cameroon National Federation (CNF) in Kumba. However,
disagreement between Endeley and R. J. K Dibonge of Douala on to issue of including
Francophone Cameroon in to ballot arrangements under the Macpherson Constitution of
1951 was indicative of weakness in the party. Endele/s refusal to endorse Dibonge's
proposal to include French Cameroon in the ballot led to the latter's breakaway from to
CNF. Dibonge formed to Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC). In 1953, ^
KUNC and CNF leadership resolved their differences and merged to form to Kamerun
National Congress (KNC) in 1953.
In 1955, a new political party emerged, to Kamerun National Democratic
Party (KNDP), led by John Ngu Foncha, from the grasses area of Northwestern
Cameroon, According ,0 Chiabi, formation of to KNDP changed to political
dynamics in Southern Cameroon, He maintains tha, to formation of to KNDP no,
only added an "ethnic and regional orientation" ,0 to territory's politics, i, hampered
"Rubin Neville, Camernni An African F^t^ti^ 78
solidarity.32 In the general elections of 1959, grassfield dominated KNDP, which
the viable opposition party, defeated the ruling KNC, and formed a government. It has
been suggested that the defeat of KNC by KNDP convinced Mbile to join forces with
Endeley. In 1960, Mbile's Kamerun People's Party (KPP) merged with Endeley's KNC
to form a 'coastal' party, the Cameroon's People National Convention (CPNC). This
alliance, needless to say, marked the beginning of ethno-regional politics in Southern
Cameroons and perhaps strained prospects for consensus between the coastal/forest and
grassfield peoples of Southern Cameroons.
Intra-Southern Cameroons polarization and lack of solidarity would be
evident in 1960 and 1961, on the issue of Southern Cameroon's merger with either
Cameroon Republic or Nigeria. Disagreement between Endeley (CPNC) and Foncha
(KNDP) would lead to United Nations' 'Two Alternatives": (1) whether the territory
should merge with Nigeria or become autonomous but with ties to Nigeria; (2) whether
the territory should remain autonomous or reunify with Cameroon Republic. It should
also be noted that the United Nation's resolve on the "two alternatives" was precipitated
by other African leaders and anti-colonial groups, especially the radical "Casablanca
group (Ghana, Mali, Libya, Sudan, Liberia, UAR, Tunisia and Guinea), who feared and
suspected the motives of the British in trying to delay talks towards eventual
independence ofher colonial possessions.
On February 11,1961 under the United Nations monitored plebescite,
Southern Cameroons voted overwhelmingly to join "independent" Cameroon Republic,
32Chiabi, 70.
while Northern Cameroon* voted to join Nigeria. Table 1. illuminates the results ofthe
plebescite organized by the united Nations in 1961.
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Source: The Southern Cameroons Information Service, 196
94.741 votes
— of Southern Cameroon, and "independent" Cameroon Republic became a
on October ,, Rafter flawed negotiationsbetween Ahmadou Ahidjo, resident
ofCameroon Republic and John Ngu Fonch* Prime mnister
Foumban in July 1961.
The various constitutional proposals by Foncha and Ahidjo were discussed a,
•he Foumtan Conference of My ,7-2., ,«,. a^,^ „ ^ .^^ ^
Foumb» conference and the subsequent Yaounde Conference clearly defined and
esfcblished the role »d **us ofSo^hem Cameroon, in the Federatioa To begin whh,
Foncha. Prime Minis* rf the S^thern C^neroons ws ,„ negotiate wM, Ahidjo
presidm of "pendent- RepubHo of f^^ A(xmdjngt ^ 2^^^
Foncha had hoped 4. United Nations ™d United Kingdom would mediate with French
Cameroon on a workable framework for the federation. To his disappointment, neither"
the United Nations nor United Kingdom was present at the talks, placing Foncha in an
awkward position of bargaining. Foncha was not only misguided and mislead by the
United Nations and United Kingdom, but also faced interne challenge from some of his
constituencies in Southern Cameroons, who wanted to strike deals with Ahidjo."
Prior to the constitutional talks in Foumban, Foncha and his team of advisers
had drafted an elaborate set of proposals during the Bamenda Conference, as a blueprint
for the Federation. The initial impression created was that the Cameroon Federation will
be a loose one. According to Willard Johnson, Southern Cameroon's proposal for a
federal system included:
A ceremonial, rather than an executive head of state a bi-
TT* 5 r&! le8isuIature'a S°vera°r as ofeach state, with
!? 3S h6ad °f a resP°n«ble government in
T"**? S6parate *"* "* federal citizenship
^ wide range oflegislative powers to
the states, with hopes oftransferring these to the central
government. The proposal also called for protection of
fondamental human rights, powers ofthe president to veto legislation
cons.dered detrimental to the rights ofthe state.. election of81*'0"
the present by popular vote rather than by members ofthe legislature »
Clearly, this proposal was in accord with the British-style decentralized
system of governance, and in great variance with the tightly centralized, highly
bureaucratized structure in the French system.
33Chiabi, 127.
?;-i^^^
Ahidjo's proposal, on the other hand, sought to establish a clear,88
preponderance of the federal government over the state systems. As Rubin has
suggested, this approach was generally in line with the leader's preference for strong
government" Ahidjo's proposal, we should add, was a reflection of 4, Gaullist
Constitution of Cameroon Republic, which was established a. independence in January
1960. Furthermore, Ahidjo's goal was not only aimed at
consolidating power a. the .enter, but also ,o dominate all other institutions of
government, a. the federal and s«e level, His proposa. among other things included
giving powers to the president *, act unilaterally or concurrently with the legislative
body, giving the presiden, powers ,0 appoint and dismiss prime ministers and other
officials of government. I, is dear, however, tha, Ahidjo's goal of forging a centralized
regime was eminent, given the fact that the proposal for a bicamera. legislature was
rejected am) in its place a unicamera. system esfcblished. This, again, was in accord with
the French system ofgovernance.
Clearly, Foncha and Southern Cameroons political elite, were handicapped
by three circumstances prior to the Foumban talks: (,) Foncha and his team lacked
adequate preparation prior to the talks, and relied entirely on the United Nation, and
United Kingdom as their prime negotiators. (2) Souther, Cameroons entered the
constitutional tafcs not as "equals", but as a substate against an independent Cameroon
Republic. (3) Lack of solidarity among Southern Cameroons politicians was seen by




Cameroon became a Federal Republic in 1962, with Cameroon Republic and
Southern Cameroon* relinquishing their separate identities, to form a federated republic.
Southern Cameroon, know, 1tmdkl „ Wea ^^^^^^^
became East Cameroon. Ahmadou Ahidjo, president of former Cameroon Republic,
became Federal president, while John Ngu Foncha, former Southern Cameroons Prime
Minister, became the Federa! Vice President Two significant oufcrowths of this federa.
experiment resulted in the estoblishmen, of "federal" or "national" institutions, the
Federal National Assembly (FNA), comprising of fifty (50) members, e.ec«ed by direct
universal suffrage in a secret ballot» and the Executive Branch, with the president as
chief executive officer. Members of the Federal Assembly were chosen based on
prop.miona.ity of the population of the two states.. Hence, West Cameroon had ten (,0)
represematives and East Cameroon forty (40) representative, The stipulation in the
constitution tha, the federal vice president should reside in the capita! Yaounde, created a
power vacuum and strugg.es in West Cameroon. In.nica.lv, this power struggle was
between ST. Muna and Augustine Jua of KNDP, and from the grassfield region As
Rubin has noted, both men vied for the post of Vice Prime Minister of KNDP, and make
his observations apparent in the fo.lowing statement for personaI ^ ,o
based on an interim arrangement.
6. For details,
respective state
extern, ethnic factors involved, bu, no ideological question, apparently „ issue, Fond*,9"
supported Muna.37
Despite Foncha's solid support for Muna, his opponent, Jua, won with a wide
margin. Jua's victory not only tarnished Foncha's reputation and prestige but set in
motion endless struggles among West Cameroon political leadership.
In summary, we presented an overview of Cameroon, from its colonial past
to reunification. We also examined the internal characteristics and discontinuities in
Southern Cameroon,, arguing that the peripheral or substate stams which the region
carried from Nigeria, plus disunity among Anglophone political elites, reinforced
Ahidjo's bargaining powers a, the Foumban talks. The chapter also revealed the schism
and feud among Southern Cameroonians, particularly along ethno-regional basis, was the
outcome of the regions association with East Cameroon. The differences among
Anglophones was magnified by Ahidjo, who viewed division among Anglophone elites
as his best sWegy of accomplishing his political objectives. Finally, the chapter laid the
foundation for our esamiMtion and^ rf
three.
37Rubin Neville, Cameroon: An Afri^n ^H-atinn 123.
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CHAPTER m
INTEGRATIVE AND DISINTEGRATIVE FORCES IN CAMEROON
Although East Cameroon's preponderance over Southern Cameroons was
evident in the political, economic and socio-cultural domains after re-unification of the
two entities in 1961, formal political union of these separate political communities in
May, 1972, reinforced and magnified this dominance. Our attention in this chapter will be
on the concepts of political integration and disintegration. Particular emphasis will be
directed at the factors or circumstances which necessitated political union of the two
polities. We shall examine four integrate variables: national unity, elimination of
economic imbalance between East and West Cameroon, political stability and foil
utilization of the country's resources. Furthermore, we will discuss each element of
domination perpetuated by Francophones, including, the obnoxious constitution, political
and administrative strategies, economic, as well as socio-cultural components. Similarly,
we will examine disintegrate factors in Cameroon, which have precipitated separatist
and secessionist tendencies in the Anglophone region. We shall further point out that,
policies initiated and pursued by Francophone dominated government, have exacerbated
these disintegrate tendencies in West Cameroon.
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is of Anpinphpne Domination
Political integration is defined as any attempt to bring separate political units
or entities into closer relationship, seeking to bring separate territories or states into one
state. Myron Weiner defines national integration as "a need to create a territorial
nationality which overshadows or eliminates subordinate parochial loyalties.'" Clifford
Geertz has also noted succinctly that:
The prevalence of these parochial or local allegiance or similar
primordial attachments hinder rather than advance development
and growth, since the national leader's goal of putting together
the functions of the political system demands the undivided
attention or loyalty of all citizens.2
In a similar vein, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. have argued
that a major challenge to the political system is to bring about 'the process whereby
citizens transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, or petty
principalities to the larger central system.- Integration of heterogeneous or multi-ethnic
'Myron Weiner has observed that the term
' is used in the social
e Inte8nrtive Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil
'Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., C^mnarativePolitics A
p-mental Appr,^ (b^^ 1966)j 36 ' mparauve Politics ADevelo
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According to sources, of the 2.827,338 eligible voters who went to the
polls to vote on this issue, an overwhelming number (99.9 percent) voted "yes."6 This,
almost perfect support for the president's proposal, whether it was voluntary or forced,
resulted in the demise ofthe federation.
The president's unilateral actions and the expediency with which he forced
the issues to the citizens has raised some intriguing questions such as: what precipitated
or motivated Ahidjo to forge a unitary system of government, especially as there was no
internal challenge to his regime, particularly from West Cameroon? What was his
rationale for a unitary system, given the success of the federal structure in ten years?
These questions will be relevant later on in our discussion, and will affirm or refute the
claims made by Anglophones that the president's overall goal of integration was to
subjugate Anglophones under Francophone domination, and secondly to control all
decision making processes from the capital, Yaounde.
Scholars and observers have argued forcefully and convincingly that the
abolition of the federal structure and creation of a unitary system in its place marked the
beginning of dominant/subordinate relations between East and West Cameroon. They
maintain that the major mechanism used by the president to legitimize this unequal
relationship was the constitution of July 1972. What geopolitical and economic
implications therefore, did this political changeover have for the country at large?.
Integration and centralization resulted in enormous powers to the president, undermining
and placing other institutions of government in subservient positions, especially the
T Eyongetah and R. Brain, A History nfthgfW™™ 177-178.
Judiciary and the National Assembly. Clearly, the president's capacity to act alone,96
disregarding other important constitutional bodies of government signaled the beginning
of authoritarian rule in Cameroon, especially in Anglophone Cameroon, where citizens
were used to the parliamentary system, and less rigid control ofcitizens' activities.
National Unity Ahidio's Rational*
Cameroonian society presents a mosaic of ethnic and regional diversities,
which also differs in social organization, size, religion as well as their customs. In the
Moslem north as well as the central regions, formal, hierarchical and centralized social
structures are evident. Usually, leadership revolves around a single powerful individual.
In the southern coastal/forest regions, the social structures are much less rigid and less
hierarchical. Although the leader, usually the chief, and his council form the basic
nucleus of the ruling class, the chief remains an equal among his subjects; and his
authority does not include the right to command as is prevalent in the northern and
central tier of the country/ Given this complexity and fragmentation, the possibility of
collapse and disintegration can hardly be ruled out. In several occasions, the President
reminded Cameroonians that while the fragmented society is a great asset to be cherished,
it could also become the nation's most lethal weapon, splitting or doing away with the
nation.8 It is against this backdrop that one must understand Ahidjo's commitment for a
1968). ^ As Told hv AhmaH"" akHjtt (Monaco: Paul Bory,
unified polity and his push for integration of East and West Cameroon as well as^
centralization ofthe administrative apparatus.
While Cameroon faced equally challenging economic, health, education, and
communication problems, the President's focus was on national integration. Throughout
his years as federal president and later, president of the United Republic, Ahidjo never
failed to underscore the importance of national unity. He envisioned that such unity can
only be achieved with a strong central government and a strong leader. In various
speeches to the nation, the president made his priority of unity apparent, as in the
following:.
"The independence of a people, of a country, 'he emphasized' is
one thing. The existence of a government, an administration,
local authorities and chiefdoms is another thing. But a nation, a
real nation, is something else again. Since the 1st of January
I960 our country, Cameroon has been free and independent
That, however, does not mean that since January 1, 1960 a real
Cameroonian nation has existed. It is incumbent 'upon us the
leaders and people in charge at all levels, to forge this nation for
torge this national unity."9
President Ahidjo's rationale for dissolving the federal structure and
integrating the polity could be analyzed from three perspectives: economic, socioculturaJ,
and political. A compelling argument by the president for integration of East and West
Cameroon was the natural and historical imbalance between regions, so that the country
could achieve harmonious development as a whole." Regarding the budgetary situation
ofWest Cameroon, the president remarked:
9Ibid., 72.
""Towards Integration", Africa Confidential (January 9, 1976), Vol. 17 No. 1,6.
\ T" th°Ugh mOSt Services have been federalized the
g of the state of West Cameroon is still experiencing
difficulties; in spite of a balancing subsidy from the Federation
totaling more than 2000 million (francs), that is to say an amount
equivalent to approximately three quarters ofthe budget."
This economic imbalance, we should stress, was not limited to West
Cameroon alone. As we indicated earlier, in the Eastern and Northern provinces, the
economic picture was equally bleak. Socio-culturally, the president insisted that
consolidation of national unity would iron out rivalries and tribal divisions. He further
maintained that divisions and rivalries between Francophones and Anglophones,
Northerners and Southerners still constituted the greatest problems in the country,
particularly the government in Yaounde, regardless of the ethnic or ideological
complexion" of the leader, Politically, Ahidjo argued forcefully that the cumbersome
federal structures of the Republic greatly affected the development efforts of the
Cameroonian people, and the functioning of the three governments and four assemblies.
The president argued that this overlap involved considerable expenditures which could
have been used in the economic, social and cultural fields.13
Clearly, Ahidjo's emphasis and conviction on national unity, whether real or
otherwise, seems to have be the centerpiece of his domestic policy agenda and served as
his greatest asset, convincing the people to vote for integration, thus consolidating power
in 1972. The president's idea of national unity, we should add, was inextricably linked to
"Cameroon Nt-w^ \jay \g^ \gi2, 2.
""Towards Integration," Africa Confidential, January 9, 1976, vol. 17, No 1,6.
"Cameroon Npw8j May 19} 1972^ 2
political stability. One would, therefore, argue that his goal not withstanding his"
strategy has primarily aimed at strengthening his hold on the reigns of power by
preventing competition or challenges to his regime. His critics have charged that his goal
ofnational unity was based on egoistic indications to remain in power.
It is little surprise to students and scholars ofCameroon politics that Ahidjo's
overarching goal in Cameroon was national unity. Nicolas Ofiaga has approached and
analyzed this issue from a comparative stance. In his text, Stability and in«,hii»y ;-
Politics: The Case of Nigeria and Cameroon, Ofiaga stresses that political stability in
Cameroon was the outgrowth oftwo principal factors: (a) the pre-eminence of the quest
for national unity and national independence over all other priorities, and (b) the
development and maintenance of a highly centralized and authoritarian system, which
according to the President, was invaluable for the maintenance of unity and political
stability." Although Ahidjo succeeded in sustaining unity, political stability, and
projecting Cameroon's image beyond its frontiers, the same level of commitment to
economic growth and development was absent. Documents from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) reveal that the country's dismal economic performance after
independence in 1960 through the early 1970s, was largely due to the government's
neglect of the economic sphere and its obsession with national unity. On several
occasions, Ahidjo lent credence to this goal in the building of the Cameroon state. For
example in his address to the National Council of the Cameroon National Unity Party
"Nicolas D. Ofiaga, Stability and Instability in




(CNU) in Yaounde on November 5,1967, the president unequivocally summed up his
position on the issue in the following words:
We shall never tire of repeating, as we have already done several
times on other occasions, that economic development which will
give a more substantial content to our independence cannot be
achieved without national unity.
National unity, therefore, viewed as Ahidjo's political "oxygen" was the
bedrock without which economic development and growth in Cameroon could not have
been attained. The president's remarks and emphasis not only point to variations in the
goals or objectives with which the government had to contend with, it clearly served as a
reflection of the leader's preference when confronted to choose between desirable
objectives for the country.
In summary, therefore, 'national unity' was used by president Ahidjo not
only for bringing together and maintaining the focus of Cameroonians for nation
building, but it served as a ladder through which the leader used to accomplish his varied
political objectives. Under the guise of national unity, Ahidjo succeeded in reunifying
former French and British Trusteeships to form a federation, with Ahidjo as federal
president. He used national unity as a rallying tool to combat and defeat his political
enemies, especially the outlawed Communist or terrorist party, UPC in Cameroon.
Scholars and analysts of Cameroon politics have argued strongly, that the formation of
the CNU in 1966, was the outcome of Ahidjo's ceaseless plea for unity. This objective
was achieved by calling for the abolition of regional parties in both East and West
Cameroon.
Furthermore, under the guise of national unity, Ahidjo was able to create101
a unitary state, United Republic of Cameroon, with a highly centralized and
bureaucratized administrative system. To maintain unity, Ahidjo built an elaborate
security network considered by most observers as the most effective in Africa.
Elements ofDomination
(a) The Constitution of 1972
The overwhelming and enthusiastic support of the Cameroonian electorate in the May
1972 referendum, in favor ofintegration ofEast and West Cameroon, meant their support
for a "new" constitution. By presidential decree 72-270 of June 2, 1972, the Federal
Republic of Cameroon ceased to exist, and Cameroon became a unitary state known
thereafter as the United Republic of Cameroon. The constitution declared Cameroon a
"secular state" in which the rule of law governed the people. In close examination of the
"new" constitution, however, one would find that the 1972 document was neither "new"
nor did it take into account the welbeing of all Cameroonians, especially the Anglophone
minority. The constitution in large part was a reflection of the "Gaullist" style
Constitution of La Republique du Cameroon, which was adopted when East Cameroon
gained its independence from France in 1960. Against this backdrop, therefore, some
scholars have forcefully argued that adoption of the 1972 constitution meant
Anglophones were bound to "play by the rules" set forth by Ahidjo and his Francophone
colleagues. This section, therefore, is to argue that the Constitution of 1972 was nothing




The Constitution of 1972 had significant and far-reaching consequences for the country,
particularly for Anglophones. A key provision ofthe 1972 Constitution which had severe
consequences for Anglophones was the abolition of the office of the Federal Vice
President. Recall that this office was created during the period of federation and was held
by the Prime Minister of West Cameroon, John N. Foncha. Although in practice, this
office did not play a major policy role; in essence, it assured the Anglophones that their
views were represented in the capital. Indeed, some scholars, observers, and
Anglophones have argued fervently that elimination of the office of the Vice President
was just the first step by Ahidjo and East Cameroon to undermine the importance of
English-speaking Cameroonians in national political life. Secondly, this move was a
glaring indication that Ahidjo was not prepared to share the reigns ofpower with anyone.
The Constitution also established a form of government structure officially
labeled "Presidentialism" or "Republicanism" with a strong executive as president, an
Executive Council of Ministers appointed by, and subject to dismissal by the president.
A unicameral National Assembly comprised of 120 members and a centralized
administrative system were set up. On the issue of succession, the constitution clearly
stipulated that in the event of the presidency being vacant, either by death or permanent
physical incapacity ascertained by the Supreme Court, the powers of the president of the
Republic shall devolve upon the president of the National Assembly until the election of
a new President." In May 1973, Ahidjo appointed a pro-centralist, Solomon Tandeng
15T. Eyongetah and R. Brain, A History ofr^^n 179
Muna, President of the National Assembly. It should be pointed out that Ahidjo had
previously selected Muna as Prime Minister ofWest Cameroon and later made him Vice
president ofthe Republic, after the dismissal ofFoncha, the pro-reunificationist.
Troubled that Muna (Anglophone) and President of the National Assembly
might assume the presidency in the event of his death or inability to govern, Ahidjo
initiated a Constitutional Amendment, which the National Assembly passed, creating the
post of Prime Minister. Paul Biya, a former Secretary-General at the presidency, a
southern Christian, and one of Ahidjo's young "Lieutenants" was appointed Prime
Minister.- The amendment further stipulated that in the event of the president's inability
to govern, the Prime Minster, not the President ofthe National Assembly will assume the
office until elections are held. Although Ahidjo repeatedly stated that whosoever holds
the post of Prime Minister should not be regarded as heir apparent, Biya's succession
seven years later only revealed the truth of what Ahidjo had downplayed previously."
Clearly as the two examples have shown, Ahidjo used the constitution in a manner that
buttressed his position as president and at the same time used the Constitution to block or
prevent Anglophones from holding the top office ofthe land.
Administrative Chanpes- Their Implications
During the federation, the republic was divided into six administrative
regions, with West Cameroon serving as 'one' region. But as Mack W. Delancy has
noted, with the end of the Federal System, Ahidjo was able to extend the highly
: Towards Integration," Africa Confidential, Vol. 17 No. 1 (January
9,
'Ibid.,
centralized structure established by the French throughout the county." Cameroon'04
was partitioned into seven administrative units or subdivisions called provinces, with
appointed governors as administrative heads. West Cameroon, which was a single entity
with a Prime Minister, was subdivided into two separate administrative provinces. As
Eyongetah and Brain have suggested, this partition was based more or less on both
geographical and etaic lines." The grassfield region consisting ofMezam, Momo, Bui,
Menchum and Donga, and Mantung, made up the Northwest Province, with its provincial
headquarters in Bamenda (see map showing the «>umry as E*,< and West Cameroon,
Appendix E). SimHarly, ,h, coastal/fores, region consisting ofMany,, Fako, Meme, and
Indian constituted the Somhwes, Province, whh Buea as the provincial headquarter.
Recall ttat Buea h* served as the political headquarters ofwhat was known as Souftem
Cameroon and West Cameroon prior to integration in 1972. These administiative
changes had profound and far-reaching consequences for West Cameroonians; it exposed
and magnified for example, the historic differences that had existed between tfce
coastal/forest and the grassfield people.
When asked about the motives for the partition of West Cameroon into
Northwest and Southwest provinces, 47 percent of respondents say the move was a
deliberate politic*, calculation by the East Cameroon's ,ead of government to create
disagreement between the two regions based on their historic differences. They also
confirmed that this goal was achieved through manipulation of the politicians of the
"Mack W. Delancy, Cameroon- rVpmH.nCe »nd inH^^f.- 55
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regions coupled with the selfishness of West Cameroon's leadership. Only 28 percent'05
of the respondents believed the partition of West Cameroon was aimed at bringing the
government doser to the people as most centralist advocates including Muna have
argued. As we sha!l see in the next sections, Ahidjo and later Biya have capitalized on
this ethno-regiona. differences a, various periods, co-opting one region against the other
and also providing political and economic incentives to maintain this imbalance. When
asked which of the two Anglophone provinces (Northwest and Southwest) has benefitted
most from the government since unification, (30 percent) of our respondents said the
Northwest province, while 10 percent say the Southwest province. However, 37 percent
ofthe respondents said neither of the two provinces have benefitted and 23 percent say
bom provinces have benefitted about the same. This finding is ofparticular significance
because i, appears to be consistent with the view held by most Southwes.en.ers tha,
Northwest politician have "sold ouf West Cameroon to East Cameroon for their own
selfish and parochia! interest, Also u^,^ „ „,, ^^^^^ ^
imagined, that this division among Somhwes. and Northwest provinces has given the
East Cameroon's ,ead administration the leverage to continually manipulate and put the
leadership ofthis region a. odds with each other; thus, making the possibility of solidarity
for secession from the union even more difficult.
Furthermore, Anglophones have sharply criticized successive Francophone
regimes of Ahidjo and Biya, of appointing Anglophones to head only Wessential"
ministries. They argue, for example, that since re-unification and later integration of the
nvo entities, Anglophones have no, been appointed to lugh profile" Ministiies such as
Defense, Territorial Administration, Finance, or Foreign Affairs. A majority of the
respondents (53 percent) agreed that Anglophones have not been appointed to these^
top offices, while 19 percent said Anglophones have served as heads of these ministries,
and 28 percent were unsure. This noticeable gap reflects and supports the views of most
Anglophones including some Francophones that the government has not provided equal
access to Anglophones as guaranteed by the constitution. Political elites from Northwest
and Southwest provinces have echoed this imbalance in the following:
"In the foreign service, Anglophones rarely get appointed as Cameroon's Ambassador to
London, Washington, Lagos or Paris. These key diplomatic posts are reserved
exclusively for Francophones."20
Similarly, Anglophones have voiced their concerns and displeasure with
Francophone domination in internal administrative affairs, especially in their "own-
territory. They argue, for example, flat the government has embarked on a policy to post
only Francophones to Anglophone zones in top administrative positions, includmg Senior
Divisional Offices, Legion Commanders, Institutional and Parastatal Directors. Again,
this policy ofthe successive regimes has been at variance with the Constitution.
Another significant component of integration with far-reaching ramifications
for West Cameroonians was the introduction of centralized rule throughout the coumry.
This rigid system, we should point out was the hallma* of French-style adminisfrative
system in East Cameroon and other French possessions in Africa, htegration and
introduction of centralized n,,e, therefore, was a, variance with the British libera.
parliamentary system, which Anglophones had been used to. for nearly 40 years. The
20"The Buea Declaration," 19.
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Cameroon National Union Party (CNU), formed in 1966, became the single most
important vehicle through which major political and administrative decisions in the
country were made. The leadership utilized the party to award patronage to supporters.
As Ruth Morgenthau has clearly observed, the party was the cohesion of a few important
people, each of whom brought in his/her loyalists to the party.21 Likewise individuals
who did not conform with the party dogma were arrested, tried, and sentenced to long
periods in prison for alleged "plots" against the state. Also, strict laws were passed
which barred or hindered non-CNU party members, especially non-CNU
parliamentarians from exercising control in the Assembly. This initiative by Ahidjo was
designed to instill fear and to intimidate potential anti-government elements both in East
and West Cameroon, particularly in West Cameroon, where freedom of expression was
pervasive. It was also intended to further enhance Ahidjo's image among all
Cameroonians as a strong leader.
An important consideration which Delancey touched upon, regarding
Ahidjo's strategy to usurp power, was through extensive use of patronage in West
Cameroon. As we noted earlier, the president used the CNU party as major lever through
which political, economic, administrative, and party positions were distributed to his
loyal supporters, particularly in West Cameroon. The dismissal of Foncha as Vice
President and his choice of Solomon T. Muna, first as Prime Minister and later Vice
President of the central government only attest to the fact that Ahidjo wanted men who
shared his views and supported a strong centralized regime. As Delancey and other
21See Ruth S. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), for a similar discussion.
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scholars have noted, Ahidjo's appointment of pro-centralizers to the party hierarchy,
combined with his ability to nominate candidates for legislative positions, placed
individuals who advocated for strong West Cameroon like Augustine N. Jua in an
awkward political position.22 The activities of the CNU party at the local levels under the
watchful eyes of the Prefect also had some ramifications for West Cameroonians. In the
past, most traditional rulers were chosen by the villagers, who, together built a strong
traditional political institution. With integration, the West Cameroon's House of Chiefs
was dissolved. The local prefects' and the party gave the president direct link to
grassroots, traditional activities ofthe party which the president controlled from the top.23
The president's representatives, therefore, became significant players in the selection of
officials of the local governments as well as traditional rulers such as chiefs, fons or
kings.
Integration and centralization of the political and administrative system
revealed discontinuities in the country, especially in West Cameroon. It resulted in the
demise of West Cameroon's bi-cameral system, and led to domination by Francophone
prefects in decision-making areas where traditional rulers had prevailed. Centralization,
we should add, caused political infighting among West Cameroon's political elites, each
seeking ways to get to the president's "side" to take advantage of patronage.
Concentration of the decision-making powers in the capital Yaounde, and under one
person, the president, meant unacceptable delays in action by the governors and prefects
22Mark W. Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence. 54.
23Ibid., 56.
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even on matters of great importance. Concentration of the decision-making in the
hands of the president also raised concerns of overloading the president with huge
burdens of decisions, some often very minor.24 Furthermore, the tendency to constantly
seek approval from the capital and the president before any key policy is executed had
some revealing negative consequences on local initiatives as well as free thinking. As
Delancey has correctly observed, even bureaucrats became timid, not only afraid to
contradict or oppose their immediate seniors, but also fearful to suggest ideas that might
conflict with that of another individual further up the hierarchy.25 Sammy Kum Buo, in
"How United is Cameroon?" forcefully illustrates the negative realities of centralization
in Cameroon, especially in the former Anglophone region in the following:
The high degree of centralization has ushered in abuses ofpower
by security officials, whose vehicles seem to out-number
pedestrians in a number of Cameroonian towns. Inefficiency,
red-tape, and corruption have grown. Under the former federal
structure, some national administrative functions were performed
regionally in Buea, the former capital of Anglophone Cameroon.
Now, with the unitary system, everything has to be done in
Yaounde, the national capital. This has caused problems and
difficulties for government workers. For example, even minor
officials have to make the pilgrimage to Yaounde to trace their
files, or have their papers of employment signed. The results
have been disruptive and there are complaints at the inefficiency
ofthe bureaucrats in Yaounde.26
In sum, therefore, the unitary system which emerged in May 1972 and its
attendant centralization which followed closely thereafter, have been viewed by a large
MIbid.,
*Ibid., 57.
26Sammy Kum Buo, How United is Cameroon? 17.
majority to Anglophone Cameroonians as a hoax, and a major disappointment Most""
West Cameroonians maintain today tha, the region is worse off politically and
economically than was the case before re-unification in ,961, or when the territory
joined East Cameroon to form a federal republic in 1962 Tnis pessimism and frustrations
ofAnglophones with the state ofbeing in Cameroon, is, without a doubt the outcome of
the policies instituted by successive regimes from Francophone Cameroon.
Economic Dominant
Economic imbalance between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon since
unification in ,972, has been a cause of concern for most Anglophones lie country
adopted a regioral Gnomic planning smtegy after independence aimed a. equalizing
the uneven economic needs of destftute regions with those of more economical viable
regions. The .ogic behind this approach was to satisfy the diverse culture, ettnic, ^
economic disparity of the various areas in the country. Ndongko Wilfred has succinctly
sued that the differentia, impacts ofBritish and French economic policies in Cameroon,
laid the foundation for the economic disparities which have existed in the country after
independence and unification - Ahhough regional economic imbalance remains a major
anomaly throughout the country, our concern, however, is on the factors which .ed to ft.
creation and sustenance of t»is imbalance be^een Francophone and Anglophone
Cameroon.
A thorough examination of Anglophone complaints will reveal that their
problems range from poor and inadequate physical infras.rucn.re,, unequal distribution of
industrial facilities, insufficient energy production and deficient, transport and'"
communication systems- To grasp the essence of these economic disparities between
the two regions and why i, has emerged as a fixating and relative important issue
among Anglophones, we must first understuKi the source of these disparities. The
Cameroon Investment Code (CIC) origmally proposed and approved by the East
Cameroon National Assembly on June 27, 1960, would serve as our point of departure.
With ramification of the two territories and by law No. 64-LF-6 of April 1964, the CIC
was adopted throughout the Federation. The fundamenttl goal of CIC was to hasten the
removal of economic disparities, which had existed baween the various regions of the
country, especially between East and West Cameroon - This initiative was also designed
to identify the potentials for economic and social development induding problems
impeding growth in the regions. Finally, it was aimed a, ensuring ma*imum gains from
public and private capital investments- We should also note that in June 1975, the
provisions of the National Investment Code (NIC) replaced the Came™ Investment
Code.
The question we are left with is, whether the NIC mirrored the objectives of
regional eco»oraic and s<*ial development, and whether application of these provision,
encouraged concemration of industrial activities in the Francophone region ,„ the
'"Ibid., 134.
disadvantage of Anglophone Cameroon. If, as most scholars and observers have"2
argued that the investment strategy widened the economic and social gap between the
two regions, then the question becomes why the notion of balanced development
objective was not forcefully implemented by the government. If, on the other hand, the
initiative of balanced regional development is well and alive, as some supporters
assessed, then it begs the question why there remain disproportionate economic and
social differences between East and West Cameroon and among regions within each
entity? Answers to these questions will enhance our understanding of the prevailing
anomaly between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon.
An examination of two major investment ventures in the country after the
enactment of the National Investment Code in 1975, will reveal that the government's
rhetoric ofbalanced regional development was more an illusion than real. Our focus will




































































Planning, Yaounde of Economic Affairs and
I. can be observed from the above figures in Tab.e 2. that, .he National Investment Code
of 1975, that the development priorities ofthe govercmen. in Yaounde focused so much
on Eas. Cameroon than West Camerooa Of a tottl of 67 investment ventures in the
coumrv, „„!„ four were allotted ,0 West Cameroon, parfculariy in *e Southwest
province. Ahhough other East Cameroon provinces^ as North^^^^^
investment undertaking each, and no investmem aUotted ,0 Bm Province and none for
Northwest Province (West Cameroon). On the aggregate, therefore, Eas. Cameroon
dominated the economic scene with over 92% of investment in the manufacturing114
industries.
It will also be observed with respect to the Agro-industrial ventures, that East
Cameroon continued to dominate this sector with over 84% of the undertakings. As
Table 3 reveals, the Littoral Province (East Cameroon) continued to draw huge number of
investments undertakings, 18, representing 56% of investment ventures in the country.
The table shows that Littoral Province alone received 12, 238 million francs CFA in
investments and made a substantial turnover of 15,787 million francs CFA. Meanwhile,
West Cameroon (Northwest and Southwest) received a total of five investments
undertakings, representing jus, over 15% rflto M mmher of investnKntS) ^ ,oU|
investment of !,479 million francs CFA with a negative turnover of 311 million francs
CFA. We should note, however, that although Littoral Province had huge investment
capital it created employment forjust 3,000 individuals. While in West Cameroon, with
relatively less investment capital, a total of 4,219 jobs were created. In terms of salary,
however, the jobs in Littoral paid comparatively better than the jobs in West Cameroon
because m the former, focus was on processing, while in the latter, greater attemion was































































Source: Ndongko Wilfred, compiled from files of Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Planning, Yaounde. (Author's comments also included.)
In view ofthe above evidence, it is clear that the National Investment code in Cameroon
was skewed and served the interest of East Cameroon more so than West Cameroon.
East Cameroon, it will be observed, clearly benefitted from the investment incentives
reflected in the number of companies approved under the investment code of 1975.31
Ndongko Wilfred had pointed out that West Cameroon has not benefited.
Furthermore, East Cameroon's preponderance over West Cameroon is made
apparent when one examines evidence presented by Anglophones political leadership
31Ibid., 245.
predicament since formal union with East Cameroon, and further question and116
challenge the constitutionality ofthe agreement reached in May 1972. They maintain that
this arrangement was not only "illegal, but also a breach of faith."32 The architects
succinctly and methodically outline and discuss each area of East Cameroon dominance
over West Cameroon, supporting these claims with examples. They argue for example,
that since unification, core ministries in the country such as Territorial Administration,
Finance, the Armed Forces, Foreign Affairs, etc., have never been headed by
Anglophones. Although Anglophones have been appointed Prime Minister, successive
Anglophone Prime Ministers have not been given real power and authority as their
Francophone counterparts. This paradox is revealed in the following statement.
When the Prime Minister is Francophone, there is no Secretary
Oeneral at the Presidency and no vice Prime Minister.
... The Prime Minister wields real power and authority
But when that office comes to an Anglophone, he is hedged
in between a Francophone Secretary General at the presidency
and another at the Prime Minister's office. At the same
time, (the Anglophone Prime Minster) is saddled with not one
but two deputy Prime Minsters, on whom real power devolves.33
Anglophones further argue that successive Francophone regimes have used
the old colonial strategy of "divide and rule" to achieve their goal of domination and
control. First, that the partition ofCameroon into seven provinces, especially the division
of West Cameroon into two Provinces (Northwest and Southwest), was designed to put
these regions at odds with each other, to the advantage of Francophone or East
Press, imut^^ C°nference' 'The Buea Declaration," (Limbe: Moore Mac
"Ibid., 18.
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Cameroon led government. This was achieved by rewarding one region with high
political appointments over the other region. For example, some Southwesterners have
argued that since integration with East Cameroon 1972, mostly Northwestemers have
been appointed to high profile positions in the government. John N. Foncha Federal Vice
-President, Solomon T. Muna later succeeded Foncha as Vice- President and later as
Speaker ofthe National Assembly.
Sociocuitural Domination
East Cameroon used various strategies aimed at assimilating Anglophones culturally into
French culture by utilizing the radio, television and road infrastructures. Anglophones
cites, for example, that "television films and programs originally made in English are
always shown in Cameroon only after they have been edited and translated into French,
and only in French version." They also argues that since unification, cinema theaters in
major Anglophone cities such as Kumba, Victoria, Buea, Mamfe and Bamenda were
compelled to show only French Language films34.
Although Cameroon is theoretically a bilingual country, its educational
institutions, according to Anglophone elites, do not reflect this orientation, especially in
the Yaounde University and other professional schools of higher learning. The leaders
maintains that Anglophones have been systematically discriminated against especially in
admissions, and that French language has been used extensively for instructions to the
disadvantage of Anglophones. Similarly, critics argue that Anglophones with foreign
academic and professional diplomas are subjected to rigorous and timeless evaluation of
"Ibid., 23.
their degrees before they are considered for employment and often some have to
for as long as five years for the process to be finalized."
Finally, Anglophone leaders argue that East Cameroon has utilized
communication networks especially road infrastructures to fimher marginalize and
subjugate West Cameroon. They maintain for example, that since unification, key roads
connecting major cities in West Cameroon-Mamfe-Kumba, Mamfe-Bamenda, Bamenda-
Wum and Nkambe were destroyed, preventing commerce and easy movement of people
from one region to the other. Meanwhile, the roads leading from major East Cameroon
cities such as the Douala-Bafoussun roads were well developed. This strategy, according
to the architects of the document, was designed to compel Anglophone, traveling from
Bamenda to Buea or Victoria (Limbe), to pass through these major Francophone cities*
The problems of West Cameroon, as espoused by Anglophone leader,,
supports Claude Anderson's "Political Integration" thesis. According to Anderson:
rf™11tegI?tiSfOrthe intesratins group is an illusive
dream than real. That the integrating group loses all self-
determination, since all plans and goals must be processed
through and approved by the dominant society into which




Political Disintegration: Secessionist and Separatist Nexus
Prior to the April 6, 1984 coup attempt in Cameroon, the country was hailed by both
African and Western observers as one of the most peaceful and politically stable
countries in Africa. The attempt to unconstitutionally size power by a group of
disgruntled elites, reveal however, the deep and intense disaffection in the country,
fanned by ethno-regional affinities. Similarly, demands and protests from some
Anglophone leaders for devolution of state authority, most importantly, forceful calls for
secession by militant elements, attests to the growing discontent from the Anglophone
community who view themselves as victims of political, economic and linguistic
discrimination by Francophones. Before examining the factors which have culminated in
calls by members of the Anglophone sector for separation and/or secession, from East
Cameroon, it would be important to put in perspective what political disintegration is.
Ernst Haas, defines political disintegration as "the process whereby political
actors in several distinct political systems are persuaded to shift their loyalties,
expectations, and political activities toward a new center, the institutions of which
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing sub-system."38 This process
produces results in communities, which vary markedly in dimension and intensity. In
some instances, the decision may warrant political leaders in a sub-system to withdraw
their allegiance and recognition of the existing political center and build their own center.
This breakaway from the dominant or major political entity is called secession. When a
state breaks away from an internationally established and recognized political entity and
"Ernst Haas, The Uniting ofEurope (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968),
16.
declares her independence as a new state, she has seceded. Conversely, separatism, is
when political elites of a peripheral or distinct community seek greater autonomy or semi
autonomous government from existing principal political authority. Viva Ona Barkus,
draws clear contrasts between these concepts, noting that the "crucial distinction between
secession and separatism lies in the willingness or unwillingness of the discontented
community to recognize the sovereignty of existing political authority- Secession and
separatism as we have shown, are two components or elements of political disintegration.
Anglophone elites, political leaders, and "radical»militants however, differ markedly on
which of this elements to employ in their bid to force Francophone dominated
government for significant changes. Despite these differences, Anglophones of all works,
agree that their political, economic, social and cultural realities in Francophone
dominated Cameroon are the motivating forces behind their appeal for secession or
separation. Anglophones point to continued economic imbalances between East and West
Cameroon, despite the latter's significant contribution to the economic welbeing of the
country. Table 4 highlights the integrate and disintegrate factors in Cameroon. We
should caution that Anglophones perceive these disintegrate factors as barriers to the





INTEGRATIVE AND DISINTEGRATIVE ELEMENTS IN CAMEROON
Integrative Factors Disintegrative Factors (Anglophone)
Common legacy: both territories were
under German colonial rule
Continued economic imbalances between
Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon
Desire for national unity: bringing
diverse ethno-regional, religious and
cultural groups together
Hostile attitudes and intolerance
Francophones towards Anglophones
of
Elimination of economic disparities
between Francophone and Anglophone
Cameroon
Francophones dispice Anglophone social
mobility and view this as a threat to their
"rights
Desire for political stability to enhance
economic growth
Anglophones view themselves as victims
of political, social, cultural and linguistic
discrimination by the dominant society
Need to utilize the country's human and
natural to maximum
Exploitation of natural resources in the
Anglophone region, by French interest, to
develop the Francophone zones is a great
concern to Anglophones
Need to promote Cameroon's dual
heritage
Absence of good road infrastructures
linking major cities to one another in the
English-Speaking territory
Clearly, as this chapter has revealed, although domination of the Anglophone
region began before formal political integration in 1972, there is no denying that the
events of May 20, 1972, reinforced and exacerbated Francophone hegemony over their
Anglophone counterparts. As we pointed out in the chapter, East Cameroon's dominance
over West Cameroon was possible through various strategies, which included
constitutional, administrative, political, economic and socio-cultural means. For example,
adoption of the 1960 constitution of East Cameroon as the supreme document for East
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demanded of them. Furthermore, the partition of West Cameroon into two distinct
political and administrative zones, Northwest and Southwest, was another major attempt
by Francophone regime to balkanize English-speaking Cameroon, and prevent cohesion
as best as possible. Similarly, enactment of the Cameroon Investment Code (CIC), as
well as the National Investment Code (NIC), laid a solid foundation for economic
inequality between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon. Finally, through use of the
radio, television, and cinemas, East Cameroon's resolve to assimilate West Cameroon
into French culture was eminent. Without a doubt, East Cameroon's ability to dictate and
"push" her will on Anglophones is clearly the result of the unequal relationship between
entities. Anglophones' lack of political, economic, and social advancement in
Francophone dominated Cameroon, as the study indicates, is the outcome of the vertical
and unequal relationship between East and West Cameroon.
CHAPTER IV
LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Our goal in mis section is to examine the nature of leadership change in
Cameroon and the implications of these changes on the political economy ofEast
and West Cameroon relations. To ac<=omPlish this task, however, we must first
examine the leadership style ofAhmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, putting into
proper perspective their political vision as well as other exigencies that might have
combined to influence their decision making processes, particularly as it relates to
Anglophones. Naomi Chazan and others have identified two major components of
political decision making at the center, which include: (a) consolidation and (b)
entrenchment, as well as three principal elements in the decision making process
which all leaders, including Ahidjo and Biya utilized in fulfilling then-
constitutional duties. These decision making elements include: (a) articulation of
a political vision, which is usually linked to the leader's goals and plans for
govenung the policy (principles ofdecision making); (b) refinement of leaderchip
ayles and modes of operations (locus ofdecision making); and the establishment




124ever, that these elements do not operate in insolarion, neither are they mutually
exclusive of each other.
Peaceful transfer of political power in Africa has not made a lot of
headlines or attracted attention as other major occurrences on me continent, like
military takeovers, assassinations, ethnic and regional wars, and political
corruption. This is because of the relatively few s^cessfol transitions that have
taken place in (he continent since decolonization and independent of most of the
counties in the continent begmning in me 1960s. In fact> since ^^
independence, fewer man half a dozen countries have experienced successful
transfer ofpoIitical power^^major ^.^ w^^^^
the Osman-Sharmarker succession in Somalia in 1967, the Senghor-Diouf
transition in Senegal in 198., the Stevens-Saidu transfer in Sierra Leone in 1985,
the Nyerere-Mwinyi succession in Tanzania in 1985, and me Ahidjo-Biya
■nation in !982, which is the focus of this chapter.- Despite these successes,
most observers and critics point ,„ numerous violent transitions which have
characterized the political landscape in Africa as evidence that poUtical succession
in the continent remains an il.usion man a reaHty. Peaceful transfer of power in
the above countries was influenced by a number of factors including me imtiative
of the incumbents and in others, the result of collective efforts by individuals and
i.). Politics and
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groups outside the political arenas, who employed violence as a strategy to
change the political leadership in the country.3
Michael Schatzberg has noted that since the end of the Cold War and
the demise of the Soviet Union, the world has witnessed a steady decline in
various forms of authoritarian rule in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and
Asia. He maintains that the forces of change have caused most long-ruling
autocrats of both left and right to pursue a range of strategies and tactics to remain
in power. He aptly argues that though some of these leaders relinquished powers
behind the scenes, some attempted to undermine the legitimacy of their successors
through overt and covert activities. Schatzberg succinctly reveals this in the
following statements:
Few (leaders) have successfully ceded their coveted
positions as heads of a state-party without resistance; fewer
still have openly and sincerely embraced the new cross
currents of political change. The vast majority of them have
waged fierce and occasionally violent political struggle to
retain both their positions and power.
Even when autocrats have either departed or have been
removed from the scene, however, they often leave behind
them political forces and erstwhile allies who continue to
fight to pressure or restore the old order that nurtured them.4
3Ibid.
4Michael Schatzberg, "Hijacking Change: Zaire's Transition in Comparative Perspectives" in




President Ahidjo's announced resignation on the evening of November 4, 1982,
stunned not only Cameroonians, but observers of Cameroon and African politics
alike. Analysts and scholars of Cameroon politics have raised intriguing
questions, seeking to know the reason(s) for the leader's abrupt decision to step
down from power. Although there were some speculations about the leader's
ailing health, the precise cause or causes of Ahidjo's decision to relinquish power
remains unclear. As Victor T. LeVine has noted, however, "the president must
have been planning his departure some time.5 This speculation was, however,
confirmed by Ahidjo himself in a press conference in Douala, at the Congress of
the Cameroon National Union (CNU) in February 1975. In his interview, the
president stated: "I had ah-eady decided to leave power."6 The president's decision
to leave office after nearly twenty-three years was, therefore, not spontaneous as
some observers have suggested, but rather a carefully planned and strategized
decision that would ensure continuity. If one examines the events and actions of
the president prior to his resignation, one would find patterns that suggest a
planned, rather man a precipitous or spontaneous resignation. As LeVine has
Victor T. LeVine, "The Politics ofPresidential Succession," Africa Report. May-June 1983, 22.
6 President Ahidjo made these remarks in an interview during the February 1975 Congress of the
Cameroon National Union Party (CNU) in Douala, Littoral Province.
clearly pointed out, some key events by the President suggest the image of a
man putting his house in order before leaving it.7
The Succession AmenAnmt
The first indication of the president's future plans to depart office was effected in
1979 with a constitutional amendment. This amendment permitted the Prime
Minister to succeed to the presidency with foil powers, in the event ofthe
president's death or inability to serve. The amendment also empowered the new
leader to choose a new Prime Minster as well as his cabinet and to serve until his
predecessor's full term runs out. It stipulated further that if the Prime Minster
could not serve as president, then the president ofthe National Assembly will be
next in succession, followed by a minister "in the order ofprecedence."« The
provision also stated that if either of these elites becomes president, he will serve
only on an interim basis, until the next presidential elections are held~"not to
exceed 50 days after the [imtial] vacancy." We should point out that under the
previous dispensation, the president of the National Assembly was to be the next
in succession to the president who could only serve for a short period until new
elections are held, that is 50 days afterwards.
The amended succession law had two significant implications: (1) Paul Biya, the
Prime Minister at the time, was a beneficiary, who was to assume full
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7 Victor T. LeVine, "The Politics ofPresidential Succession", 23.
'Ibid
responsibilities of the office of president and to serve until his predecessor's'2"
own term of office was over. Ahidjo's early retirement, therefore, afforded Biya
more man two years to assert himself in office and start establishing himself as a
leader, away from the shadows of his boss and mentor. Tie second important
aspect of the amended succession law was that it prevented any power struggle
that might have ensured, if early elections were held.
The second major implkarioii of me succession amendment was that it
Prevented an Anglophone, Solomon Tandeng Muna, former federal Vice-President
and president of me National Assembly from becoming national president, even
on an intermittent bask Biya's assumption of the presidency did not alter me
Norm-South balance established by his predecessor and mentor, Ahidjo. Biya's
appointment of BeHo Bouba Maigari, a northerner, as Prime Minister, not only
assured continuity of FrancophoneKlomiaance bu, perhaps reveded to
Anglophone Cameroonians their unequal role in the unitary state, and eclipsed
fteir aspirations to hold me highest office for some foreseeable time.
Tie second major action by Ahidjo, which clearly demonstrated a man putting the
"house- in order, was a cabinet reshuffle in January 1S82. What appeared
dilferent ftom past reshuffles was ftat the major actors involved were not aware of
*e presidents proposed changes. More so, „ inv^ p,,^ ^^
particularly in me presider*y. The most sigmfican, move was Sadou Daoudou's
(torn me minisAy of public service to deputy secraary-generaf at me
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presidency. Recall that Daoudou was Ahidjo's most loyal and oldest friend in
government. Daoudou was not only a political ally, indeed, both men were from
Garoua, the northern province. Ahidjo's goal in this personnel change was geared
towards limiting the growing powers of Secretary-General, Samuel Eboua, who
had presidential ambitions.9 This strategy, while it kept Eboua's maneuvers in
tact, aided the smooth transition of power from Ahidjo to Biya later in the year.
When Biya assumed office, he named Sadou Daoudou Secretary-General at the
presidency, while the former secretary-general, Eboua was moved to a less
powerful ministry of agriculture.
The third major event was Ahidjo's fifth-five year development plan,
promulgated in November of 1981. Of special importance was the primacy given
to agriculture over other development issues. As LeVine has aptly pointed out, the
fifth-five year plan firmly placed Ahidjo's pragmatic stamp on the development
priorities of Cameroon, making it difficult for his successors to deflect the
economy from the course he had chosen.10
The final event or pattern suggesting the president's preparation to
depart office was planned official presidential visits to some European and North
American countries, including France, Canada, Great Britain, and the United




farewell tour in the world. Lastly, was the tenth anniversary celebrations
marking a decade of political union between East and West Cameroon. In an
elaborate yet succinct speech, the president detailed many of his accomplishments
and hopes for a better Cameroon. All these events put together without knowledge
of the president's closest aides, illustrates the secretive nature of Ahidjo.
Leadership Styles
Since decolonization and independence of most countries in Africa in
the early 1960s, numerous books and commissioned studies have been carried out
by scholars and analysts regarding approaches and models in studying leadership
styles in Africa. These endeavors have resulted in characterization of leadership
in the following categories: the charismatic type, patriarchal style, the populist-
prophetic leadership and the tyrannical leadership sort. Of the four leadership
categories just stated above, our focus will be on patriarchal and populist-
prophetic types, since they reflect more closely to the styles embraced by Ahidjo
and Paul Biya of Cameroon.
Patriarchal Leadership Style: Ahmadou Ahidjo
This leadership style is prevalent in regimes generally referred to as
administrative-hegemonial regimes.11 These leaders, including Ahmadou Ahidjo,
Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold S. Senghor, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, etc, who emerged
11 Ibid., 158.
during the struggle for independence and embraced pragmatism as their"'
political amour.
Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, like most of his post-independence
counterparts in other countries in Africa, utilized manipulation coercion, award of
patronage and other devices to achieve his political goals. Ahidjo remained above
the political frail, always able tojuggle, vying political factions in the country, and
coopting his political adversaries to ensure their dependence on him. The
president, UVtae has noted, held himsetf purposely aloof and reserved. Sammy
Kum Buo has aptly depicted the leader in the following statements:
Mr. AWdjo, a shrewd . . politician, who uses a combination
of moderate tactics and tough handed rule, depend^2
ttT'T?V SUited "■ needs • •he-"« «fr d£2
tical ascendency, but also created a simation in
Ahidjo portrayed himself as father of the nation and was glorified by his fellow
countrymen as such.
Ahidjo's political success hinged not so much on coercion as some of
his critics have clearly charged, but he also relied heavily on an effective network
of clientelism brtween himself and powerful political elites, as well as traditional
nuers. An effective strategy employed by Mr. Ahidjo to achieve his desired
politic outcomes was * pit his a,*^^^^ ^^
loyalty from bo* ends. For example, aware that the grassfie.d and forestfcoastal
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people of West Cameroon had vast disagreements on political, social and
economic matters, Ahidjo exacerbated these differences further by partitioning the
region into two separate political and administrative entities, called Northwest and
South Provinces. It is also evident in his appointment of two Northwest political
elites, Foncha and Muna as Vice-Presidents of the country and later Muna as
speaker of the National Assembly, as a strategy to put the Southwest and
Northwest at odds with each other. Although the president's rationale for the
partition was administrative expediency, his refusal to partition his home base-the
Northern Province, which was three times larger than West Cameroon, in land
mass, and constituted about a third of the population, makes his motives even
clearer.
Another important aspect of Ahidjo's leadership style focuses on
decision making process. Decisions were centrally made by Ahidjo with
assistance from a few of his trusted fideles.13 Ahidjo's leadership style, just like his
counterparts in other countries, encouraged nepotism, favoritism, promoted
corruption and fueled factionalism.14 Furthermore, his leadership style created
inequality in the country particularly in the distribution of resources. Although
this aroused social resentment, the president's effective internal security apparatus
made it difficult, if not impossible for disgruntled groups or individuals to voice
13 Michael Schatzberg, "The Metaphors of Father and Family," 30.
14 Naomi Chazan et al., 159.
their discontent" especially from Anglophones. Without a doubt Ahidjo'"
exemplified a leader who employed the "carrot and stick" philosophy in his
administration to achieve his political goals. Besides his strategy of pitting his
adversaries against one another as indited earlier, me ex-president did not
hesitate to purge recalcitrant cabinet member and others in the civil service who
challenged or held opposing views from his. ™s was evident wifl, his dismissal
of Foncha. and his replacement with a pro-unificationist, S.T. Muna. Finally,
AhidjCs poMcal skills in juggling and manipulating party e.ites. legislators, and
civil servants gave him an overarching political edge over all other pohtica. elites
in me country. SimUariy, Ahidjo's persuasive skUls and his abUity to cpitahze on
his political opponent's disharmony. especiaUy (West Cameroon) politicians, will
be viewed as perhaps one ofthe president's major strengths.
Ahidio and th, raj
A major cornerstone of president Ahidjo's political success revolved around his
ability «o buiM and maintain what professor Love,, Elango has aptiy and
succinctiy characterized as me "old consensus.- This old consensus centered
ahnost exclusive* on national integration. Given the inherent difficulties
manifested in Cameroon's diverse ethnic and cultural makeup. Ahidjo utUi«d a
nmge of saategies to hold the fragile nation togemer. Besides excessive use of
jal, Vol 18 No. 9, April 29, 1977,2.
1982-1992.
134pafronage, discussed previously, Ahidjo also used repressive measures, to
achieve this consensus. To buttress his argument for one Cameroon, and to
prevent al.eg«. divisiveness stemming from primoda. ethnic loyalties, the
prudent, on July 12, 1967, passed ,aws^.^^.^^.^ _
exclusively triba., Can or regional character- The leader's commitment ,„
building a strong nation under the .eadership of a singfe parry, me (CNU), is
-emarkaWy made clear from his dements during the tenth anniversary of
celebrations in ,976. President Ahidjo firmly stated "a muto-party system wou,d
only lead ,„ anarchy and inefficiency and even ultimately ,0 me^ ofow
Cameroonian nation."18
Before moving further with our discussions on leadership succession
and its unpUcations, i, would be inporfcnt ,„ make a brief digression and examine
the nature and character of Ahidjo's relations with Ang,^ Cameroomans
particuMy me pohtica. eUtes. We should state that without such background
information, our discussion and analysis will have lMe
Ahidio ana
He poUtical history of post-independent Cameroon, until 1970 and
1982 respectively, is without doubt associated with two key actors, Ahmadou
OT no
18
Africa Confidential vol. 18 no. 9. April 29,1977,3.
Ahidjo and John N. Foncha ^ j
Foncha-Wes, Cameroon rose to poUtica, prominence in their respective* states in
1958 and ,959. to I958; Ahmadou Ahidjo, leader of Union Camerounaise (UC)
and pro.unificatio.uH became Premier of French Cameroon. Simi.ar.y, in January
1959, John N. Foncha, leader of Kamenm National Democratic Party (KNDP)
became Prime Minister of West Cameroon."
In me course of eleven years, .96.-1972, three major events of great
were reafcsd under the direction of these leaders, including- (,)
^unification of the former French and British Cameroons (2) formation of a
federa, structure, and (3) po,itical mtegration
*e United RepubHc of Cameroon m
discussed with some detail in chapter three.
^roughou, their pohtica. ^ one wou|d
•ionUnated me political scene, o,,,^ Ws ^^ ^
Ahidjo, poHtica. M, and his manipulative abilities, pitting Foncha against his
Anglophone tnends and counter^ gaVe Him an edge over Foncha. After re-
-^cation and me formation of the federa! system in My .962, Ahidjo became
federal President while Foncha was his Vice President.
We shou.d point ou, to the office offedera. Vic-President performed
v«y me or no functions of significance. ^ federal constitution, no doubt,
recognized this insignificant and granted that the Vice-Presiden, conld retain"6
influence a, the state level. - He constitution a!so spelled ou, clearly that Foncha
was entitled to continue as Prime Minister of West Cameroon.- Foncha himself
decHned me office at the time of the firs, Vice-Presidentia. e.ectio, Ms
provision was auowed for the next five years, ma, is until 1967 and was to lapse in
1970- AhidjoreappointedS. T. Muna as Prime Minster of West Cameroon after
his e.ection as federa, Vice President in ,970. This had some significance worth
mentioning Technical i, br0Hght Foncha,s .
the same time elevated Muna to great political heights.
According ,„ Article 47 (2), (4) of the federal constitution, the Vice-
President was to reside in the federal capitaNYaounde. Foncha's constitutional
responsibility, therefore, to relocate to Yaounde no, on>y to cut „„, off Us
poHnca. base in Wes, Cameron, i, created a .eadership void with many eager
contest for me post of vice-President of me party. Foncha, favorite
candidate, we should point out, was ST. Muna agains, ^ poIitica| ^
Augustine N. Jua, We should poin, further that mese pohtica. eUtes hai,ed from
the grassfield region ofNorthwest. In a similar vein, Foncha supported Emmanue,
Egbe Tabi, for me vacant post of secretary general agatast N. Ekhah-Nghaky, both
from me fores, region ofme Soumwest. Urformnateiy for Foncha, both Muna and
20 Rubin Neville, Cameroon; A
Federal 0™^,^
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Egbe Tabi lost the election to their opponents. This setback greatly undermined
Foncha's prestige and reputation in the region. As if these troubles were not
enough, Muna, Foncha's one time candidate, and supposed heir apparent, argued
that it was the constitutional prerogatives of the federal president to appoint the
premier in West Cameroon. However, as Neville has argued, Jua's supporters
asserted the right of the KNDP members in the State House of Assembly as bona-
fide individuals to be heard on this matter,22d to make the final call. A caucus vote
in 1965 favored Jua as Prime Minister.
In accordance with the will of the KNDP militants, Foncha refused to
submit his candidate, Muna's name to the president for consideration, and further
called on Muna to accept the will and decision of the party, hi a dramatic turn of
events, Muna refused to capitulate and was suspended along with seven of his
supporters from the party.^Cogrnzant of internal dispute among the West
Cameroon party elites, Ahidjo wasted no time in asserting himself as a role player
in the political affairs of the region. On his own initiative in June 1966, Ahidjo
gathered key figures of West Cameroon's political parties in Yaounde, joined by
the Prime Minister of East Cameroon. As Neville has observed, Ahidjo secured
the agreement of these political leaders within two days to dissolve all existing




Union Nationale Camerounaise/Cameroon National Union (UNC/CNU)."8
Clearly, Ahidjo's overarching goal of putting together ,^^^^^
achieved mainly on ideological imperatives. As he [Ahidjo] pu, i,, me single party
in Cameroon came about at leas, because of a 'bold and rigorous analysis' of the
political realities of the federation.24
What we have noted thus far is that Ahidjo's interactions with West
Cameroon's political elites revo.ved around half a dozen men. Interesting all
the leaders with whom Ahidjo dealt with, either as Prime Minister, fe4eral Vice-
rodent, and later speaker of the National Assembly, were all from me grassfield
region of West Cameroon. We should also point ou, that KNDP's final decision to
dissolve tojoin the UNC/CNU was made in Bamenda, Northwest Province. As we
shall later discuss, Bamenda, the Northwest provincial capital, will be used by
Ahidjo's success., Biya, ,„ bring to an «,„ „,, CNU ^^^^^.^
party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). Tnese facts,
coupkd witi, their daring and pushfilI nature ^ ^u^^^
polindly and economically from Ahidjo's patronage system.2' In 1972, for
example, after successful political integration of East and West Cameroon, Ahidjo
appointedS. T. Muna, a pro-umficationis, and federal Vice-Presiden, as speaker of
me Nati^al Assembly. TU. appointment, we should emphasize, p,a«d Muna as
24 1
25
KOtfs Speech lo He NattonaT Council of^ UNC/CNU> N<Jvember
]%7
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Ahidjo entered a room, the temperature seem to drop by 10 degrees." He was
reserved and secretive. Under his leadership, Cameroonians enjoyed political
stability as well as economic prosperity. However, these dual achievements were
obtained at the expense of individual freedoms-such freedom of speech, freedom
of the press, and freedom to associate. These freedoms were minimally allowed
by the president, whose internal security networks were reported as the most
effective in Africa.27 Ahidjo's relentless efforts to effect a smooth transition to his
successor, and later, his attempts to overthrow his successor's regime, attest to the
complex nature of Cameroon's premier leader.
Populist-Prophetic Leadership Style: Paul Biva
The second category of leadership style we will examine and which reflects the
pattern adopted by Biya, is the Populist-Prophetic leadership style. Scholars have
characterized this style as a contemporary version of the charismatic leadership
style, with many attributes of early autocrats.28 Biya took over the political mantle
of Cameroon after nearly twenty-three years of Ahidjo's rule, in which he (Ahidjo)
managed to impose his will on Cameroonian politics and the conduct of
Cameroonian governmental affairs.29 Biya, we should point out, was part of
26 Tikum Mbah Azonga, "The Man Biya: A Man of the People," West Africa. November 1,1987,
2212.
27 "Cameroon: Political Pressures," Africa Confidential. Vol 18, no. 9, April 29, 1977,2.
28 Naomi Chazan et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. 160.
29 Victor T. LeVine, "The Politics ofPresidential Succession," Africa Report. May-June, 1983,26.
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Ahidjo's government and an able "lieutenant," who joined the civil service
under Ahidjo in 1962. It was therefore assumed that Biya would continue with
Ahidjo's policies. However, as future events will reveal, Biya did not only
abandon some of his mentor's policies and agenda, he charted a new political
course for Cameroon establishing his own personality and unique leadership style.
Biya brought with him a set of new political objectives encapsulated in his "new
Deal" program. The President promised to "gradually liberalize and democratize"
the Cameroon society, ensuring open debate of ideas, the multiplicity of candidate
for elections, as well as the free choice of leaders of all political levels.
Biya's leadership style, according to Mario Azevedo, confirms that he
is deliberate and methodical in his approach to statesmanship.31 His countrymen
believe he is more sincere and considerate, and has the interest of Cameroonians at
heart. Earlier in is presidency, most Cameroonians described Biya as "a man who
mixes, a man of the people."32 Biya's cordial relationship with Cameroonians is
revealed in the leader's ability to draw huge crowds wherever he visited. In
Douala, the provincial headquarters of Littoral, Biya was honored and initiated
into the society of the traditional rulers.33 Similarly in January 1985, the President
30 Asonglefac Nkemleke, "Democratic Pursuit," West Africa. November 1, 1987,2205.
31 Mario Azevedo, "The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon," Current History. May 1987, 220.




accepted to be crowned "Fon of Fons," the highest traditional title in the
grassfield regions of the Northwest. This title was conferred upon the President
under the auspices of the fons of Bali, Bafut, Kom, Mankon, and Nso. Biya
demonstrated his seriousness and respect for the rights and tradition by appearing
in public, shrouded in his traditional robes. During the Agro-Pastoral Show in
Bamenda-Northwest Province in 1984, Biya, again, walked through the crowds,
willingly savored dishes offered him, and chatted freely and warmly with
exhibitors. Biya's personality and charisma are revealed clearly in the following
statement:
Usually when he is waving to crowds and is overwhelmed,
he clasps his hands and waves them over his head
relentlessly with his usual smile. Had it been Ahidjo, he
might not have waved back; even if he did, it would be with
a stern look.34
Lastly, Cameroonians saw in Biya a certain gentle attitude and
unpretentious disposition. He was endowed with infinite patience and evoked
hope in the future. Anglophones saw in Biya a leader who had concerns for their





Biva and the New Consensus
Like his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, Biya understood the diverse
and complex nature of Cameroon society and promised to work within the existing
framework to strengthen national integration. His attempts in fulfilling this
realization are depicted in numerous excerpts from the president's speeches and
interviews in Cameroon and abroad with Cameroonian citizens. At the close of
his speech at the Fifth National Council of the CNU in Yaounde on November 21,
1982, for example, the president made his stance on national unity apparent with
the following words: "The consolidation of national unity must remain our major
concern; it must be preserved at all cost."35
In an interview with the national daily news, the Cameroon Tribune.
Biya echoed the same message of unity in the following statements:
I, therefore, urge the people of Cameroon ... to remain
vigilant in order to preserve and constantly strengthen this
unity and consensus which are never acquired once and for
all, but must be conquered each day so that Cameroon,
despite foiling and defying maneuvers of any kind, from
whatever they may come, maneuvers of diversion or
confusion, of speculation or dramatization, of
demoralization or destabilization, can remain a strong,
united, peaceful, prosperous and just state.36
Throughout his official visits to the provinces, the president kept his
message of unity at the top of his agenda. In his end-of-year message to the
35 d;,.-!,
1982.
Biya's closing speech at the Fifth National Council of the CNU in Yaounde, November 21,
36
Cameroon Tribune. January 18,1983.
nation, for example, Biya emphasized the need and importance of unity and'"
solidarity to a young nation like Cameroon. He offered this in the following
words:
2 ^ ! sOmulated by *e successes so achieved,
showed Ae* awareness mat progress can only be £3
through meir own efforts, that is, through theiraSto
~Jf£L"nationaI developnient *-
Further in his official tour of Maroua, »e provincia. headquarters ofme
Far Norft, Biya revisited me issue of unity as an invaluabfe mechanism in me
developmental goals of Cameroon. The president elaborated on me subject in the
following statements:
manner the same common^
WhUe addressing 4e people of me Centre-South Province on toe 11,
1983, the president equally admonished citizens of the region to work together ,„
realize goals ofCameroon. He expressed these in the foHowing words
-Message to the Nalion," Yaounde, December 31,1982.
liiiili
Btf Between Ahidio and Biv, w ;- .mr|in|i|,,,
We shaU examine fte nature rf .^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
Cameroon relation, On November 4, ,982, president Ahmadou Ahidjo
decision ,„ transfer power to his Prime Minister Paul Biy, „* move, according
.0 Michael Schafcberg, was hailed as a statesmanlike gesture and met with near-
-iversa, approval. « One wou,d have expected, given the circumstances, ^
president Ahidjo would have done eve^thing in his power to ensure a cann and
-ooth transition to the new regime. Unfortunately, the ex-presiden,, alleged
conspiracy against his successor in 1983, and the fai,ed mi,^ conp ^ of
April 1984 to topple the government of president Biya, cast a da* cloud on the
W presides sincerity of re,inquishing the reigns of power. Kor example
*>ugh Ahidjo stepped do™ as president of the Repubhc, he r«ained me J
powerful position of chainnan tf^^^^^^^ ^^
president a«empted ,„ amend the constitution in which the par,y, n0, the president
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would be responsible for national policy decisions of the country, to . p^
interview with the national news daily, TMCameroojUnbune, on January 31,
1983, Ahidjo declared tha, the parry was responsible for defining poHcies, which
the government would implement* This strategy by Ahidjo in essence, was
desigued to dictate po^s „«* me ^ whfle ^ fa ^ ^.^
remained a powerless figure head. This bicephalism in leadership, Joseph
Takougang has succinctly pointed out, resulted in a series of
Ahidjo and his successor Paul Biya.47
We should stress that the unsuccessful piracy against the Biy.
government in .983 and the failed miHtajy revolt of 1984 changed me political
dynamics in Cameroon. As Victor LeVine has noted:
Cameroon Trih.,,^ 31 j 983
^aTi5KssasasK?a^Mawar
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stabilise the cZtly" oust Biya's regime and
—y. almough m noticeable
n^n between Ahidjo and Biya has been highlighted, espe.ia.lv in their
dealing with Angiophone, it is important neverthe.ess, re.evan, to note to both
- we* determined to main and re-enforce the
Unship be^een East and West Cameroon. WhUe Ahidjo used the succession




PAUL BIYA AND POLITICAL REFORMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-
WEST CAMEROON RELATIONS 1982-1997
When Biya assumed the Presidency, he assured Cameroonians that he
would continue with the programs and policies of Ahmadou Ahidjo, his
predecessor. Biya's activities as Prime Minister, however, did not offer any clues
as to his policies and principles. It was therefore conceived that the new leader
would not deviate from the policy footsteps of his mentor. Ahidjo's image, his
leadership style, his constitutional and "political shoe," we should add, were too
large for Biya to fill. As events would later reveal, through Biya's speeches and
his actions, it was apparent that the President was not willing to be perceived as
Ahidjo's political "puppet." Instead, Biya embarked on creating his own image
and political vision for Cameroon.
Through the years, Biya recognized the extent of repression that Ahidjo
tolerated and how hypersensitive the regime was toward criticisms, more
importantly, how detached the regime was to the public. The president was
therefore determined first to "liberalize" and "democratize" the society, allowing
greater individual freedom, free exchange of ideas as well as tolerance for
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opposing political points of views.1 Early indications of the President's actions
were the proliferation of independent newspapers, some of which were critical of
the President's "snail-paced" reforms and policies. Paradoxically, Biya's actions
failed to eliminate his predecessor's repressive laws of March 12, 1962 and June
19, 1967 respectively which restricted citizens' freedom of expression and
association. Under the guise of the antisubversion decree of 1962, journalists and
Cameroonians who were against or criticized the regime were dealt with severely.
Individuals found liable for publishing or reproducing rumors, false statements,
reports, or tendentious comments deemed "harmful" to the state were fined and/or
imprisoned.2 Under Ahidjo's 1962 antisubversion laws, two international
magazines, West Africa and Jeune Afrique were banned from circulation. Under
Biya, these magazines and other newspapers were allowed to operate without the
stringent censorship of the past. Cameroonians were also encouraged by Biya to
make "constructive criticisms" of the government and its policies without fear of
arrest, torture or detention.
The most significant reform instituted by the president was to
demystify the Cameroon National Union party (CNU), permitting competitive
elections at all levels of the party's hierarchy. Biya's goal was to utilize the party
lPaul Biya, Communal Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1987), 26-38.
2Cited in Phillippe Lippens and R. A. Joseph, "The Power and the People," in Richard Joseph, ed,
Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidio (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978),
114.
150
as a platform for national development and a forum through which free
discussions of ideas could be achieved. Indeed, Biya wanted a "democratic" party
with contested elections rather than political elites picking and choosing party
candidates. The goal of Biya's new approach was to blend "new blood" in to the
party structure by permitting voters to select candidates they believe would best
serve their interests.
These bold and "revolutionary" proposals however, were too much for
entrenched party elites to accept. As Takougang has observed, these proposals
were rejected by party officials mainly because those who controlled the reigns of
power,—members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the CNU—
were hangovers of the ancient regime, who owed their political fortunes to Ahidjo.
Another reason advanced by Takougang for resistance by the party elites was that
it threatened their stay in power and made their political futures doubtful.
Biya's victory against Ahidjo in the feud over party and policy control
resulted in some dramatic changes in the country. A major move by Biya to shake
off the shackles of Ahidjo was to propose amendments to the constitution of 1972.
By Presidential Decree no. 84-001 of February 1984, for example, Biya abolished
the name, United Republic of Cameroon, replacing it with the Republic of
Cameroon or La Republique du Cameroon. Recall that the name, La Republique
du Cameroon was the pre-unification name of East Cameroon, which gained its
independence in 1960. Some Anglophone elites have argued fervently that Biya's
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unilateral decision was tantamount to the secession of La Republique du
Cameroon from the union; thus, Anglophones had the rights to declare a separate
state of their own. Biya further abolished the post of Prime Minister, which was
created in 1975 by his predecessor, Ahidjo, who made him (Biya) Prime Minister.
Politics of Partition
The events of April 6, 1984 also triggered administrative changes in the
country, resulting in the partition of the Northern and Center-South Provinces ( see
map showing partition of Cameroon into ten political and administrative units
after April 1984, Appendix G). Recall in our last section that after political
integration in 1972, Ahidjo partitioned West Cameroon into Northwest and
Southwest provinces. Although administrative expediency and "bringing
government closer to the people" was Ahidjo's rationale for the partition, it is
evident that this strategy was designed to exploit the differences (political,
cultural, social and economic) of the grassfield and the forest/coastal people of
West Cameroon. Paradoxically, the North province which constituted one-third of
the country (in land and population) was not partitioned. We should state that
Ahidjo was from the North and wanted to maintain his stronghold of the region
under the leadership of his hometown, Garoua. We should further point out that
the people of Adamawa and Far North resented Garoua's hegemony in the region
as well as inadequate resource distribution to their zones.
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Source: Ministry ofEconomic Affairs and Planning, 1976 Census
When Biya assumed the presidency, he was already aware of the plight
of the people ofAdamawa and Far North regions. The aftermath of the April coup
provided him the opportunity to fulfill his promises to the people. Biya broke up
the former North Province into three autonomous provinces—Adamawa, North and
Far North Provinces. This move neutralized the stronghold of Ahidjo's
hometown, Garoua and gained Biya Northern political support. In a similar vein,
and to avoid any appearances of playing regional politics through partition, Biya
partitioned the Center-South region into two separate administrative entities, later
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referred to as Center Province and South Province respectively. Some
observers have argued that Biya's goal was to prevent any ethnic group in the
region from dominating the others, especially the more ambitious and politically
aggressive Ewondos, Etons, Bafias and Bassas from overshadowing the Boulous.
(See map of Cameroon showing partition of the former North and South-Center
Provinces in 1984).
Clearly, as Table 5 reveals, Ahidjo's objective was to prevent solidarity
among Anglophones, more so than any suggested imperative. Both in terms of
land area and population, the table shows that the North Province was about four
times larger than West Cameroon with one-third the population. Similarly, the
South Center Province with the second largest land area with one- fifth of the
population remained a single political/administrative unit. Broadly therefore, one
would argue that president Ahidjo's goal was designed to employ the old colonial
strategy of "divide and rule" to keep Francophones intact, while preventing
cohesion among Anglophones, a's strategy of creating a new consensus was
designed therefore to establish himself and consolidate his hold on power away
from the stigma of Ahidjo. In September 1983, Biya convened an emergency
party congress of the CNU in the capital, Yaounde, in which party elites elected
him chairman. Shortly thereafter, the president called for a presidential election in
January 1984. We should point out that elections were originally scheduled for
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1985.3 Biya, emerged victorious in this uncontested election, and strengthened
by the mandate from the citizens. Reinvigorated by this mandate, the president
convened the Fifth Ordinary Congress of the CNU in March of 1985 in Bamenda,
Northwest province. Although the Congress achieved nothing substantive, it
nevertheless, scored some major political points. At the Congress, the name of the
party was changed from the Cameroon National Union to the Cameroon People's
Democratic Movement (CPDM).
The significance of this move was that it marked the effective end of
the Ahidjo-CNU era on the one hand and the beginning of the Biya CPDM era on
the other. Also significant was that Biya's men replaced Ahidjo's loyalists in the
party bureaucracy.4 Biya, President of the "New Deal" or the ""Renoveau"" was
determined not only to liberalize and democratize the regime, but to infuse young
men into politics, utilizing their skills and intellectual abilities to reconstruct the
Cameroonian society.
Biya's decision to launch his CPDM party in Bamenda, Northwest
Province had some profound implications. First, it was in Bamenda that the
KNDP party of Foncha, Muna, and Jua decided in 1966 to dissolve and merge
with Ahidjo's Union Camerounaise (UC) to form what was later known as the
CNU. Secondly, Biya's strategy of launching the birth of his party in Bamenda,
3 Mario Azevedo, "The Post Ahidjo Cameroon," 217.
4 Lovett Z. Elango, "Pretenders, Progressives Populists and the struggle for Change in Cameroon"
1982-1992,6.
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Northwest Province was to assure Anglophones, especially the politically
aggressive Northwesterners of his concern for the plight of the English-speaking
Cameroonians. Ironically, it will be from Bamenda six years afterwards that Biya
will face the most unprecedented challenge to his regime and party.
Biva and the Progressives
A key strategy designed by Biya and his aides to dismantle the party
machine ofthe CNU, was to call for party reforms. The President, early on, stated
that the party must be able to "convince Cameroonians of good faith, whoever they
are, wherever they are, whatever they think, that it was no longer necessary to go
underground, or to go into exile in order to be able to discuss political issues at
stake."5 The President's insistence that multiple candidates be allowed to run for
party posts and for legislative elections, saw new faces in the National Assembly.
As Elango has clearly stated, this move gave young Cameroonians the hope that
substantial changes were possible within the one party framework.6 This
optimism gave hope and rise to the Progressives or liberal wing of the party,
which included faculty members of the University, businessmen, lawyers and civil
servants. As Elango has further noted, these Progressives pressed for more
substantive changes along the lines postulated in Biya's Communal Liberalism.
5 Asonglefac Nkemleke, "Democratic Pursuit," West Africa, November 9,1987, 2205.
6 Lovett Z. Elango, 6.
7 Ibid,
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Critics have charged that Biya's reforms were more symbolic then
real, that they were designed for public consumption than to effect real political
change.8 A key indication that Biya's political reforms were more "artificial" than
substantive was apparent when the Progressives demanded that the president
summon a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPDM party. Despite Biya's
refusal to heed to the demands of the Progressives, he nevertheless called a
meeting of the lesser body, the politburo. Furthermore, although Biya out-
maneuvered the Progressives, he nevertheless paid a heavy price for his strategy.
The president's resistance and rebuff of the demands of the Progressives
demonstrated that the president's promises and commitment to genuine political
reforms were more self-seeking than real. A second implication was that it
revealed to the public the impotence of the Central Committee and its inability to
resist political pressures from the president.9 This scuffle between Biya and the
Progressives tarnished Biya's reputation with the public as a true reformer, while
the Progressives gained an increasingly receptive and sympathetic audience
including workers, petty traders, hawkers and even some white collar workers.
These groups, we should point out, would be instrumental in the political
transformations that will ensue in the 1990s.
8 Joseph Takougang, "Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform," 165.
9 Lovett Z. Elango, "Pretenders, Progressives, Populists and the Struggle for Change in Cameroon"
1982-1992,6.
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The assertion that economic decline played a key role in precipitating
demands for democratic ideals and promoted political exfremism in Cameroon in
me !990s remains an undisputed fact Despite the consensus on the vahdity of
this assertion one cannot however, underestimate the influence and contributions
of non-economic ftctors in shaping the politica. dynamics of the c^. ^
non-economic ftctors provide meaning insights of the genesis of Biya's
politica. chaUenges in tt,e 1990s and helps us pu, into proper „«„. &e
-sons for Ang.ophone agitation and dissatisfaction with the Francophone
dominated regime. Biya, politica. duties can Wore be examined and
"■alyzed by focusmg on bod, intema! and externa, circumstance,
Internal
Students and scholars of Cameroon politics have offered varied, yet
compelling exp.anatio*, ofme causes ofpresident Biya, politica, problems in the
.«e .980s and ,990, As we pointed out^ Biya,s^^^^
hnnsef as leader and away from ffie shadows of his predecessor, mean, he W to
Cameroon pe^.e, but wou,d counter the entrenched interests of the politica!
baron, ^e present's c^nnutment to bring about meaningft, change in the
country wou,d Wore be seen as effective, if i,^ ta^^^
bonom-up. r* first steps in mis process was to democratic the choice of
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party leaders through competitive elections at all levels of the party. Biya
further called for reorganization of the basic organs of the party, advocating that
able young men and women be permitted to seek high positions in the party
hierarchy. This strategy of marginalizing the status quo alienated most of the
barons, whose desires were to continue with the system as it existed. This struggle
between the status quo- "Les homines de L'ancien regime" and Biya's "Les
homines du ""renouveau""" (the men of the New Deal), diminished the president's
ability to lead, particularly after the failed attempted coup of 1984. Furthermore,
the president's political challenges increased significantly as he systematically
purged cabinet members whose ties and allegiance to the former leader remained
strong, as well as those ministers whose loyalties were doubtful, or others whose
job performances were unsatisfactory. All these changes, needless to say, served
as major political challenges to the president as he sought to build and maintain a
new consensus.
The president's next political challenge was with the Cameroon people,
from whom he had enjoyed enormous support. When Biya took office, he
promised through his "rigor" and "moralization" to curb government excesses
including corruption, embezzlement, tribalism and lack of productivity by
government workers or civil servants. The president further promised
Cameroonians that individuals who engaged in such evil practices will be
investigated and brought to justice. Biya's failure to deliver on his promises to
scale back corrupt and tribalism, had a chuling effect among
Cameroonians. As a former government employee pu, i, -Biya, a man whom
Cameroonians trusted Wou,d deliver justice based on moral princip.es, turned into
a moral misfit"10
In another interview win, a physics professor of the Bnea University
me same negative remarks were echoed when asked about the President's handling
ofcormption, embezzlement and tribal matters. He simply put i, mus.
THese comments reflect the disappointment with the President by most
Cameroonians who argue that the President, lax enforcement of anti-common
poucies was because his tribesmen (the Betis) were me masterminds of these evil
P^ces. When asked in our survey the most serious issae^ „^fte
um,y of the counhy, more than (72 percent) of the respondents identified tribalism
and caption as key. * „ 1bmtia not
Jam.uy* 1997.
president Biya's government has focused on these i
manifest themselves in slogans both in
communities.
Anglophone
President Biya's greatest political challenge emerged in ,990 with the
of me president of the Cameroon Bar Association, Yondo Black m ^
for alleged attemp. to form m^^ fc fc ^^
,0 their arres, however, was mat BU.k and his associates he,d secret and
gatherings in violation of me law of association adapted in ,962
-n, Jiggered me .aunching of me S^ia, Democratic Front (SDF) par,y in
, Northwest Province. Mhough me president « initiaUy encouraged
competition at various ,eve,s w*hin the






- "Sht. He therefore argued m. in a multiethnic countiy Hfce Camera
-tip, pohtica, parties win serve as a divisive indent ma, would hinder
-a, and economic grown, Biya succinctly arg.s in favor of one-par* system
m the following statements:
together f°' bringing
of human resources, especially i
SZ"^"? *"*."invaluable'» **«-*?country. For how could we ensure the efficient running
!ffiri£ r ^ "* poBti"1 leanin8s ofme few «£«officials Cameroon now has were to be torn between several
opposition parties, thus creating for any ruling ^gtae m
insurmountable crisis ofpower?" "« regime an
Although the president has eloquently a«gued against muMpartyism,
citing the possibilities of balkanization of me county a,ong emnic m regjona)
lines, his appeal nevertheless, seems to be geared towards preserving his authority
under the one-party system.
The president's most potent political challenge surfaced in March 1990
with the formation of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) party formed in
Bamenda, Northwest Provincial headquarter, [The] Anglophone party, as most
people refer to ft, emerged as a result of the events in Douala and the increasing
discontent among Cameroon partly Angbphones of their decHning
socio-economic standards in the country. to May ,990, SDF applied for permit
ftom me government for an inaugura, ,aunch ^ „, ^ ^ ^ ^
government ,„ grant mis request resulted in defiance by party faithful of
adminis^ve orders. This event led * a b.oody clash befcveen government
forces and civiiians, resulting in me deams of six individuals and hundreds others
injured. This was the firs, time citizens outnghtly defied government orders, and
Prepared the stoge for other acts of defiance in the years ahead.
"ESSTI,£SytBij3(Y«»ffl(fc,Caa1«K.n: topnxsieK Em, 1987): 44.
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Implications
politica. events of early ,990 as described above had some
and Caching conseqllences &r
who,, !n June 1990, for examp,e ^
by worsening economic conditions, president Biya announced A,
adoption of a multiparty system was imminent and later outUned a series of
^rms * be undent by the government, inc.uding the ,aw prohibiting
^ association (under which Vondo B,ack and his assies were
in April). ne president^ ^^
and summoned a commit whose tas, was „ fonnulilte legislation „„^
ngh.. Two monms toer, hundreds of poUtica. prisoner were re.eased induding
Vondo Blac, PinaUy, on December 5, ,990, the nation^ assemb,y approved a
constitutional amendment providing for me estabhshment of a muKpar* system
in the countiy.
Pohtical pluraUsm in Cameroon as in other countries in the worid,
.nggered anomer major poUtica, development. As poHtica, parties emerged in
Bamenda, Douala and other provinces of the republic, suspicion sfcrted mounting
a-g me Betis. As Tamlu Hanson h« argued, this suspicion gave rise to Beti
"maintain Biya in power." As 4e various
Be«i oHgarchy, Biya used his strategy to raUy ^
vehement argued tha, the goal of the other parties was ^ ^
-oving »in> from office, bu, again, the Beds as an etoc group, ^e Ben
-*** «m a,so be eviden, according to Tamfl, in me l992 president
elections.
11'eNaH"'"1'r""f-nirr nnl in, Tmjiii
Resu.gence ofdemocratic pressure and spiraling violence in most cities
■n the county forced Biya, beleaguered government * seek other pohtical
solutions, n. opposition pari(ies „ CwKtomu ^jbm^^^s
of the ^ationa. conference" strategy utiU.ed by opposition parties in Benin,
Gabon, Congo Ma>i, Togo and Niger, and they worked in unison caUing for a
nationa. conference. The national conference, according to WaUer S. Clarke is a
-odel for an insfrumentaBty ofmobi^g and chaimelillg^
of *e population, n. goal of me ^^^^^^ ^ ^^ ^
P-iously Cosed poUnca, doors for debate, mus enabung poUtica. deve-opmen,
- • —flr «o fester, to ^er change the character of the poutica,
environment.- Even though mis stingy fOT managing poUtical reconcihation was
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successful in former French territories mentioned above, in Cameroon,
however, this strategy was less fruitful. Biya tactfully out paced the opposition by
refusing to adhere to the oppositions' demands for a sovereign national conference.
As Lovett Elango has succinctly argued, the President avoided a potentially
inquisitorial sovereign national conference and instead summoned a Tripartite
Conference in Yaounde from October 30 to November 13, 1991.16
Participants of this conference included representatives of the
government, civic and religious leaders, representatives of the ruling CPDM party
as well as representatives of the various opposition parties. Although "nothing"
substantive was achieved in the conference, according to some opposition
members, participants, nevertheless agreed on some key decisions which were
later put together and called the Tripartite Accords of November 13, 1991. The
most significant achievement of the conference was the decision to create a
technical body to review and revise the constitution of the country. As some
observers have pointed out, Biya used the Tripartite Conference to cool the
political barometer in Cameroon, at the same time, seek ways to further prevent
solidarity among the various opposition parties. Biya's second goal was achieved
when opposition leaders started pointing fingers at each other for having "sold out"
to Biya, particularly leaders who signed the Tripartite Accord. Furthermore, when
Biya denied access to the national television (CRTV), to opposition leaders as
16 Lovett Z. Elango, "Pretenders, Progressives, Populists and the Struggle for Change in
Cameroon, 1982-1992," 14.
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agreed previously, it became apparent to these leaders with the exception of
John Fru Ndi of SDF, that Biya could not be trusted. Thus far, Biya's ability to
manipulate his opponents and keeping them confused and in disarray had
succeeded. But as Lovett Elango has observed, the President's maneuvers "far
from easing tensions and restoring mutual trust and confidence between the
government and the people, the Tripartite fiasco only intensified the mutual
distrust"17
Another significant achievement of Biya over his political opponents
during the Tripartite Conference was his ability to limit the scope of the discussion
to constitutional matters. As Jean-Germain Gross has noted:
Unlike national conferences in other African countries,
where the terms of reference covered a whole range of
issues—from the first days of independence to the present—
the Cameroon tripartite meeting was restricted to the
constitutional reform.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the President and his aides led
the opposition leaders at the talks to believing that electoral and constitutional
reforms would be tackled first before legislative and presidential elections
scheduled in March and October 1992. As it turned out, those reforms did not
materialize, thus, both elections were governed by the old or existing electoral
17
Ibid, 15.
18 Jean-Germain Gros, "Whither Authoritarianism in Cameroon? An Examination of the 1992
Presidential Elections." The Democratic Challenge in Africa. Discussion Papers from a Seminar on
Democratization, The Carter Center ofEmory University, May 13-14,1994,153.
166
laws, which authorized the minister of territorial administration to run the
19
elections.
President Biya's tactical maneuvers continued unabated as he further
promised early legislative elections for March of 1992 and presidential elections
for October of 1992. Scholars have argued that the president's strategy was to "cut
the opposition off guard" by announcing these elections earlier than originally
scheduled, that is, April of 1993. The President further promised that he would
appoint the next Prime Minister from the party that won majority in the Assembly.
It is important to point out that the President's pledge to appoint the next Prime
Minister meant he/she (the Prime Minister) would be answerable to him, the
president and subject to dismissal at the president's pleasure. Secondly, it
indicated that the leadership of the party was powerless to appoint a prime
minister further making the president supreme.
Even though Biya's strategy for early elections was to inflict what
would be described as a political "KO" punch to the opposition, results of both the
legislative and presidential elections would prove otherwise. As Table 6 shows,
Biya's CPDM failed to win an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. Below, is
















































Socia. De,nocratic Front (SDF), the mOst ^^ rf ^
~~**~*e legU^e elections has been^ as the voca, lea,,
*- water,00. Biya chtri m ^ ^




™s SDF, boycott of the legislative elections, despite the participation
of other opposition parties, has raised serious questions both in Cameroon ^
uaernationally. „ is possib.e tha, had the SDF participated in the elections, Biya
and the CPDM wouTd no, have attained 88 of me AssemWy seats. As the «.
u-dicates, i, is however doubtful u, say the leas, if an Northwestern^ who voted
CPDH wou,d have done so with SDF, presence. I, is equaUy uncertain whemer
* loyal* of many of me Normweaw ^^^^^^^
s»ch as Achidi Ach, the PM Alcum Fomum, Francis Nkwain, John Neba
as weU as Uwre-c Fonka Shanfe Speaker of me House of me Assembly
would cross the political -carpefand vote for Fru Ndi, one of their „W Despite
*e specuUtions and uncertainties as to the voting patterns, a few mings remain
SDF, wimdn.wa! ftom the elections gave Biya the needed mandate, even
hiwassmaUtoexertcon.olov^,^,,,^^
Fru Ndi, image and popular*, ^^^^^-
ahm me SDF elites. Another significant reveUtion from the legislative election
was that it foUowed bo* regional and efcnic Unes. Bo»ba BeUo Maigari of
™«P wo. aU seats in the North and Adamawa regions, but Biya and CPDM
ed
woo a., seats in the North and Ada-nawa region, but Biya and CPDm
were able to saatch the Par North region fa. ^p. Meanwhile ^ fc
^ and Sou, province, fc ^ cpDM ^ ^ ^ ^^
m the Sourest (AngIophone), West and UttoraI, North and
proving the UNDP registered big victories. !n Cosin.^ it
would be p™dent to argue that SDPs boycott of fl.e .egisla^ve elections aUowed
B»ya to gain a Wor,dng
Perfonnance in the .egislanve elections .nay have encou^d and lured Joh» Fm
Ndi and fc SDF party^ „
1992 Pr^irt
ad<ire
"Cding of preside elections « October 1,, ,«. TOs
,d point ou, was origillalIy ^^ to ^^ ^ iw3 bfore
—y, k wom ^ to exmine some ^^^^^
ng the elections, tinun. ^e availabffity . ^ ^
Ca.eroon, ^W presidentja,^ fc^^^^^^
of a .nassive .rnou, bu, because of bespread nregulaHties, from „„„,
* Party " We" ^ ^ 0^°»— Son,e Scho,ars have .ised
-stions for
As WGermam Gross has succinctly argued, the presidential
, Cameroon waS marked by gr0Ss un^ss of fte^
-uting mis fcUure to factors »ch as tirnm. mechanic, resource
- -», ana a.mnis.ation and conflict resolution procedure, He m^^d




was me role of me minister of ^toria,
the
*■
on was m charge of ci. servants, it rai
raised questio. of
opposition challenged the government and called for an i,
electoral commission to conduct the
by the governs a Nationa. Commission of the Final Counting of Votl
(NCFCVOwassetup.23
IHe third question raised regarding fairness of Cameroon's presidential
elections in 1992 concerns equal or equitable access to
presidential contest, Some observers have argued l, LZTJl«
afforded equal air time in (he public media, particularly me radio and televisi
(CRTV), which is the most a^ssib.e source of information andZJlZT
ofCameroonian, tofaimess, however, president Biya, by virtue ofhis position as
-umbent, enjoyed aU the privileges of his position as other .eaders in the
developed and less developed countries.
These key issues raised wul be me basis and grounds for problems after
•he final result, of me electjon On^^^ ^^^^^^
" - - vote, either to re-elec, me incumbent or a new leader. Below are results
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east against John Fm Ndi and the SOP, 3,9%, and BeUo Maiga. and
'9 "" * «« oy some independent
ohse^ers hke fte NDI. when the Supreme Court finally declared Mr. Biya the
"inner of me election, a number of violent demonstrations erupted to
Bamenda, Northwest province as well as Douala in me Littora, province
Although me opposition charged me Biya government with electoral fraud, in
faoness, we should s»te ma, mere were widespread irregularities on bom ^
w*h «.e SDF also engaging in e.ectora, matfeasance. For example, in me
aS-ath of me presidential election, me SDF priced two conflicting set, of
«* figures without bothering to offer my
coBected and reasons for the discrepancies.24
My interview with miUtants of bom me ruUng party and opposition
"eluding intimidation and bribes. As one sympamizer of the CPDM pu, it, ^
were here firs, we know me comers and the depths of me poUtica. whole we
W when to jump or walk over moms.- Similarly^ of me SDF
boasted ma, they ^paged peop.e who supported cormpt Biya, One of me
■foot sobers- of the SDF, during my interview, s^ confidently me
words in Hdgin HngUsh: We dey for Ni John m
■-er don fcus, (SDF) we go make yi suffer.- LiteraIly,
^ *"" Wh° re&S6d to^ *• °*«™» of »e Social Democratic Front
23, 1993.
(^-retofacesevereconseouence, TUs atinosphere ofintin^
franbo* sides mav have prevented many Can,eroonS from going to the poUs
-giona, and ethnie vo6ag^ We
S9% respective,y in fc ^^^
- -d. significant in roads fc fc West 71%
and Bast 6B%. Boft fte So«» and Center pmviaces
and .giona, base, Bjya
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thousand. TTese overrated turnout figures on* reinforce the argument
that electoral malpractice occurred on both sides ofthe poUtical parties.
As we have noted before, the Supreme Court's announcement or
declaration of Mr. Biva as the .992 winner of the presidential election triggered
™.en, protes* ^ demonstrations in some sfrongholds of the SDF party. m
Bamenda, the birthplace of fc party, for example, there were reports of brtfa,
assaults on individuals and their properties for their support of the CPDM.
TTe SDF employed several poMca. tactics to protest the election
-*, But ib most lethal^ wa$ fc .operatjon^^ ^ ^ FraKh
"operation viUes morte," in which widespread coercion and intimidation was use,
by party diehards to induce compHance. ^ese acts of civ. disobedience caned on
wo* stoppage by civil servant, merchant, school and olher essentia, services
Nodding the magniti.de and potentia, conseq«ences of such actions on the
**i% ofthecoumry.Biyaorderedthe forces of law and order top^ohnFru
Nd, SDF chah^an and several of his radica. supporters^^^^
* declared Bamenda and the Northwest province under a three-month
of emergency. AUhough the "ghost town" s*,tegy was successful initiaUy in
some of the non-Anglophone zones such as the Western province and Littora, the
momentum in these regions graduaUy sfcrfcd fading as economic hardship of the
People continued. b me Anyone regions of Northwest and Southwes,
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outcome or impact was differential. In the Southwest economic "capital"
of Kumba, for example, properties of individuals known to be supporters or
sympathizers of the ruling party were destroyed by SDF militants, including
destroying and burning down one of the biggest employers of the region,
Brasseries du Cameroon. In Bamenda, as well as other towns in the Northwest,
and to a lesser extent the Southwest, administrative and commercial activities were
almost brought to a halt. But, as Gros has convincingly argued, the opposition
may have underestimated Biya and the regime's stay in power. He further reminds
us that although the ghost town operation may have scared away investors,
reduced tax receipts, and to some degree embarrassed the Biya government, it may
have hurt the population even more.27 Anglophone school children were mostly
disadvantaged by this civil disobedience strategy as their counterparts in other
provinces continued school uninterrupted. Evidence also suggest that Biya's
regime, despite all the pressures, remained in control and never in any serious
danger, either threats of military insubordination or donor lack of confidence. On
the contrary, at the apex of the civil disobedience, the government concluded two
key accords with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the other with France
which forgave some of Cameroon's debt.28 The political misjudgement of John
Fru Ndi, the SDF, and the other opposition leaders on the impact of operation
27 Jean-Germain Gros, 155.
28 Ibid,
ghost town wou!d have in bringing Biya ,„ his knees failed to material
Meed, Gros has summarized succincdy reasons for the iack of success with mis
strategy in the following statements-
* the face of faUure, one is ^^ to ^ why ^^^^
«% and sustain the momentum to achieve its desired reaiIte. Severa.
or reasons may have heen response for m faUnre ^ rf fc reasons
for fauur, of the gKos, tow, opemion was that me opposition was unaWe to
Rafter. Some schCa. have argued convey tna, me s^tegy wou,d have
been success*., if fcey had used increment counts ofpressure on Biya as time
and circles caUed for. Second.y, the opposition beheved Biya was aheady
a weak president whose pohtica, surv^va, ,aid on the "canvas" However, once it
dawned on me opposinOn m Biya,s^^^^^^^^^
canva, me opposition iacked me mechanism to dehver the fina, pm,ch. Further-
'Ibid,
opposition par* on the
more, evidence of fragmentation within the
•own sti«egy and its impact on me ^
success.
When asked in our survey how effective and successful the opposition,
sabotage strategy of "operation ghost town/operation vn.es mortes" was onIy 21
percent of our respondents though, the strategy was poKticaHy and economically
successful forcing the government in making significant changes in the county
An overwhe,ming majori* of our
opposition, stnuegy « ineffective and unsucessfin. Responds stiUed ftat
•he srategy was flawedfor many reasons, including poor coordination and interna.
-usagree.en. among Ae opposition leader,. Respondents further pointed ontthat
*e sfrategy caused more economic hardships on citizens and tha, violent means ,„
achieve political goa,s was counter to what they oeHeved. One could argue tha,
*e civil disobedience s.a.gy of a. opposition ^
countiv. For examp,e, Biya, ahih* to bttffCT civil servant, the nnU^y md ofller
law enforcement components as weU as the tradition* ru.ers (chiefs) n.m the
advantage. Besides e«emal assistance from Flance and omer in^ationa,
<—I •. advance of incumbency provided Biya me oppo^ to use
-urces ,„ shieM the most significant in,^
. M
B-ya's success was atoned «o his se.ective .wards to key factors
-* responsible for regime ^3. ^^^
^8 His tour of the provinces in late 19,,. Focusjng on fc
B.ya echoed c^dentlv t0 ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ J
Yaounde is breathing, Cameroon will live."31
We sh0uM also point out that although Yaounde is the political capital
- - of government, i, is ^ Biya,s .^ ^^^^^^
arrested during the 1992 riots.
Havi,g olundered „ ^^ ^ ^^^ ^
3, formed a coaUtion caHed fte Union P0lff ,e Changement or Union
— and ChangeCUPC, * goal of me
Punishment on Fra,ee for supporting the Biya regime, ^e objective of the
opposition coalition was to boycott French
show of strength was
presidential election. Biya's government
'Ibid,
31 Ibid, 155-156.
(UPC) of attempting „ incite civil disorder and fimher destabiBze me
«-*y. As international pressure for reforms increased, Biya announced ma, the
national debate on constitutional reform was eminent by the end ofMay.
Meanwhile, after the ghos, toM1 fiasco> me ^on once again re-
grouped wim hopes of overcoming Biya and me CPDM. In ,,94, «he opposition
formed me AUiance For Change (AFC), a coalition comprised of sixteen parties
-luding the leading opposition, SDF. We should point out mat a former high
ieve. government officia,, Samuel Eboua of the Movement for Democracy and
degress (MOP) was part of me aliance. However, as Tafcougang h. argued, me
fiance wasriftwith ideologic, differences and rivahy among the variousparties
Pearly between me leader of Union Democratize du Came™ '
Adamou Ndan, NJOya, UNDP lewier, Bouba^^^^^^
John Fru Ndi. Marc Vared has su,,ed me obvious mat the chairman of
, John Fru Ndi was resented by me other opposition parties for his apparent
o« unsuccessfiU ca- for a national Terence »d for his ambig«ous
towards federalism.33
As if the dilemmas for me SDF
were reports of mtemaI
pany were no, enough, in April, mere
Yared,-Cameraui: u ban* de six.'J,
1723 (January 13-20,1994): 22.
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member of the SDF, Ben Muna called on the SDF to join the government
in its efforts for a national debate on constitutional reforms. Muna's appeal did not
resonate with most elites of the SDF and he was subsequently dismissed from the
party. In keeping with his promise for constitutional reforms, in addition to
mounting pressure from the international community, the government, in May of
1993, promulgated a draft constitutional amendments. The amendments called for
the creation of an upper legislative house, council of the state, decentralized (but
not a federalized) government system, provide a "high authority" to oversee the
civil service as well as limit the president's tenure in office to two five-year terms.
The constitutional provision also called for elections to comprise two rounds of
voting (a system more favorable to the opposition). These constitutional proposals,
according to Pierre Engelberg, were open to amendment by recommendations to
the technical committee.34
The Anglophone Phenomenon
Despite his concern with the opposition and their challenges, President
Biya's most troubling dilemma was with the English-speaking minority, comprised
of the Northwest and Southwest provinces. Recall that the president's major
political and party challenge started in Bamenda, the Northwest province, where,
ironically, the president was crowned Ton" of "Fons" in 1985. It was also in
Bamenda that Biya "buried" the CNU and gave birth to the CPDM in March 1985.
34 Pierre Engelberg, "Cameroon: Recent History" in Africa South ofthe Sahara (London: Europa
Publishers, 1994): 217.
Since taking office in J982, President Biya has had to dea?
«* one of me most polarizmg issues in Cameroon politics, me Anglophone
—* to , 985, fOT examp)e ^^^wae_ (o ^^^
«Wthe SouthwestandNo^estprovincesanda^join^ signed by both
groups with their eh.es based in Douala, the Li«oral province. In me same period,
a letter Was sent ,„ me British Prime Minster before the head of s^e, wooing
-* - London. The elites enu.nera.d their grieve^ ffie ^^^
"*•"^ ■* ^^ "** * — "amed me Francophone
dominated government of Ahidjo and Biya for failure t0 ^
« in me region, paroc^ h^^^^
and road ne^. On me pohtica, fron, me memory comp^d about
government discrimination in appointing Anglophones to high profile positions in
*e civil services, as weU as state ™n corporation, These elites fcrmer decried
unpunished cordon and embezz,en,en, of pubhc funds by Francophones in
*ese instils, particmarly in me oi, industry (Iocated m me e
region).
Anglophone region in 1990 to
-urces, but a retum of Cameroon to the federal system, which guaranteed some
-norny to West Caneroon. This demand orgar^d by me Cameroon
Anglophone Movement (CAM) took p,a« in me former West Cameroon capita,
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Buea. As Pierre Engelberg has observed, this demand by Anglophones
was far from unanimous. He argues strongly that even the SDF (Anglophone
party) was not in support of the proposed establishment of a federal state.
Similarly, far-right or radical Anglophone groups pursued a rather
separatist approach, calling for the secession of the English-speaking Cameroon
from La Republic du Cameroon. Since abolition of the country's name, United
Republic of Cameroon by Presidential Decree No. 84-001 in February of 1985
which was replaced with the pre-unification name of East Cameroon (La Republic
du Cameroon), Anglophone radicals have argued that French Cameroon, from a
technical standpoint, seceded from the union. They further argue that by adopting
the pre-unification name, Biya and the Francophones were, in essence, confirming
completion of their assimilation of English-speaking Cameroon into dominant
French culture. This unilateral withdrawal of East Cameroon from the Union the
elites maintain, meant the state of West Cameroon became "stateless." As
Takougang has observed, these radicals, called for the creation of a separate
English-speaking Cameroon with its own name, "Ambazonia."36
Despite the frustrations of these radical Anglophones with continued
Francophone dominance, we should caution that the views expressed by this group
is not in anyway shared by a majority of Anglophones. When asked in our survey
35 ibid,
36 Joseph Takougang, "Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform," 177.
what option respondents would most likely support m ta of
and remaining in the union ^ East Camera a majority of respondent, 53
percent of Anglophones *, mey prefeiTCd t0^ m ^^^^ ^
republic, bu, would like ,„ see major constitute and policy initiatives token by
•he government ,„ bridge the gap between East and West Cameroon. Also 29
percent of our respondents said mey preferred a return ,„ the federal system as i,
existed prior to unification in ,972 with some modifications in the citation
Only ,4 percent of our respondents ^^ ^ ^ ^^ _
autonomous West Cameroon with no ties to East Cameroon. About 4 percent of
our respondents said they were no, sure. AKhough jus, . ^^^ rf
Ang.ophones believe the region should separa. from East Cameron, me problem
ofAnglophone Cameroonians should not be taken for granted.
The fictions of Anglophones was evident in 1993 with the
formation of AU Ang.ophone Conference (ACC) in fte Soumwest
capi^ Buea in April ,«. Dming me ^^ ^^
exp.oi.tion of resources of me two Ang,ophone provinces for the economic
development of fte FrancopDOIle^^ ^
Perpe^ed by me predominantly Francophone nUing ^ md me ^ ^
Anglophone Cameroonians were freattd as "second-Cass citizen" in their own
^ aU Anglophone Conference (AACI) ^k place in
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Bamenda, the Northwest province to review the progress of the first
conference in Buea. The "Bamenda Proclamation", as the conference was known,
noted that "any union between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon would not
last, develop and prosper, unless it was built on a solid foundation and was
sustained by a greater degree of openness, trust, mutual respect, and a sense of
belonging by all." 38 Francophone "hostilities" against Anglophones is echoed
especially by Beti strongman, Emah Basile, during the tripartite talks in Yaounde.
Basile described the Anglophones as "Les ennemies dans la maison" or enemies of
the house.39 Although this attack was directed at SDF chairman John Fra Ndi,
who became Biya's political nemesis, it is evident that this characterization was
directed at Anglophones who had expressed their disgust with Francophone
dominance since integration in 1972. In fairness, however, we must point out that
Biya has listened to, and acted on some of the Anglophone demands since taking
office, particularly since the advent of multiparty system in Cameroon. We should
credit some of the reforms enacted by the president to the relentless efforts of the
opposition parties.
38 Cited in Tikum Mbah Azonga, "The Anglophone Problem".West Africa (June 20-26,1994),
1090.
39 Tamfu Hanson Ghandi, "Ayissi Mvodo: 'L'ennemi dans la maison."' The Pilot. Vol. 1 No. 1,
December 1996, 235.
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Southern Cameroons National Council: Leadership Paradox
Anglophone frustrations with the Biya and Francophone dominated
government re-emerged in October 1995, championed by the Southern
Cameroon's National Council (SCNC). The council adopted a proposed resolution
by the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) on October 1, 1995, calling for
independence of West Cameroon from French Cameroon. Led by SCNC
Chairman, Barrister Sam E. Elad, a delegation of prominent political elites of the
region traveled Washington, D. C. to launch the Southern Cameroon's Advisory
Council. The delegation included John N. Foncha, former Prime Minster of West
Cameroon and federal vice president of Cameroon after re-unification. We should
point out that Foncha was the major actor and advocate of re-unification of the two
entities in 1961. Another significant elite who accompanied the delegation was S.
T. Muna, also former prime minister of West Cameroon, federal vice president of
the Republic, and speaker of the National Assembly from 1973-1988. He was the
chief architect of integration of East and West Cameroon, and strongly supported
Ahidjo's strategy to abolish the federal system, which gave Anglophones some
leverage as an autonomous entity to decide on some key issues gennaine to the
region.
At this point, one is bound to inquire about the motivations behind
these leaders' mission to the United States. The purpose of this trip was for these
political elites to deliver a draft petition to the United Nations Security Council
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about the predicament of Southern Cameroons. Specifically, the draft
petition called for nullification of what the architects alleged was "illegal
annexation11 of Southern Cameroons and excessive exploitation of the region's
resources by La Republic du Cameroon. This delegation sent copies of the draft
petition to the government of her majesty the Queen of England, the
U.S.Department of State and some members of the diplomatic corps in
Washington, D. C.
There is, however, a certain irony in the activities of these leaders
which makes their intentions and motives not only suspect but their strategy and
timing questionable. First, Foncha, as we mentioned earlier, federal vice president
of Cameroon after re-unification in 1961, until his dismissal by the president,
Ahmadou Ahidjo, in 1970. Foncha was the main force in the Anglophone region,
advocating for re-unification of East and West Cameroon. Foncha was also
named Grand Chancellor from 1979 to 1990. Interestingly, through these years,
Foncha did not condemn or step down from his positions in government, neither
did he criticize Francophone dominated government for "illegal annexation" and
exploitation of resources in Southern Cameroons. Indeed, if Foncha is to be
credited with making re-unification of East and West Cameroon a reality, then his
statements about "illegal annexation" of Southern Cameroon ought to be re-
examined with a critical eye. Furthermore, Foncha's ill-advised endorsement of a
government plan to block holding of the second all Anglophone Conference or
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AAC11 in Bamenda in 1994, raises even more questions about the former
leader's political judgement. More importantly, Foncha's decision and role in
inducing SDF chairman, John Fru Ndi into opposing this conference reflects once
more, the vacillating positions of Foncha through the years, concerning matters of
political significance for West Cameroon. As Chiabi Achuosih-Nyouk has
indicated, Foncha's constantly changing positions on issues germaine to West
Cameroonians has raised suspicion among the SCNC leadership and West
Cameroonians at large, as to the sincerity of his motives and commitment to the
Southern Cameroons struggle.40
Solomon T. Muna, on the other hand, was a key actor during the re
unification process of the two regions. Muna was appointed federal vice president
from 1970-1972, after Foncha's dismissal, and was the staunchest pro-unification
politician in West Cameroon. After political integration of East and West
Cameroon in the "glorious revolution" of May 1972, Muna was appointed speaker
of the National Assembly from 1973-1988. Like Foncha, Muna did not criticize
or condemn Francophone hegemony and exploitation of the resources of West
Cameroon until years after they were dumped by the system which they had
benefitted from. From the above scenarios, therefore, one can only conclude that
the goals of Foncha and Muna in the final analysis was to redeem themselves after
40 Chiabi Achuosih-Nyouh, "Foncha and Anglophone Quest for Independence: The Uncompleted
Assignment" The Harald. No. 745, April 14-15,1995.
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many years of accusation as having "sold out" to the Francophones for
their personal and selfish interests.
As our preceding discussion has illustrated, although Biya's political
challenges continued to mount, fanned by a sluggish economy, the opposition was
unable to unite to counter Mr. Biya. Internal discord among the opposition leader
ship prevented the opposition from forming a formidable, well-coordinated
alliance against the Biya regime. Lack of solidarity on the part of the opposition is
reflected within the UNDP, the dominant opposition party represented in the
legislature. Expulsion of two executive committee members for accepting
positions in Biya's government, despite criticism and objections from the party's
boss, only reinforces the level of disharmony in the group. Within the ranks of the
largest and most influential opposition party, the SDF, we also notice serious
internal discord. For example, dismissal of the party's secretary-general, Siga
Asanga, for allegedly extending an olive branch to Biya's CPDM with a view to
including the SDF in the administration only confirms how polarized and
disunited the opposition party is. This lack of solidarity would play an important
role in the presidential election of 1997.41
Recall also that in March 1992, the SDF party unilaterally boycotted
the legislative election. This political miscalculation has not only raised serious
questions among party adherents, but also with foreign observers. Also in the
41 Africa Research Bulletin. Political Series, May 1994,11445.
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presidential election of 1992, the opposition, particularly the SDF, blamed
the minister of territorial administration for fraud and inaccessibility to voters of
voting materials and information. For this reason, therefore, the opposition parties
demanded the creation of an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to oversee
the electoral process. During the last parliamentary session in 1997, a UNDP
representative tabled a private bill calling for the creation of such an organization.
The government, however, argued that a legal and institutional framework already
exist which regulates the electoral process and offers the best guarantees for "free,
fair, and transparent elections." The government further argued that it is within the
existing framework that the local government elections of January 21, 1996 were
organized in which some of the major opposition parties scored impressive
victories. The government also maintained that under the same framework, some
electoral litigations have been channeled to the Supreme Court and the rulings
have been viewed as fair. For the above reasons, therefore, the government
pointed out, there is no need for an electoral commission.
hi an apparent show of solidarity and notwithstanding government's
refusal to heed to their demands, leaders of the three major opposition parties, the
SDF, UNDP and UDC held a news conference in the nation's capital, Yaounde, to
announce their decision to boycott the presidential election of October 12, 1997.
The leaders also declared that they would no longer call for disruption of the
election as earlier planned. Furthermore, the leaders appealed to Cameroonians to
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remain indoors and isolate the CPDM candidate and eight others in the
race.42 Bouba Bello Maigari of UNDP offered the following reason for the
boycott "the boycott is a means of expressing our political rights and nobody has
the right to force us into a faulty process."43 Despite all threats and plans of
sabotage, the election went on as scheduled without incident. Absence of the
major opposition parties left Biya without serious challenge at the election.
According to the national daily news daily, The Cameroon Tribune. Biya
registered a resounding victory, receiving 92.50 percent of the votes cast, while
the eight presidential contenders scored 7.43 percent.
In summary, therefore, as our discussion has clearly revealed, the
absence of "real" democracy in Cameroon cannot be explained by simple factors
such as poor constitution or the influence of "power-hungry" Biya and a small
circle of his elites alone. As the case of Cameroon has shown, the most difficult
and intractable barriers to Cameroon's democratic transition has been structural in
nature, rooted largely in the underlying socio-ethnic and regional components of
the country. As the next chapter will reveal, the economic circumstances of the
country will play a major role in undermining efforts for political reform. Further-
42 Peter Ngea Beng and Randy Joe Sa'ah, "Fru Ndi, Bello and Ndam Say No to Disruption ofPoll:




441992 et 1997: Deux Presidentiel les Historiques," Cameroon Tribune (Yaounde), No. 2754,
October 29,1997.
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more, the premise that Biya has been, and continues to be the major
barrier to any efforts for genuine political reforms deserves further examination. It
is uncertain, given the discord among the major opposition parties in Cameroon
that if Biya were to leave office, reforms would be implemented swiftly and
smoothly. Biya, no doubt, has demonstrated his ability and capacity to manipulate
and co-opt the opposition on various occasions for his political advantage.
However, he is not just an intransigent actor determined to prevent political
reforms in Cameroon, other factors and circumstances combine to stifle the
democratic process in the country.
Similarly, although the Francophones have to a large extent stood in the
way of development in the Anglophone region, it is prudent nevertheless to argue
that Anglophone elite themselves have contributed substantially to the regions
relative underdevelopment. As the case of Foncha and Muna has shown, these
political elites were not willing to risk their illustrious political careers for the
good of West Cameroon. Their role in demanding secession of West Cameroons
from the union with East Cameroon has not only raised questions and suspicions
of their motives, but has intensified and rekindled the debates among the
Norfhwesterners and South Westerners concerning the future of the region, vis-a
vis East Cameroon.
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Thus far, our attention and focus has been on the internal political
dynamics surrounding the Biya regime and his handling ofthe Anglophone affairs.
Our objective now, is to examine the external or exogenous circumstances and
how these factors have contributed in exacerbating the gap and distrust between
Francophones and Anglophones in Cameroon.
The Cold War and its ImplicationsThe end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union had profound political impact on Africa, especially Cameroon.
Also, the end of bipolarity resulted in dramatic changes in attitude of Western
democracies toward autocracy, malfeasance among strategic allies, and welcomed
expression of more idealistic foreign policy goals.45 Political events in Eastern
Europe, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, may well have influenced the thinking
and behavior of elites as well as the masses in Africa and Cameroon in particular.
From an elite perspective, the overthrow and summary execution of Romanian
dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, in December 1989 had a chilling impact on other
dictators and allies around the world. In the case of Zaire, Mobutu's
announcement of political reforms as well as Kenneth Kaunda's declaration of
multiparty elections seem to suggest that they too wanted to prevent their violent
overthrows by their subjects. Perhaps the most dramatic turn of events occurred in
45 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands
and State Responses", in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton eds. Governance and Politics in Africa
(Boulder: Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992,), 48.
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Anglophones have become politically conscious, and no longer accept
autocratic rule and domination from their Francophone brothers as a given, neither
do they accept exploitation as ordained by God. Anglophones, in the final
analysis, do not see themselves as inferiors to Francophones. It seems they want to




THE CAUSES, SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS
In chapter five, we examined the internal and external political dynamics in
Cameroon and how these factors contributed in shaping the political contours of the
country. We particularly noted that Francophone dominated regime used political,
military and judicial means to subjugate Anglophones throughout the country. In this
chapter, our focus will be on the economic exigencies and how Francophones have used
the economic component to further marginalize Anglophones. We will show that the
decline in the economy, combined with the political factors, triggered demands for
political reforms in Cameroon, particularly in West Cameroon. The layout ofthis chapter
will be as follows: background of Cameroon's economy after reunification, reasons for
decline, attempts to revive the economy and the political as well as economic
implications of decline.
Background
Since independence until the late 1980s, Cameroon was frequently referenced
by donor nations as one of Africa's rare economic successes. The country's economic
growth was in part based on her diversified agricultural exports including cocoa, coffee,
banana, tea, rubber, cotton and timber. The country's growth accelerated from the late
1970s to 1985, thanks to the development of the petroleum sector. Relative to other
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African and third world countries, Cameroon's economy soared markedly, pushing the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita income to record levels in 1984. An
international comparison of Cameroon's economic performance between 1970-1985 with
other developing countries clearly attest to the country's vibrant economy.
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TABLE 9
IINTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CAMEROON'S ECONOMIC
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Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) based on
Statistical Data from United Nations Statistical Office.
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What then must have accounted for this rapid economic growth? Economists
and scholars have offered several reasons for Cameroon's economic success. One
among many reasons advanced for the Country's success is the fiscal discipline of the
leader, Ahmadou Ahidjo. Under his leadership, Cameroon pursued a centrist economic
policy. This disciplined policy ofeconomic liberalism coupled with its record of political
stability attracted foreign investors including the French, the British, Americans,
Germans and Dutch.1 Cameroon's economic activities were controlled by the state which
used the selective tariffs and import-controlled measures to limit and reduce luxury
imports as well as protect "national priorities"- infants or indigenous. As table 9. shows
Cameroon's total imports per capita as well as her imports GDP % were slightly lower
than those of other African and developing countries. Furthermore, like most African
and developing countries, Cameroon's economic growth in the 1970s was propelled by an
increase in bank lending from developed to less developed countries of "recycled" OPEC
financial surpluses (petrodollars). Cameroon, however, did not spend most of her growth
revenues in luxurious foreign goods, neither did she spend on "pork barrel" projects. The
infamous presidential place, however, appears to be the only extravagant spending by the
government.2
Although rent-seeking was the government's initial rationale for intervening
in the economy, tribute taking by politicians, public officials, civil and military personnel
1 Anita Research Bulletin-Economic 1982,691a
2 Ndongko A. Wilfred, The Political Economy ofDevelopment in Cameroon: Relations between
the State, Indigenous Business, and Foreign Investors," in Michael Schatzberg and I. William Zartman, ed
The Political Economy of Cameroon. 84.
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as well as large scale farmers appears to be the most obvious.3 This strategy, of course,
encouraged corruption in Cameroon. Williams maintains that although government-
regulated economic activities did not originate corruption, regulations, nevertheless
rewarded corruption.
Using the aforementioned perspectives as a backdrop to understanding and
appreciating Cameroon's economic success, one is nevertheless tempted to ask probing
questions such as: Why did this vibrant economy decline in the first place? What factors
or circumstances might have necessitated this decline? What steps, if any, did the
government and non-governmental organizations take to redress the situation? Were
there any constraints to achieving these goals, and lastly, what were the implications for
Cameroon's economic decline? To answer these questions, therefore, we have to
examine the cause of causes of decline, focusing on both the internal and external
realities. We should stress that just as Cameroon's economic decline is not the outcome
of a single factor, answers or solutions to her problems will equally not be simple. We
shall now turn to the internal and external circumstances, which, according to observers,
have been responsible for Cameroon's downward economic spiral.
Internal Causes ofDecline
Since the end of Cameroon's robust economic growth in 1985, several
perspectives and sometimes contradictory explanations have been advanced by scholars
and analysts as reasons for the country's economic decline. Below are some of the
3 Gavin Williams, "Why Structural Adjustment is Necessary and Why it Doesn't Work," Review
of African Political Economy. No. 60 (ROAPE Publications Ltd., 1994): 214-225.
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The government's priorities with respect to the PEs were centered in three
key sectors: (1) agriculture/marketing, (2) large capital intensive projects, and (3) the
banking industry. The National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB) served as the main
institution for marketing the country's agricultural products. This public sector agency
accounted for revenues over 100 billion FCFA, while the Societe National des
Hydrocarbures (SNH) which dominated oil export, accounted for revenues constituting
15 percent of the government's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and accounted for 50
percent ofthe country's export.5
In the capital-intensive projects, the government's budget was allocated to
agro-industrial facilities such as the paper mill, (CELLUCAM), the fertilizer factory
(SOCAME), oil palm (CDC and SOCAPALM) as well as the sugar complex
(CAMSUCO and SOSUCAM).6 In the banking sector which was controlled largely by
subsidiary or foreign-owned banks, the government enacted laws requiring state
participation with at least 35 percent in all banking activities. Thus far, we have seen that
the state controlled most of the economic activities of the country, sometimes at
4 Nicolas Van de Walle, "The Politics ofNon-Reform in Cameroon.,11 in Thomas M. Gallaghy and
John Ravenhill ed. Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993):361.
5 Nicolas Van de Walle, "The Politics of Public Enterprise Reform in Cameroon" in Barbara Grosh
and Rwekaza S. Mukandala ed. State-Owned Enterprises in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1994): 152-153.
6 The agro-industrial sector in Cameroon is described in Piet Konoings "L'Etat, L'Agro-
Industriatie et la Paysannerie au Cameroun," in Politique Afrique. June 22,1986,120-137. Also, see
Barbier, J. C, G. J. Courade, and J. Tissandier, Complexes Aero-Industriels au Cameroun (Paris: Orstom,
1980). Courade, G. "Des Complexes qui Coutent Chers: La Priorite Agro-Industrielle dans VAgriculture
Camerounaise," in Poliaaue Africane. Ne 14 (1984): 76-91. Jean Claude Williame, "The Practices of a
Liberal Political Economy: Import Substitution in Cameroon 1975-1981" in Michael G. Schartzberg and I.
William Zartman. The Political Economy of Cameroon. 186.
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agricultural dilemma in the following statements: Through regulation and stabilization
measures, the NPMB-ONCPB generated surplus revenues. These surplus revenues were
lavishly spent on projects and programs which were politically appealing and self-
gratifying, and included among other things, infrastructural projects such as building of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc. These revenues were also used to reward political
clients, especially providing lucrative bonuses to non-farmers.14 The recession of the
early 1980s had a devastating impact on agricultural economies, including Cameroon.
Sharp declines demand for commodities in foreign markets, resulted in drops, in
agricultural prices. This economic downturn revealed the inability of the Marketing
Board to perform its stabilizing role as originally intended. The implications of this
failure is that farmers experienced long delays in payments for their products, and were
not able to secure loans to open new farms or expand existing acres. Furthermore,
farmers were unable to meet their family obligations (providing health care and other
basic needs to their families), parents could not send their children to school, while others
were evicted from their farms. As a consequence of this failure, farmers resorted to other
"survival" strategies, including diverting from cash crop to food crop production,
engaging in non-agricultural related activities to sustain their families.15 This diversion,
needless to say, contributed significantly in reducing CameroonDs agricultural input in
the world market, and diminished the countryDs revenues from this sector.
Ahidjo - Biya confrontation
14 Gavin Williams, "Why Structural Adjustment is Necessary and Why It Doesn't Work," ]
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time when revenues were declining due to global recession. These ambitious projects,
needless to say, contributed markedly in the country's economic deterioration.
Civil Disobedience-Operation Ghost town
As we stated earlier, Biya's refusal to capitulate to the demands of the
opposition had some peculiar political implications for Biya and the country. The most
severe impact of the opposition's strategy on the government was the call to strikes and
civil disobedience by the population. The goal, of course, was to bring Biya to his
"knees" through economic pressures. The opposition designed "Operation Villes
Mortes" or Operation Ghost Town, in which citizens were encouraged not to go to work,
and students not to attend classes. This strategy also called on citizens not to pay taxes
and to massively withdraw their monies from the banks and other financial institutions.
Supporters and sympathizers of the opposition used intimidation to force compliance.
This strategy may have scared some potential investors during this period in the country,
causing reduced tax receipts. Although overall this strategy did not achieve its intended
goal of forcing Biya to the terms of the opposition, it nevertheless undermined the
government's extractive capabilities. According to sources, as a result of this campaign,
the government collected as little as 15 percent of the previous year's revenues.17 During
a question and answer session with members of the Manyu Elements Cultural
Association in Atlanta Grorgia, in 1996, I asked Dr. Peter Agbor-Tabi, Minister of
Higher Education, ofthe ramifications ofthe "ghost town" strategy, and he stated:
17 This claim was issued by Africa Confidential in "Cameroon: Crisis or Compromise?" The
government officially maintained that the ghost town campaign had a negligible impact, although in
private, many officials conceded that in exacerbated an already dismal revenue situation.
213
Cameroonians are peace-loving people who will seek peaceful solutions to
complex problems. The ghost town tactics had disproportionate adverse
impact on Anglophone students and pupils, who did not attended school for
several months compared to their Francophone counterparts. Similarly, this
strategy contributed significantly in polarizing, rather than uniting
Cameroonians. It inflicted pains on innocent citizens, and in the end achieved
nothing politically.18
In closing, Cameroon's economic decline as we have pointed out was not due
to one internal factor or circumstance, but sometimes intertwined factors. It is however
clear that the government's dominance in economic activities in the country, widespread
fraud and corruption by government officials through contracts, bloated bureaucracy, the
feud between Ahidjo and Biya, as well as the opposition's economic sabotage strategy all
worked to underscore Cameroon's economic troubles. In the next section, we shall
examine the external factors and how these factors also contributed in undermining
Cameroon's economy.
External Causes ofDecline
Cameroon's economic woes can best be understood within the context of
more relevant external factors. A major reason advanced for economic deterioration in
the third World, particularly in Cameroon, emerged from the developed countries.
Economic reforms and political pressures within these industrialized countries to reduce
their budgets had a chilling consequence for most dependent nations like Cameroon. The
recession of the 1980s, for example, triggered economic stabilization policies in these
industrialized states particularly from the conservatives. These policies called for
reduction in foreign aid to developing countries including Cameroon. As Michael P.
18 Dr. Peter Agbor-Tabi, Minister of Higher Education (question and answer session with
members of the Manyu Elements Cultural Association MECA GA, in 1996).
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Todaro has observed, the net private investments ofthese industrialized countries reduced
by $480 million.19 Like most African and Third world countries, Cameroon's economic
decline was precipitated by the following external factors:
Decline in Commodity and Oil Prices
The most important cause of Cameroon's economic malaise in the 1980s
include: sharp falls in commodity and oil prices. The government, however, cushioned
the impact of the crisis by pumping revenues from sales of oil in order to maintain the
level of investment expenditure and imports. The startling drop in international prices for
oil in 1986, not only concluded Cameroon's robust economic growth, but the beginning
of economic hardship. The simultaneous drop in commodity and oil prices significantly
reduced the export revenue base of the country. As Igoh Karmiloff has argued, with the
exception oftobacco, all other major export commodities of Cameroon experienced sharp
declines. The price of cocoa, for example, dropped by 22 percent, Arabica coffee by 34
percent, rubber by 3 percent and cotton by 23 percent. The drop in oil prices by 32
percent exacerbated an already traumatized economy. Furthermore, the country's GDP
showed a negative growth rate of 8 percent for 1987, followed by a 20 percent drop in
1988.20 With sharp falls in commodity and oil prices, the country's terms of trade also
19 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (New York: Logman, 1989):
596.
20 Igoh Karmiloff, "Cameroon" in Roger C. Riddell, ed Manufacturing Africa: Performance and
Prospects of Seven Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books,
Inc., 1990): 137.
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declined remarkably. We should point out that as Cameroon's terms of trade continued to
decline, the country was bound to use more (in terms of quantity) of her primary
commodities to pay for imports. Although Cameroon and other African and Third World
nations noticed significant drops in the prices of their commodities, the prices of imports
from the industrialized countries continued to rise. Prices for machinery spare parts, new
technology as well as the dollar continued to gain strength. This economic anomaly
caused Cameroon's terms of trade to decline by 45 percent, at the same time increasing
the country's import bills.21 Faced with bloating current account deficits, the government
resorted to import controls, further creating scarcity in consumer products as well as
intermediate and capital goods. These factors, needless to say, served as a catalyst in
fueling inflation, at the same time slowing down economic activities.22
Cameroon's Debt Dilemma
Another major factor which contributing to Cameroon's economic decline in
the 1980s was the country's huge foreign debt situation. As we pointed out earlier,
contractions in the industrialized markets caused sharp falls in commodity and oil prices,
resulting in worsening terms of trade and balance ofpayment deficits for the government.
Cameroon's foreign debt between 1980 and 1985 stood at $2.940m, equivalent to slightly
over one third of the country's annual GNP in 1985. Servicing of the country's debt,
therefore, represented close to 15 percent ofher exports. In 1986, however, as the global
economic situation worsened, its impact on Cameroon became severe and unmanageable,
21 Nicolas Van de Walle, "Politics ofPublic Enterprises Reforms in Cameroon," in State Owned
Enterprises in Africa. 156.
22 Saleh M. Nsouli and Justin B. Zulu, "Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience,"
Occasional Paper. No. 34, Washington, DC: IMF, 1985.
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did not only cause further financial burden to Cameroon, it forced the country to accept
(SAP).
Although we have argued that Cameroon's debt burden constitutes one of the
major external constraints and contributors to the country's economic malaise, it is
equally necessary to point out that the size of the debt alone is not to blame for its
decline. Rather, the government's inability to use the loans productively and service it
appropriately played a key role in the decline. The World Bank has espoused this
concern about misuse of loans by Third World African governments, including
Cameroon, in the following statements:
A major cause of Africa's precarious situation has been the
failure of many countries (including Cameroon), to invest
borrowed resources productively . . . [and] hand-in-hand with
economic policy reform, these economies need to strengthen their
debt management capabilities, requiring in some cases, changes
[in] the institutional and administrative procedures used to
monitor and process information on external debt.2S
Attempts to Reinvigorate the Economy
As Cameroon's economy continued its down spiral, the Bretton Woods
institutions -IMF and World Bank, urged the government for reforms through
negotiations. These negotiations began in 1986, but showed no signs of progress.
President Biya, in an attempt to appeal to economic nationalism, steadfastly refused the
draconian measures of these financial bodies. The president insisted that Cameroon
would undertake an adjustment on its own and seek only non-conditional capital from
25 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis i
Bank, 1989).
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difficulties. These situations, needless to say, encouraged external borrowing by the
country, which of course doubled in value.29 In Cameroon, as in most other states in
Africa and the developing countries, the government served as the single largest
employer. In the past, the government provided 1500 jobs each year to university
graduates, mostly "non-productive" jobs, which did not contribute directly to economic
growth. With the bleak economic situation, however, the government announced
suspension of these offers, further magnifying the magnitude and dimension of the
country's economic problems.
With rapid economic deterioration and no positive signs from the main
economic indicators, the government acted once again to re-establish the major
macroeconomic balances, and to adjust production costs as well as structure, and realign
the performance and competitiveness of the economy with new circumstances, realities
and challenges. The government adopted a series of measures aimed at ameliorating the
dismal economic circumstances, which included: (a) passage of the Finance Law
1986/87, geared towards reducing the budget, (b) instituting ceiling regarding
expenditures on personnel, (c) systematically retiring personnel in certain age limits and
(d) increase taxes on some items such as petroleum products, liquor and beer, cigarettes,
beverages as well as some imported luxury products. A State Revenue Collection
Commission (SRCC) was established to oversee revenue collection. Despite these
elaborate efforts to revive the economy, through internal measures, no success was
accomplished in this direction. The president notwithstanding these problems appointed
29 Igoh Karmiloff, "Cameroon," in Roger C. Riddle, ]
Prospects of Seven Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 130.
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a Commission of five Cameroonian technocrats, assisted by foreign experts financed by
the World Bank and United Nations to recommend reform measures for the ailing public
sector. The Commission's report was issued to the president in 1988, suggesting
institutions to be liquidated, rehabilitated, or sold to private interests. The Commission
further recommended that the roles and functions of some irreplaceable parastatals be
redefined.30 Aware of the internal political ramifications of eliminating some of these
PEs, the president continued to placate donors with rhetoric, without actually following
through with the Commission's recommendations. As Tedga has eloquently argued, the
president instead requested that the Commission examine with thoroughness the financial
sector. Ofthe seventy-five (75) public enterprises examined by the Commission, only 30
were recommended to remain in the state's portfolio. The commission also called for
significant reductions in state subsidies to the public sectors from CFA 150 billion to 30
billion in 1993.31 According to Nicolas Van de Walle, the deplorable economic situation
in 1989/90 financial year, forced the Biya government to act on the Commission's
recommendations. Fifteen of the most inefficient and wasteful parastatals, including the
machinized rice project SODERIM were to be liquidated immediately. Another fifteen
public or state ventures including CAMSUCO, CHOCOCAM, and OCB were
recommended for sales to private interests. Lastly, government ventures like NPMB-
ONCPB, SONEL, SOCAPALM and SEMRY were retained under the government but
30 Paul John M. Tedga, Enterprise Publiaue. Etats est Crise au Cameroun: Facillite d'un System
(Paris: Edition L'Harmattan, 1990), 70-71.
31 Ibid,
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restructured. The NPMB operations, for example, was to privatize its quality control
functions, slash back its marking operations as well as layoff a third of its workforce.
Cameroon and Structural Adjustment Program
Faced with severe debt burden, foreign exchange scarcity, balance of
payment difficulties, declining levels of foreign aid, limited access to private capital
markets, and the dire need to relieve the Cameroonian economy from further stress and
hardship on the citizens, the government reluctantly caved in, becoming another "victim"
ofIMF and World Bank conditionality and monitoring.
Before examining the various elements of SAP in Cameroon and its attendant
difficulties, let us first explore the definition and some key components of this term. In
macroeconomic terms, "adjustment" refers to the adoption of fiscal, monetary as well as
exchange rate policies to attain internal and/or external stability.
Ann Siedman and Frederick Anang provide a mainstream definition of SAP.
According to these authors, "structural adjustment programs" link needed loans by
African countries to offset persistent deficits and for limited development expenditures to
the re-introduction of competitive market forces.34 The standard IMF conditionality
package has focused on demand management and includes the following components:
32 Nicolas Van de Walle, "Politics ofPublic enterprise Reform in Cameroon." in Barbara Grosh
andRwekaza S. Mukandala, eds., 156.
33 For theoretical debates on the "why" and "how" of adjustment within the context of the
"assignment problem," see R. A Mundell, "The Appropriate Use ofMonetary and Fiscal Policies for
Internal and External Stability," IMF StaffPacers. Vol. IX, No. 1 (March 1962): 70-79; or J. H. Levin,
"International Capital Mobility and the Assignment Problem," Oxford Economic Papers (March 1962): 54-
67.
34 Ann Siedman and Frederick Anang ed. 21st Century Africa: Towards a New Vision of Self-
Sustainable Development. 26.
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budget and money contraction especially to control inflation; reduction or elimination of
subsidies especially regarding consumer goods and services; changes in exchange rate
policies, particularly requiring large devaluations of currency; raising of nominal interest
rates; liberalization of import controls particularly regarding licensing systems; expansion
commodity exports; reduction and rationalization of the role of the state in the economy
especially in the public enterprises or parastatal sector; and encouraging the growth ofthe
private sector through increased reliance on market and price incentives especially in the
agricultural sector35
In 1988, Cameroon negotiated a short-term stabilization program with the
IMF, aimed at assisting the government with her balance of payments crisis. It was also
designed to assist the government to reduce her balance of payment deficit, and enable
the government to acquire foreign exchange needed to repay earlier loans. In 1989,
Cameroon was granted stand-by and compensatory credits which enabled her to obtain a
rescheduling of some $440m, up to the end of March 1990.36 A similar program was
negotiated with the World Bank, which stretched even longer than with IMF. The World
Program required both quantitative and qualitative resources (World Bank, African
Development Bank [ADB], and the Cameroon government). The goal of this program
was to gradually reduce constrains impeding economic activities and the re-orientation of
35 Thomas M. Gallaghy, "Between Scylla and Charybolis: The Foreign Economic Relations of
Sub-Saharan African States," in Peter Lewis ed Africa: Dilemmas ofDevelopment and Change (Boulder,
CO: WestView Press, 1998): 390.
36 Michael Chapman, "Economy," Current History. 220.
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the role of the state and public services towards programs that improve the welfare and
productivity of all citizens.37
IMF's Rationale for Adjustment in Cameroon
Like most other African countries, the rationale by IMF officials for Cameroon to adopt a
SAP was based on the following argument: officials argued that government spending
was far in excess of revenues and that this circumstance resulted to budget deficits and
inflation. The second reason advanced by the IMF is that the government failed to
maintain a balance between imports and exports in the face of rising prices for imported
goods. Another argument advanced by this institution Cameroon to adopt SAP was that
the government failed to adjust exchange rates to reflect internal inflation, leading to
over-valued currency.38 The IMF has also argued that unless these deficiencies are
ameliorated, Cameroon's balance ofpayment difficulties will not be ratified.
Key Components ofCameroon's SAP Package
Currency Devaluation
As a condition for receiving further IMF/World Bank assistance, the
government was required to devalue her currency, which, as we pointed out earlier, was
considered over-valued by IMF. The goal, from IMF's perspective was to provide a
37 Ndongko A. Wilfred, "The Experience of Cameroon," in Alan R. Roe, Instruments ofEconomic
Policy in Africa (NH: Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 1992): 83.
38 Robert Browne, "Conditionality: A New Form of Colonialism?" Africa Report (September-
October 1984): 16.
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relatively neutral and comprehensive solution to stabilize Cameroon's economy, since it
experienced short-term balance ofpayment problems.
Devaluation, according to Gavin Williams, results in the "elimination of
opportunities which rationing overvalued currencies and imported goods creates for the
corrupt enrichment of those who control the allocation of foreign exchange. As K. P.
Mosley has aptly argued, devaluation caused massive under-valuation of currency,
enabling creditor countries to obtain resources (raw materials) for extremely low real
prices and raising the costs of imported necessities (including machinery, equipment),
required for development. He also maintains that devaluation also added inflationary
pressures on the economy.41 Currency devaluation also required the government to
replace licenses with tariffs, thus giving the government control over unofficial currency
and commodity markets.
Economic hardships increased in Cameroon in 1994, when the CFA franc
was devalued by 50 percent, in relation to the French franc. This action by the IMF led to
a sharp increase in inflation (35.1 percent). However, as a result of this move, prices for
Cameroon's export commodities increased, improving the economic situation in 1995 and
1996 respectively. This strategy also resulted in a drop in inflation to 4.7 percent, and
real gross domestic product (GDP) edged by 2.8 percent in 1996.42 Cameroon was able
39 Augustine E. Ayuk. "Economic Stagnation and Reform in Cameroon: The Influence of
IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program," 21.
40 Gavin Williams, "Why Structural Adjustment is Necessary and Why It Doesn't Work," 221.
41K. P. Mosley, "West African Industry and the Debt Crisis: A Research Report." Paper Presented
to the 32nd Annual Meeting ofthe African Studies Association (Atlanta, November 2,1989).
42 United States Energy Information Administration Cameroon (Washington, D.C.: 1997): 1.




those activities entirely (in what has been referred to as "load shedding").43 As we
pointed out previously, through the recommendation of the president's Commission of
five plus other experts sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations, Cameroon
was able to privatize her least efficient and most corrupt parastatals like FONADER,
CHOCOCAM and OCB. The NPMB for example, laid off 1400 her employees as result
ofrestructuring, and subcontracted some of her quality operations to private entities.
Anti-Inflationary and Demand Measures
Cameroon also adopted a package of anti-inflationary and demand
management measures designed to stabilize her economy.44
Specifically, the policy called for a combination of slowing the rate of growth
of money supply as well as fiscal adjustments by the government to restrain wages.45
Two schools of thought have emerged, each claiming to offer solutions to deal with
Cameroon's financial difficulties. On the supply side, monetarist argue that reducing the
rate of growth of money supply will be the most feasible way of managing demand.
Proponents, including I. Friedman argue that tighter money supply will force the
government to confront the sources of its payment difficulties, rather than inflate its way
43 R. Bailey, "Uses and Misuses of Privatization," in S. H. Hamke, ed Prospects for Privatization
(New York: The Academy ofPolitical Science, 1987).
44 Killick, T. C, Bird, J. Sharpe, and M. Sutton, "The IMF: Case for Change in Emphasis," in R.
Feinberg and V. Kallab, ed. Adjustment Crisis in the Third World (Washington: Overseas Development
Council, 1984): 77.
45 Thomas J. Biersteker, "Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual
Exploration ofIMF and World Bank Prescriptions," International Studies Quarterly. 34 (1990): 484.
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out of them.46 Opponents, including Biersteker, argue that fiscal adjustment by the
government will be the path to follow, on the assumption that Cameroon's public sector
difficult is central to many of the country's balance of payment problems. Biersteker and
others further maintain that through this strategy, barriers to long-term adjustment would
be realized.47 On the supply side, the government adopted wage reduction measures
aimed at drastically reducing the fiscal deficit, which would eventually lead to a smaller
increase in the amount of money in circulation.
Restoration ofMarket Mechanisms
This measure, proponents argue, will increase efficiency of domestic
production. It called for reduction in price controls (ending subsidies particularly on food
and energy items). It also advocated for an increase in interest rates by eliminating
subsidized credits.48 Externally, the measure called for trade liberalization through tariff
simplifications, elimination of trade licensing and phasing out export incentives. It is
also believed that this measure will encourage competition, resulting in farmers enjoying
higher prices for their products, and less delays in payments for their products.
Democratization
Democratization and liberalization of the political system in Africa and the
Third World were not regarded by IMF and the World Bank as important elements in the
46 Friedman, I. "Private Bank Conditionality; Comparison with the IMF and World Bank," in J.
Williamson, ed, IMF Conditionalitv (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983): 122.
47 Thomas J. Biersteker, "Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual
Exploration ofIMF and World Bank Prescriptions," 484.
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political opportunism for some individuals to become visible and prominent, with to the
populace, and purporting to have solutions to the problems ofthe country.
There is no denying that the country's economic decline and attempts to "fix"
the broken economy through austerity measures (SAP) caused scarcity of resources in the
country, particularly consumer goods. Another major attempt to revive the sluggish
economy which had serious consequences on the population was devaluation of the
country's currency. After the January 1994 devaluation, imported goods became more
expensive and scarce, forcing the government to use foreign exchange to import scarce
consumer goods instead of paying for industrial imports (parts, semi-processed
materials). Perhaps the most serious implication of Cameroon's economic decline and its
attendant political instability caused prospective foreign investors to look to other
directions to establish their businesses. Domestically, many entrepreneurs were forced to
fold their business, while others withdrew and transferred their capital to foreign banking
and financial institutions.
Furthermore, calls by IMF and World Bank through SAP further caused
hardships on citizens, particularly children and the elderly. Cuts in the health budget had
devastating consequences for hospitals and patients, as doctors and health professionals
were unable to provide basic health care services to the sick and dying. Cuts in doctors'
salaries forced some doctors to relocate to neighboring countries or travel oversees to
provide services for lucrative compensation. It also opened up opportunities for some
doctors to set up clinics, but charging high fees for their services, which most of the
citizens could not afford.
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Similarly, cuts in education resulted in increased cost of education (tuition,
books, uniforms and other school supplies). As a consequence, some parents were
forced, given the hardship, to withdraw their children from school because they could not
afford the charges. Also, cuts in teachers' salaries by about 35 percent, and sometimes
without pay for several months, caused some of these professionals to devote their time
and energy on other sectors in an attempt to make ends meet. Citizens reacted to these
hardships by demonstrating and protesting against the government. Students at the
University of Yaounde protested termination of allowances; teachers, cuts in their
salaries; and parents decried high cost of educating their children.
In sum, Cameroon's political economy can be characterized by at best, state
inefficiency, and at worst, state corruption, which have combined to serve as a hindrance
to private investment particularly in the Anglophone sector. Although West Cameroon
served as the "breadbasket" ofthe country, citizens of this region were disproportionately
impacted by decline in the economy. First, as a result of gross mismanagement of the
National Produce Marketing Board, controlled by Francophones, Anglophone farmers
experienced long delays in payment for their produce, resulting in massive smuggling of
cocoa and coffee to neighboring Nigerian. Similarly, Anglophone farmers did not benefit
from agricultural credits issued to their Francophone counterparts through FONADER.
On the positive note, however, the decline and measures to reform and revive
the political and economic system have started yielding some fruits. Cameroon has
embraced a multiparty system of governance largely as a result of international pressure
as well as IMF and World Bank conditionalities. The crisis has also caused most
Cameroonians to rely less on the government and seek opportunities in the private sector.
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Lastly, the impact of Cameroon's decline affected citizens throughout the country, not
only in West Cameroon. This, perhaps, explains why the SDF party led by John Fru Ndi,
an Anglophone, drew support from some Francophone regions such as Littoral and West
provinces. Perhaps the most positive revelation of Cameroon's economic difficulties is
that it uncovered the unequal treatment successive Francophone regimes have had on
Anglophones, in the economic domain since reunification in 1961. The poor economy
also served as a springboard for Anglophone elites to demand greater political leverage
from the government, including, calls for devolution of state authority. From the above
text, it is clear therefore that the dismal economic situation in West Cameroon was the
result of policies designed by the dominant society, to keep Anglophones in subordinate
roles in the economic life ofCameroon.
CHAPTER VH
DISCORD IN THE PERIPHERY: REASONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
WEST CAMEROON SOLIDARITY
The divisions that threaten a polity's internal cohesion and solidarity are
rooted in its society, geography as well as its demographic makeup. In West Cameroon,
the most important of this cleavage is the division between Northwest and Southwest
Provinces, or better, the grassfield and coastal/forest people. Although significant
schisms have erupted between ethnic groups within each polity, on the whole, however,
these seem to be less threatening to the solidarity of West Cameroon. Much of the
political, socio-cultural ills engulfing West Cameroon today, emanate from the region's
peculiar history, including politics and geography. These factors have combined with
other circumstances to impede unity among the political elites of the two regions, thus
making it difficult for them to work in unison to exert collective political pressures on the
Francophone government in Yaounde.
The focus of this section therefore, is to examine the forces which have
worked to prevent unity among West Cameroonians and how these forces continue to
fester and promote disunity and "lack of progress" in the region. Before we stretch any
further with this discussion, some key questions need to be advanced. (1) Did partition of
West Cameroon into two provinces cause or exacerbate disunity among members of these
entities? How has the government succeeded in preventing cohesion among these two
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category and these differences have produced friction and dissension on matters
Germaine to the region.
Demographic Disparities
Besides size disparity, the two regions also display marked differences in
their demographic makeup. The population of West Cameroon in 1978 was 1,495,272.
Ofthis total, 914,912 or 61 percent of the population was from Northwest, while 580,360
or 39 percent were in the Southwest. From Table 9 below, we notice striking differences
in the population density of the two regions. Northwest, with a relatively small land area
compared to Southwest had 52.9 inhabitants per square kilometer, while Southwest only
had 23.3 inhabitants per square kilometer. This imbalance reveals therefore that there
was noticeable pressures on land activities in the Northwest, and confirms why some of






















































580,360 39 186,992 32 393,368 68 24,910 23.3
"• Percentages were calculated by author.
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TABLE 11
































































































































Source: Situation et Tendances de la population Camerounaise Yaounde,
November 1985,17.
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The rate ofurbanization is highest in the Littoral, followed by the Center and the
Southwest Provinces. The least rates are found in the Far North, Northwest and the
Adamawa Provinces. Apart from economic and political reasons, it would be realized
that most ofthe least urbanized provinces are those in grassland areas where the tendency
is for the people to adopt a dispersed form of settlement on the hills rather than the
grouped form of settlement to be found in the forest region.
Again, the dissimilarities of the two entities were noticeable in the ratio of
urban and rural populations. Although Northwest had a higher population density, its
urban population constituted less than half the urban population of Southwest. Land
pressures and scarcity of jobs plus the desire by some elements in Northwest to seek
fortunes in the coastal/forest region caused migration of Northwesterners to the
Southwest. We should also point out that Buea, (Southwest) was the political capital of
southern Cameroons and West Cameroon until 1972. This factor attracted political
figures from the Northwest to the Southwest to perform their duties. Without a doubt, the
differences just outlined above, had far reaching political, social and economic effects on
both regions and may serve as a chief reason for lack of solidarity among West
Cameroonians.
Topographic Differences
The topography ofNorthwest and Southwest Provinces further reinforces the
remarkable differences of the two regions. In the Northwest, with perhaps the exception
of Ndop plains, the region is comprised of highlands, covered with stretches of grass-
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2Savannah and almost overlaid by volcanic stones.2 The soil in this region is fertile for
domestic staples as well as coffee and tea for export. In the Southwest, there are a
number of volcanic structures, including the Rumpi, the Kupe, Manenguba and the
Mount Cameroon, the highest peak in West Africa. The region also has high rainfall and
fertile soils, but less hilly compared to the Northwest. In this region, large banana,
rubber, tea, and cocoa, and coffee plantations are evident, as well as timber from the hot
swampy areas of Mamfe. The Cameroon Development of Corporation (CDC) took over
large plantation industry from the Germans in 1947, after the second World War. Also,
the Southwest region has coastal stretch which links Douala and Victoria (Limbe) and
has two major seaports, Tiko and Limbe. To the Southeastern side, there is the Cross
River in Mamfe, which connects West Cameroon with Nigeria.
From the above discussion, therefore, one can argue that population pressures
in the Northwest, abundance of highlands, and volcanic rocks, plus the absence of
waterways prevented the growth of large scale agricultural industry in the region. We
can also argue that the above factors, coupled with social circumstances, influenced
migration of large numbers of Northwesterners to Southwest for job opportunities and
other social amenities.
Cultural Differences
Described as a mosaic of small tribes with different dialects, communication
between Northwest and Southwest was through English language, but most often "pidgin
English." The two regions also displayed different life-style patterns as well as cultural
! T. Eyongetah and R. Brian, A History of Cameroon. 3.
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orientations. By virtue of her geographic location to the sea, Southwesterners were the
first to embrace "modernization" through interaction with European traders and explorers.
As a consequence, therefore, Northwestemers generally perceive that Southwesterners
look low on them as "inferiors" and uncivilized. Furthermore, the Southwest being the
gateway to the sea had great intermingling with different racial and linguistic groups
from other countries such as Togo, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, etc. Indeed, one could aptly
describe the region as "a melting pot ofraces and cultures."
The diverse social patterns of the two regions also reflects a contrast in the
political views of the people. While "tribalism", homogeneity and "authoritarianism"
dominates the social framework of the Northwest region, egalitarianism, heterogeneity
and liberal attitudes appear to characterize the orientation of the Southwesterners.
"Tribalism" in this context should be understood to mean strong and unbroken allegiance
to the "Fon" or chief and the desire to "stick together" to work for the good of the region,
even if it goes against ones' individual interest and belief. Although tribal affinities are
evident in the Southwest, they are not as strong as among the Northwestemers. Tribal
loyalties among Northwestemers residing in the Southwest and other provinces of the
country have resulted in the formation of social compartments who act generally as a
collective, particularly on electorial and voting matters. Indeed, the culture of the
Northwestemers, plus the influence of the traditional rulers (Fons) have contributed
immensely to social cohesion of the people. Keyaka R. N. Nyamboli aptly captures and
describes this unique characteristics ofthe "graffiman" in the following statements:
...What sets the graffiman apart from others is his humility and deference to
acknowledge authority as much as his arrogance and aggressiveness in the
to the top.3 othe«' toes if that's






forest areas; the instrument for this achievement was thought to
be the assertion and consolidation of the political preeminence of
the grasslands through the strengthening of the KNDP and the
weakening, if not destruction ofthe opposition CPNC.4
Political dissension between Northwest and Southwest leadership can be
traced to R. J. K. Dibongue's founding of the French Cameroon's Welfare Union
(FCWU) in Victoria in 1949. Formation ofFCWU challenged Endeley's CNF party, but
most importantly, some of Endeley's supporters like N. N. Mbile and John N. Foncha,
"crossed the carpet" and supported Endeley's rival, Dibongue. This, according to
Eyongetah and R. Brian, was the beginning of split between Endeley and Foncha.5
Furthermore, in the mid 50s, Endeley broke his neutrality in Nigerian politics, especially
dissociating himself from the NCNC, and forming an alliance with the opposition group
led by Chief Awolowu.
The chief reasons for Foncha and his grassland supporters to part from the
KNC, hence build their own political machine, the KNDP were as follows: Foncha's
desire to break or secede from Nigeria with the goal of re-uniting with French Cameroon.
Second, Foncha and Jua, both from the grasslands were supported by the traditional
rulers of Nkambe, Bamenda and Wum, who disliked the fact that the grassfield region
was economically backward, relative to the coastal/forest regions. The traditional rulers
of the grassfield region also resented the polished European sophistication of E. M. L.
Endeley, as well as the coastal intellectuals. Finally, the traditional rulers were also
afraid of Endeley's plans to reduce their roles and influence in regional political
4 Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society,
365.
5 T. Eyongetah and R. Brian, A History of the Cameroon. 131.
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discourse.6 Based on the above factors, therefore, it was clear that in any political contest
between a Grasslander and a coastal/forest elite, the former will prevail because of strong
adherence of the subjects to the traditional ruler's calling. We should also point out that
the grasslanders had a disproportionate advantage in population compared to the
coastal/forest people, and this will play a major role in electoral outcomes in 1959.
In the 1940s, Endeley was in strong support for secession of Southern
Cameroons from Nigeria, and for unification with French Cameroon. However, in the
1950s, Endeley changed his position and instead hoped for Southern Cameroons to attain
full regional status within the Nigerian Federation.7 The role and influence of the Ibos in
Southern Cameroons compounded Endeley's problems in the region and offered Foncha
the opportunity to rise as a leader. Foncha exploited "Ibophobia" and used this
successfully and with great vigor to swing public opinion for separation from Nigeria and
unification with French Cameroon. Endeley's support continued to wane especially in
Bamenda where Kom women revolted against the ruling party, KNC. Eyongetah and
Brian have argued that several women's groups or organizations were set up to unseat
Endeley's KNC, using rumors that the KNC were selling land to the Ibos and
encouraging Fulani herdsman to graze their cattle on women's lands.
Although Endeley and the KNC had record accomplishments, including
separation of Southern Cameroons from Eastern Nigeria, creation of the House Chiefs,
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Source: Compiled by author from various sources including Cameroon Tribune. The
Pilot. Cameroon Times. The Herald and books.
As Table 12 reveals, Northwestemers have dominated the political scenes in
West Cameroon, as well as eclipsed Southwestemers at the federal level from 1965-1972.
Also, Northwestemers occupied prominent positions during the unitary system as well as
the republic, from 1972, to 1990 and 1996 respectively. This political preponderance
however, was interrupted in 1990, when Effiom was chosen Grand Chancellor and Peter
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M. Mafany as Prime Minister in 1996. This disproportionate representation by
Northwesterners has been a major concern of Southwesterners for along time, and
continues to raise suspicion in the minds of most Southwesterners when cries of
domination by Francophones are echoed by Northwesterners.
When asked in our survey which of the two Anglophone provinces has
benefitted the most from the government since unification, 49 percent of our respondents
said Northwest province has benefitted most, while 24 percent thought Southwest has
benefitted from the government, 23 percent believe both Northwest and Southwest have
benefitted equally and just 6 percent believe none of the two provinces have benefitted
from Francophone dominated regime. This finding clearly parallels the evidence
presented in Table 11. above. Furthermore, when asked why West Cameroonians have
not been able to exert collective political pressure on the government in Yaounde for
reasonable changes (53 percent) of our respondent said selfishness of West Cameroon
politicians and their inclinations to parochial allegiance, than for the good of West
Cameroon is responsible for this anomaly. Forty-three (43 percent) of our respondents
said West Cameroonians could not exert political pressure on the government because of
government's strategy to keep the two regions at odds with each other, using political
office and pet projects as a tool. It is evident based on the activities and pressures from
political organizations that if Anglophones work in solidarity, they can achieve more
from the government. One can argue based on facts that through unity and solidarity
among Anglophones, French Cameroon under Ahidjo accepted the creation of the state of
West Cameroon, rather than attempt to infuse the region into French Cameroon through
assimilation. Likewise, it was unity and solidarity among the Southern Cameroonians
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that led to eventual secessation of the region from Nigeria. It is also evident that disarray
among the Anglophones in the early 1970s resulted in Ahidjo's swift decision to abolish
the federal system, creating a unitary and highly centralized system, which further
deprived Anglophones from some benefits ofthe states.
Another reason advanced for widening differences between Southwesterners
and Northwesterners, resulting in lack of solidarity among Anglophones is in the
allocation of major development projects. In my interview with a former government
official and Mayor of Kumba, the "economic capital" of Southwest about the discord
among Anglophones and its consequences on development or lack thereof, he offered the
following explanations:
Dr. E. M. L. Endeley for many years struggled for the realization
of higher institution of learning in West Cameroon~a University.
However, this project was held hostage because Northwesterners
were not pleased with the project being in the Southwest. They
made every effort to foil the project in hope of getting a
university center first established in Bambili-Northwest. It is
crystal clear that two prominent Northwest politicians residing in
Buea sent false reports to Yaounde during Ahidjo's reign and
even when Biya became president, that the proposed Buea
University Project be halted or completely wiped off 1
The actions of John N. Foncha, an elderly statesman of West Cameroon in
1995, appears to validate Mr. Eyumbi's comments during my interview in 1994. Recall,
that in 1995, a delegation ofAnglophone elites led by Foncha and Muna traveled to New
York to demand Southern Cameroons independence from the United Nations. Ironically,
after the trip, Foncha sought authorization from president Biya to open a university in
Bamenda. Foncha's actions have infuriated Southwest elites who believe Foncha, and
11 Interview with former M. P. and Mayor ofKumba, John Sona Eyumbi, December 19,1994.
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other Northwest elites indirectly inferred that the Buea University was ineffective, thus
proposing an alternative-Bamenda University«to replace it. Clearly, the unwillingness
of Northwesterners to support unequivocally the establishment of a 'complete' university
in Buea demonstrates the discord among these two regions. In a similar vein, the
lukewarm attitude and unwillingness of Southwest politicians to speak out in favor of,
and support of Licensed Produce Buying Agents, a business venture dominated by
Northwest entrepreneurs reinforces, the prevailing dysfunction of the two Anglophone
entities.
Furthermore, Southwesterners have continued to be suspicious of actions of
their brothers in the Northwest, particularly on party politics. This suspicion was echoed
during my interview with a prominent lawyer in Buea who requested that his identify
remain anonymous. He stated "that Northwest elites have kept the Southwesterners
guessing, especially on the issue of independence for Southern Cameroons". On the issue
of launching of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), Southwesterners complained that
they were not informed of such a grand plan. However, it was revealed that three
prominent Southwesterners, Dr. Enonchong, Dr. Nkongho and Chief Ngolle were
approached with a suggestion of creating a political party. Most Southwesterners have
questioned the reasons or motives underlying the selection of these three
Southwesterners, aware that they will not accept the proposal. We should point that Dr.
Enonchong helped frame the constitution of Cameroon and Dr. Nkongho is also a
prominent and respected lawyer in Douala. Based on this suspicion of motive, some
Southwesterners use this as a ploy to discredit the SDF.
Sou^wes, and Northwest eh.es has given *. te £




have countered the charge, of domination by
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sentiments by putting the blame on the "graffiman", without a critical analysis of
themselves. Mai also points out that failure or lack of progress in the Southwest is the
result of inept leaders from the region. He argues that political and managerial leaders of
Southwest including figures like Egbe Tabi, Honorable P. M. Kemcha, Honorable Nerius
Namasso Mbile, the late Dr. A. D. Mengot, John Ebong Ngole, Nfon V. E. Mukete,
Honorable W. N. O. Effiom, Honorable Lifio Carr, all had the opportunity to improve
Southwest, but failed to do so.13
Clearly, although the Southwesterners ventured into the political arena before
their Northwest counterparts, the latter's political maturity and active involvement in the
process has no doubt earned them a lot of political benefits. Northwesterners have been
articulate and sophisticated in their strategies, particularly in organizing mass political
meetings which have been well attended. Unlike their Southwest counterparts,
Northwest voting behavior has been predictable, particularly if "one of their own" is
running for office. This characteristics reflects and reinforces the homogeneous political
culture ofthe grassfield people.
Fractured Consensus
As we alluded to in the previous section, discord among Anglophones
(Northwest and Southwest) served as the major stumbling block for the region's progress,
particularly its ability to exert influence on the Francophone dominated government.
Acknowledging this salient characteristic as a hindrance to Southern Cameroon's
development, Anglophone elites, in a show of courage and solidarity, gathered in Douala
13 Yindo Ngong Mai, "The Northwest is not Guilty" The Pilot. December 1996,21.
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AACI or the Buea Declaration. Elites and participants resolved that if the government
failed to respond by their "reasonable time," the Southern Cameroons National Council
(SCNC) would eventually transform into Southern Cameroons Constituent Assembly and
do all in its power to protect the territory and citizens. At the conclusion of the
conference, the general assembly of the Anglophones of Cameroon was renamed
Southern Cameroons Peoples Conference (SCPC), while the standing committee became
the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). This body adopted the theme "The
Force ofArgument, not the Argument ofForce" as its guiding principle. According to its
architects, Anglophones will utilize dialogue and legal means necessary to resolve
inequities between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon.
Again, Anglophones' resolve for their cause was evident in 1995 when the
SCNC adopted proposed resolution by CAM for declaration of Southern Cameroons
independence on October 1, 1995. Ironically, on January 1, 1960, French Cameroon
gained her independence from France, while Nigeria, gained her independence from
Great Britain on October 1, 1960. The first All Anglophone Conference held outside
Cameroon took place in Washington, D.C. in ah attempt to internationalize the
Anglophone struggle. At this conference, an advisory council was created called the
Southern Cameroons Advisory Council (SCAC). The conference was led by a delegation
from Cameroon under the leadership of Barrister Sam E. Elad, John N. Foncha, and S. T.
Muna. Their goal was to carry a petition to the U. N. Security Council, the government
of Great Britain and the United States, what they claimed was the "illegal annexation and
exploitation of the natural and human resources of Anglophone Cameroon by La
Republique du Cameroun.
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The decision of the delegation to petition U.N. Security Council, especially
the presence of Foncha and Muna has raised not only suspicion of the motives, but
angered most Anglophones, particularly Southwesterners, who argue that the faith and
predicament ofWest Cameroon was the outcome ofFoncha and Muna's greed in the first
place, and question repeated why these figures continue to be involved in the affairs of
region. Furthermore, the SCPC delegation submitted an application to the
Commonwealth of Nations, meeting in Auckland, New Zealand in November 1995,
seeking membership and recognition by the body. Recall that president Biya had
submitted a similar request for membership into the organization in 1993, which was
approved during the Auckland gathering. Cameroon's admission into the Commonwealth
of Nations was protested by the SCPC. The SCPC delegation, on their return to
Cameroon, hoisted a United Nations flag on the other side ofthe Mungo River, signifying
that West Cameroon was a U. N. mandate territory and technically not part of the La
Republic du Cameroun.
From the above, it appears therefore that, the activities of the Anglophone
elites are at variance with the wishes of the people, thus causing more problems of
legitimacy than anticipated. Using the SDF as an example, the party chairman, John Fru
Ndi, during the SDF's National Convention in Bamenda, called for "devolution of
powers,"H while in Bafousam, Western Province, Fru Ndi echoed "decentralization," but
14 Proceedings of the First National Convention ofthe Social Democratic Front (SDF), May 21-26
(Bamenda, 1992): 29.
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completely avoided mentioning federalism.15 Some observers maintain that Fru Ndi and
SDF feared that propagating federalism as its key goal would scare Francophone
militants, whose support for the party gave it national, rather than regional trappings.
After much discussions and manueuvring, the SDF focused on creation of four
autonomous states for the Republic ofCameroon. This position was, however, counter to
one backed by CAM, whose moderates, according to Milton Krieger, sought a return to
1962-1972 federal system. The militants, on the other hand, wanted to dissolve the union
of 1961, and to form a new nation.16 Clearly, this disarray has created tension and panic
among loyal Francophones sympathetic to, and attracted by a message for national issues
such as the economy and declining living standards enunciated by the SDF.
When asked in our survey which option citizens would most likely support,
53.6 percent of our respondents said they would prefer to continue with the current
system as a Republic, but with major constitutional and policy initiatives to bridge the
gap between East and West Cameroon. Nearly one-third of our respondents (29.25
percent) said they wanted a return to the federal system as it existed prior to unification in
1972, with some modifications in the constitution. A small number ofrespondents (13.61
percent), said they wanted West Cameroon to be an autonomous state with no ties to East
Cameroon. From the above it is evident that Southern Cameroon's political elites,
especially leaders of SDF and SCNC are at variance with each other on the best strategy
15 Official SDF documentation with its seal, including Fru Ndi's keynote speech in Bafousam and
cognate material, August 1993. SDF Policy on Federalism is conveyed in reports in the August edition of
West Africa, the primary sources whichjustify constitutional matters were craftily avoided in party circles.
16 Milton Krieger, "Cameroon's Democratic Crossroads," The Journal ofModern African Studies
(1994): 617.
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for West Cameroon. Furthermore, based on the opinion of majority of West
Cameroonians surveyed, it is apparent that SDF and SCNC are at odds with the
population over the issue of separation from La Republic du Cameroon and continuing
with the current system. Similarly, in my interview with Mr. D. A. Wan-obi, a seasoned
politician and administror in 1997, on the Anglophone -Francophone issue, he offered the
following:
Although peceptually it might appear the government has not done much for
West Cameroon, and Anglophones would like to have more say in the
decision-making circles, in the government, I believe, the government is
doing its utmost to satisfy the demands of West Cameroonians. Similarly,
although Anglophones have not held senisitve positions in the government
such as Finance, Foreign Affairs, Territorial Administration, the Armed
forces etc.; they have, nevertherless, been appointed to other ministerial
positions.17
From the above, one can argue therefore, thatthe disregard of the views of
the majority that has caused intense struggle among the leadership ranks in the SCNC.
Clearly, as our discussion has revealed although Francophone dominance over
Anglophone remains a salient political reality in Cameroon, there is no denying that
disagreement among Anglophones, Northwesterners and Southwesterners has contributed
to, and made working in solidarity difficult among these two peoples. Regional and
parochial proclivity has overridden concern for West Cameroon's well-being. This
factor, therefore, is perhaps the most important reason why Anglophones have not been
able to exert political pressure on the Francophone dominated government in Yaounde.
17 Donaltus A. Wan-Obi, Former Section Vice President of CNU for Manyu, Section Secretary for
CPDM, Manyu, and First Assistant Sub Prefect for Manyu. Interview on August 30,1997, during his visit
to the United States.
CHAPTER VIH
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The goal of undertaking this study as we stated in chapter one, was to
examine the unequal relationship between East and West Cameroon, with the former
serving the "center" and the latter as the "periphery". Our motive was to explore the
factors and circumstances which contributed to, and have reinforced this unequal
relationship and the implications of this imbalance for continued harmony between the
two polities. As this study has demonstrated, not only the political leaders and elites of
West Cameroon have championed the cause for equity between Francophone and
Anglophone Cameroon, the poorest and most under-privileged citizens ofthe region have
also expressed their discontent with the government for economic mishaps. We hoped
however, that, through this endeavor, we would be able to understand the nature and
complexities underlying the relationship between Francophone and Anglophone
Cameroon, and seek, in the final analysis, ways to enhance unity, cooperation and nation-
building, rather than confrontation and conflict.
Findings
With regards to the prevailing relationship between these entities, our study
uncovered no major break-through or surprises concerning Francophone preponderance
over Anglophones. As our discussion in chapter two revealed, inequality between these










influence of Anglophone elites and militants, in mitigating secession and/or separation
from East Cameroon.
We also found that successive Francophone regimes of Ahidjo and Biya used
the divisive strategy of "divide and rule" in West Cameroon to achieve their political
objectives. First, through partition, and subsequently through award of lucrative political
positions to one Anglophone region to the disadvantage of the other region. As table 12
shows, the government appointed Northwesterners to key, or high profile positions in
various institutions of government, to the disadvantage of Southwestemers. Again, this
strategy was designed to appease the more vocal and politically aggressive Anglophones
from Northwest province. Another significant finding espoused by this study is that
the deteriorating economy served as a catalyst, bringing together disgruntled
Francophones and Anglophones together, amidst their differences, to work towards
removing Paul Biya, president, (Francophone) from power. Decline in Cameroon's
economy and the attendant hardships resulting from IMF and World Bank's Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP), measures contributed significantly in undermining Biya's
legitimacy as leader, and was partially responsible for violence and disorderliness that
swept across some provinces in the country. Equally important, we found that economic
decline precipitated Allophone leaders to push aggressively for the government to
implement reforms that would alleviate the misery of Anglophones. Likewise,
introduction of democracy and multiparty politics in the country in early 1990s,
increased political awareness of Cameroonians on key issues, and also gave citizens the
opportunity to participate in the political process. As our respondents revealed in the
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survey (66.38 percent) said the process was a major contributor to their understanding
of the political system. This process was a great impetus for Cameroonians, particularly
Anglophones, to be actively involved the political matters of the state. Anglophones were
not only able to form their own political parties, they challenged the government's of
dominating Anglophones. Despite this positive step forward brought about by
democracy and multiparty system in transforming Cameroon's political landscape, we
found that this process and system also handicapped relations between and within groups
in the society. We found that although one of the goals of democracy is to educate and
inform citizens to transcend their partisan and particularistic concerns, and to give
priority to the welbeing ofthe state, the system intensified internal divisions and triggered
fierce competitions among various parties, each vying for articulation, ascendence and
control of power. We also found that the system aroused ethnic and regional sentiments
particularly during the presidential elections of October 1992, where candidates
performed better in their region(s) of origin, with the exception of president Paul Biya,
the incumbent, who won in some regions not affiliated with his ethnic upbringing. Our
respondent (29.85), stated that democracy and multiparty politics increased distrust and
skepticism among Cameroonians about their government. We found that with the
formation of SDF party, the most viable of the opposition parties, the Francophone led
government again coopted prominent Anglophones, especially influential
Northwesterners like Ahidi Achu, Fon Angwafor, Foncha, and Lawrence Shang, as well
as some Southwesterners like Agbor Tabi, Peter Musonge and W.N O. Effiom for their
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support. This strategy has no doubt weakened the SDF, at the same time strengthened
Francophone dominance over Anglophones.
Finally, we found that the crux of Allophone bitterness with Francophone
dominance is based on the logic of self-deprivation and progress. Anglophones, maintain
that they have been refused the right to share equitably in the country's wealth, by
successive Francophones regimes, even though Anglophones are the (bread winners) of
the country. Absence of industrial and commercial infrastructures in the Anglophone has
also added to cries of domination and unequal treatment by Francophones. Similarly, we
found that complains of their disadvantaged position in the Cameroonian society,
especially in socio-cultural, and linguistic domains served as reasons for continued
Anglophone dissatisfaction with Francophone dominance. Genuine, as these complaints
are, they should not be examined in compartments or isolation. These complaints we
believe, should be analyzed and explained within the context of inequality between
Francophones and Anglophones regions, despite the prevalence of inequity in other
Francophone provinces ofthe republic. Clearly, a close examination of other provinces in
East Cameroon, particularly Adamawa, Far North, East and South provinces, will show
that the Anglophone provinces are not worse off. This, however, is not to suggest that
Anglophones should be complacent or content with their realities in the larger
Francophone dominated Cameroon.
Conclusions
In every society, large, or small, with diverse population, and with competing
interests, the task for the central authority of striking an equitable balance between the
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majority society and the peripheral community becomes of significant importance.
Forging an acceptable and equitable balance in a bifurcated state such as Cameroon,
which is ethnically heterogeneous, religiously differentiated, economically and materially
skewed, poses a number of problems to unity and stability of the polity. It seems
therefore that, the elemental problem Anglophones seek redress by the dominant society
is not much about exploitation of resources, but rather, their active role in the decision
making process on matters that affect their economic and social welbeing-being.
As this study further demonstrates, the roots of this conflicting tendencies
between Francophones and Anglophones as we as we stated previously, trace their
origins from the country's colonial past. Political integration in 1972, and fusion of these
unique colonial experiences into a monolithic, highly centralized system, had severe and
far-reaching implications for the Anglophones. Abolition ofthe federal system which had
guaranteed Anglophones some degree of autonomy and self-rule in determining their
own "internal" affairs, meant they had to rely on directives and consultation from the
Francophone capital, Yaounde, before any actions or projects would be implemented.
Clearly as our discussion has shown, West Cameroon's disadvantage ofbeing
numerically weak has often been reinforced by the deprecatory treatment Anglophones
receive from their Francophone counterparts. To a large extent, Francophones have
exhibited arrogance and intolerance towards Anglophones as depicted in Emah Basile's
characterization of Anglophones, particularly directed at John Fru Ndi, SDF chairman as
"les enemies dans la maison" (enemies ofthe house). Basile, we should point out was the
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theory of imperialism," in which harmony of interest exist between the "center" and
"periphery" but there is disharmony of interest within the "periphery."
Finally, from our discussions it is evident that the thrust of Anglophone
complaints and anger at the dominant Francophone regime is that Anglophones no longer
want to viewed as appendages to East Cameroon, they do not want to be regarded as
something grudgingly given. They want in the final analysis, to be recognized as an
integral and vital component ofthe political economy ofthe Republic ofCameroon.
Suggestions for Further Research
This study on "center-periphery" relations in Cameroon has highlighted several
issues, raised important questions worth further examination, analysis and investigation.
Key areas which will inspire further research will include, role of the economy in intra-
Anglophone relations, role and influence of Cameroonian students abroad in Cameroon
politics, secession and the future of the republic of Cameroon, "center -periphery
"relations in comparative perspective: Cameroon and other dominant-subordinate
relations in Africa or the Third World. In sum, whenever such academic endeavor is
undertaken, we hope this study center on "center-periphery" relations in Cameroon will
serve as a foundationas well as and a point ofreference.
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CPDM president of the Yaounde region, and long serving Government Delegate to the
Yaounde City Council.
Although in the real world dominated and oppressed people would prefer
doing away with inequality and dominance, the fact remains that as long as dominated
subjects are disunited and dysfunctional internally, their oppressors will always have an
edge over them, pitting one segment of the population against the other to achieve
maximum compliance and consensus. As the West Cameroon experience has
demonstrated, concern for self aggrandizement and regional growth perpetuated by
Anglophone political elites has been a key reason for continued dominance by
Francophones. While there exist an objective situation impelling Anglophones to forge a
political union, strong and viable enough to promote and protect their interests, failure or
absence of such unified organization capable of rallying and bringing together the two
provinces on the same platform highlights the problems ofAnglophones.
Furthermore, although there has been political tensions between Northwest
and Yaounde as well as Southwest and Yaounde on some pertinent issues, in general,
however, the relations between these provinces and the capital, Yaounde can be described
as strong. The struggle for access to scarce resources for development in each region,
may account for this solidarity between the provinces and the capital. On the other hand,
we noticed that solidarity between the two Anglophone provinces was missing, or at least
not as strong as one would expect. This missing link as we indicated in chapter seven, is
partly the outcome of historical circumstances, and conforms to Galtung's "structural
265
theory of imperialism," in which harmony of interest exist between the "center" and
"periphery" but there is disharmony of interest within the "periphery."
Finally, from our discussions it is evident that the thrust of Anglophone
complaints and anger at the dominant Francophone regime is that Anglophones no longer
want to viewed as appendages to East Cameroon, they do not want to be regarded as
something grudgingly given. They want in the final analysis, to be recognized as an
integral and vital component ofthe political economy ofthe Republic ofCameroon.
Suggestions for Further Research
This study on "center-periphery" relations in Cameroon has highlighted several
issues, raised important questions worth further examination, analysis and investigation.
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Anglophone relations, role and influence of Cameroonian students abroad in Cameroon
politics, secession and the future of the republic of Cameroon, "center -periphery
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APPENDIX A
Clark Atlanta University
School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Political Science
Dear Cameroonians
March, 1996
My name is Ayuk E. Augustine, I am a graduate student at Clark Atlanta University. I am
a Ph.D. candidate in the above institution, and my dissertation is on Cameroon. I am
requesting a few minutes ofyour time to review and complete the enclosed questionnaire.
This survey is designed to elicit responses from Cameroonians at home and abroad, with
the goal ofunderstanding intra Cameroon relations. I would like to assure you that this
information would be used solely for research purposes. Respondents are therefore urged
not to identify themselves by writing their names on the questionnaire.







Please complete the following:
(a) Your Division oforigin
(b) Your Province oforigin







(e) Other (please specify)
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(c) Continue with «
Constitutional and
West Cameroon





5. Politically and economically, West Cameroon has benefited as a result of
unification with East Cameroon, (please circle one)
(a) Strongly agree
(b) Agree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Strongly disagree
(e) Disagree
Which ofthe following reasons explain West Cameroon's economic and
infra structural backwardness?
(a) Government's development priorities are in East Cameroon not West
Cameroon
(b) West Cameroon contributes relatively less to the overall economy of
the Republic Cameroon.
(c) The region's economic contribution to GNP is relatively less.
(d) Perception that West Cameroon might some day break from East,
hence invest as little capital in the area as possible
(e) Other
7. The partition of Cameroon into seven Provinces after 1972, especially the
division ofWest Cameroon into North West, and South West provinces was
a political calculation by the government
(a) To create disagreement between the two regions, by manipulating the
politicians
(b) To bring government closer to the people
(c) To prevent the UPC Movement from further terrorizing citizen
(d) To consolidate power in Yaounde
(e) Other
Despite claims ofunfair treatment and discrimination, West
Cameroonians have been appointed to, and occupied high profile positions











The oppositions' sabotage strategy "operation ghost town"/ "ville mort,"
against the government was?
(a) politically and economically effective because it forced the government
to make significant changes in the country.
(b) ineffective because it negatively impacted the ailing economy, and
political achieved nothing.
(c) ineffective because most Cameroonians do not believe in violent
strategies as means to achieving political reforms.
(c) ineffective because of internal disagreement and poor coordination
among the opposition leaders,
(e) Other
Democracy and multiparty politics has:
(a) increased political awareness of most Cameroonians today on key
issues, than was the case ten years ago.
(b) revealed internal divisions among Cameroonians, along ethnic and/or
regional lines.
(c) caused more distrust and skepticism about the government
(d) given Cameroonians the opportunity to participate in the political
process.
(e) Other
Which ofthe following reasons explain why West Cameroonians could not
complain of domination, and unequal treatment by East Cameroon during the
reign ofpresident Ahidjo?
(a) President Ahidjo did not tolerate criticism of his regime
(b) He used state institutions to subdue his political enemies, sentencing
them to long prison terms.
(c) West Cameroon politicians were concerned more with satisfying
Ahidjo's demands, and maintaining their positions in gov't than
appealing for equal treatment from the president.
(d) Freedom of speech and press censorship was strictly limited
(e) There were no viable opposition parties or groups to challenge his
government
Cameroonians are relatively free today, to express their political views and







9. Which ofthe two Anglophone Cameroon provinces in your view, has
benefited most from the government since unification in 1972?
(a) Northwest Province
(b) Southwest Province
(c) None ofthe Provinces




West Cameroonians have not exerted collective political pressure on the
government in Yaounde for reasonable changes because:
(a) The government built the CPDM Congress house in Bamenda,
Northwest Province, instead ofBuea, South West Province
(b) The government built the University in Buea, South West Province,
instead ofBamenda, North West Province.
(c) West Cameroon politicians are selfish, they think ofthemselves and
their local areas than the general good ofWest Cameroon.
(d) Government strategy ofkeeping the two regions at odds with each
other has been effective.
(e) Other
IfWest Cameroon were to separate from East Cameroon, where would you
prefer the political capital to be? {please select only one city)
(a) Bamenda
(b) Buea
(c) Do not know
(d) Other
In your view, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) party is?
(a) A North West party
(b) A West Cameroon party with strong support from North West and
SouthWest Provinces.
(c) A North West party, with lukewarm support from South West
(d) A party with broad support throughout the country
(e) Other
13. In your view, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) party
is?
(a) A party with equal representation from East and West Cameroon
(b) A party with a greater percentage representation in East Cameroon
(c) A party with a greater percentage representation in West Cameroon
(d) A party with increasing support in South West Province
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CAMEROON AFTER RE-UNIFICATION IN 1961
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Source: T. Eyongetah and R. Brian. A History ofthe Cameroons.
London: Longman Group Ltd., 1974.
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PARTITION OFWEST CAMEROON TO SOUTHWEST AND














































































Sourw: T Eyongetah and R. Brian. A History of the Cameroon*.
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Ahmadou, Ahidjo. As Told bv AhmaHnu Ahidjo. Monaco: Paul Boiy, 1968.
Almond, Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. ed. Comparative Politics:A
Developmental Approach. Boston: 1966.
Amin, Samir. Unequal Development: An Essav on the Social Formation of
Peripheral Capitalism. Translated by Brian Pearce. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1976.
Anderson, Claude. Black Labor. White Wealth: The search for Power and
Economic Justice Edgewood, MD: Duncan and Duncan Inc.,
1994.
Antlov, Hans. Exemplary Center. Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership and
the New Order in Java. Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1995.
Ayitteh, George B.N. Africa Betrayed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
Ayuk, Augustine E. "Economic Stagnation and Reform in Cameroon: The
Influence of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program."
Atlanta, GA: 1996.
Azarya, Victor. Dominance and Change in North Cameroon: The Fulbe
Aristocracy. New York: Sage Publications, 1976.
Azevedo, Mario. "Ethnicity and Democratization:Cameroon and Gabon." In
Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, ed. Harvey
Glickman, Atlanta, GA: African Studies Association Press,
1995.
Bailey, R. "Uses and Misuses of Privatization." In Prospects for Privatization, ed.




Barbier, J.C, G.J. Courade and J.Tissandier. Complexes Agro-Industriels au
Cameroun. Paris: Orstom, 1980.
Bartkus, Viva Ona. The Dynamic of Secession. Cambridge: Cambridge
' University Press, 1999.
Bayart, Jean Francios. L'Etat Au Cameroun. 2d ed. Paris: Presse de la Fondation
Nationales de Science Politique, 1985.
. "One-Party government and Political Development in Cameroon."In
An African Experiment in Nation-Building: The Bilingual Cameroon
Republic since Re-unification, ed. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1980.
. "The Political Systems." In Gaullist Africa:Cameroon under Ahmadou
Ahidio. ed. Richard Joseph, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Press,
1978.
Bealey, Frank. The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science:A User's Guide To
Its Terms. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999.
Behrman, Lucv C. Muslim Brotherhood and the Politics in Senegal. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Bendix, Reibhard. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1962.
Beng, Peter Ngea and Randy Joe Sa'ah. "Fru Ndi, Bello and Adam say no to
disruption of polls: Say CPDM will be held responsible for any
violence." The Herald. (Yaounde).October 10-12. 1997.
Benjamin, Jacques. Les Camerounaise Occidenteaux:La Minorite an un Etat
Bicommunautaire. Montreal:Les Presse de L'univerite de Montreal,
1972.
Beti, Mongo. Main Base su le Cameroun: Autopsie D'une Decolonisation. Paris:
Editions F. Maspero, 1972.
Biya, Paul. Communal Liberalism. London: MacMillan, 1987.
279
Biyitt, Bi Essam, T.P. Cameroun Complots et Bruits de Bottes :Ouelaue Donnes
pour E'broiller L'echeveau. Paris: L1 Harmattan, 1985.
Boone, Catherine. "State and Ruling Classes in Post-Colonial Africa: The
Enduring Contradictions of Power." Paper presented at 33rd Annual
meeting ofthe African Studies Association. Baltimore, November 1-4
(1992): 37.
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Toward Governance in Africa:
Popular Demands and State Responses." In Governance and Politics in
Africa, ed. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1992.
Burton, John W. and Tarja Vayrynen. "The End of International Relations." In
Contemporary International Relations: A guide to Theory, ed. A.J.R.
Groom and Margot Light, New York: Pinter Publishers, 1991.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Thomas D. Hall. Core/Periphery Relations in Pre
capitalist Worlds. Boulder, CO: WestView Press, 1991.
Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild.
Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, ColoradoXynne
Rienner Publishers, 1988.
Chiabi, Emmanuel. The Making of Modern Cameroon: A History of Substate
Nationalism and Disparate Union. 1914-1961. Vol. 1. Lanham:
University Press of America Inc., 1997.
Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm
Reconsidered. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.
Chipman, John. French Power in Africa. London: Blackwell Press, 1989.
Clapham, Christopher. Third World Politics: An Introduction. Madison,
Wisconsin: The University ofWisconsin Press, 1985.
Clark, Walter S. "The National Conference Phenomenon and the Management of
Political Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa." In Ethnic Conflict and
Democratization in Africa, ed. Harvey Glickman, Atlanta, GA: African
Studies Association Press, 1995.
Courcelle, Michael. The Priva
Delancey,
BouIder
2nd. New Yoric: M1T
Yaounde, Cameroon: Impression Essn ,987
Cambridge, MA:
281
Gallaghy, Thomas M. "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The foreign Economic
Relations of Sub-Saharan African States." hi Africa:Dilemmas of
Development and Change, ed. Peter Lewis, CO: Westview Press,
1998.
Gallaghy, Thomas M. and John Ravenhill. Hemmed In: Response to Africa's
Economic Decline. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Gaining, Johan "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." hi Transnational
Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political
Economy, ed. George Modelski, San Francisco, WH Freeman and
Company, 1979.
Gaudiness, Anthony. "Nation-States and Violence." hi Social Theory and
Modernity. Cambridge: Politiy, 1987.
Gershman, John. "The Free Trade Connection." hi 50 Years is Enough: The Case
Against theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund, ed.
Kevin Danaher, MA: 1994.
Gordon, April and Donald. Understanding Contemporary Africa. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1992.
Greetz, Clifford. "Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics
in the New States." hi Old Society and New States:The Quest for
Modernity in Asia and Africa. New York: 963.
Gros, Jean-Germain. "Whither Authoritarianism in Cameroon? An examination of
the 1992 Presidential Elections." hi The Democratic Challenge in
Africa. Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center at Emory University, 1994.
Hall, John A. "State." hi The Oxford Companion to Politics of theWorld. ed. Joel
Krieger, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Haas, Ernst. The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986.
Herkosvits, Melville." People and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa." The Annals.
(March 1995): vol. 298,11-20.
282
Herkosvits, Melville." People and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa." The Annals.
(March 1995): vol. 298,11-20.
. The Human Factor in Changing Africa. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1962.
Holsti, K.J. International Politics:A Framework for Analysis .6th ed. Englewoods
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1992.
Hyden, Goran and Michael Bratton. Governance and Politics in Africa.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
Johnson, Willard R. The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a
Fragmentary Society. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1970.
Killick, T.C., Bird, J. Sharpe, and M. Sutton. "The IMF:Case for Change in
Emphasis." In Adjustment Crisis in the Third World, ed. R. Fienberg
and V. Kallab, Washington, D.C: Overseas Development Council.
1984.
Konde, Emmanuel. The Bassa of Cameroon: An Indigenous African Democracy
Confronts European Colonialism. Acton, MA: Tapestry Press, 1998.
LeVine, Victor T. "Leadership and Regime changes." In The Political Economy
of Cameroon, ed. Michael Schatzberg and I. William Zartman,
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986.
Lippens, Philippe, and R.A Joseph ed. "The Power and the People." In Gaullist
Africa under Amadou Ahidjo. ed. R.A. Joseph, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth
Dimension Publishers, 1987.
.. The Cameroon Federal Republic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1971.
.. The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1964.
283
Morgenthau, Ruth S. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.
Oxford: Clarendon, 1964.
Mosley, K.P. "West African Industry and the Debt Crisis: A Research Report."
Atlanta, GA: African Studies Association, 1989.
Nathan, Richard.'Tederalism." In The Oxford Companion to Politics
of the World, ed. Joel Krieger, New York: Oxford University Press,
1993.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. An Assessment of the
October 11. 1992 Elections in Cameroon. Washington, D.C.:NDI,
1992.
Ndiva, Kofele-Kale. "Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Political Power: A Post-Mortem
of Ahidjo's Cameroon." In The Political Economy of Cameroon, ed.
Michael Schatzberg andl. William Zartman, New York, NY:
Praeger Publishers, 1986.
Ndongko, Wilfred A. "The Political Economy of Regional Economic
Development Cameroon." In An African Expriment in Nation-
Building:The Bilingual Cameroon Republic since Re-unification, ed.
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980.
Nellis, John R. Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan African. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1986.
Nelson, Harold D. Area Handbook for the United Republic of Cameroon.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, American University
Foreign Areas Studies Division, 1974.
Neville, Rubin. Cameroon: An African Federation . New York, NY: Praeger
Publishers, 1971.
Nkrumah, Kwame. Axioms ofkwame Nkrumah. London: Panaf Books Ltd, 1967.
. Neocolonialism and the Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Panaf
Books Ltd., 1965.
284
Nsouli, Saleh M. and Justin B. Zulu. "Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent
Experience." Occasional Paper, no. 34. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1989.
O'Brian, Cruise and Donald B. The Mourides of Senegal. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971.
O'Brien, Philip J. "A Critique of Latin American Theories ofDependency." In
Bevond the Sociology of Development ed. Ivar Oxaal et. al., London:
Routlegeand Kegan Paul, 1997.
Ofiaja, Nicolas D. Stability and Instability in Politics: The case ofNigeria and
Cameroon. New York: Vintage Press, 1979.
Please, S. The Hobbled Giant: Essavs on the World Bank. Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1984.
Prouzet, Michel. Le Cameroun. Paris: Libraire General de Droit et de
Jurisprudence, 1974.
Ramsey, Jeffress. "Cameroon." Global Studies: Africa. 7th. ed. Connecticut:
McGrawHilL1997.
Rivkin, Arnold. Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects. New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1969.
Schatzberg, Michael G. "Hijacking Change: Zaire's Transition in Comparative
Perspectives." In Democracy in Africa: TheHard Road Ahead, ed.
Mariana Ottaway, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1997.
. "Metaphors of Father and Family." In The Political Economy of
Cameroon. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1986.
Seidman, Ann and Frederick Anang. ed. 21 st Century Africa: Towards a New
Vision of Self-Sustainable Development. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa
World Press, 1992.
Shannon, Thomas R. An Introduction to the World-System Perspective. Boulder,
285
Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1996.
Shils, Edwards. "Center and Periphery." In The Logic of Personal knowledge:
Essays Presented to Michael Polanvi. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1961.
Shivery, Phillips W. Power and Choice: An Introduction to Political Science. New
York: McGraw Hill, Inc. 1995.
Speigel, Steven L. Dominance and Diversity: the International Hierarchy. Boston:
Little Brown, 1972.
Stark, Frank. "Federalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and Reality." In An African
Experiment in Nation-Building: The BilingualCameroon Republic
since Re-unification, ed. Ndiva Kofele-Kale. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1980.
Takougang, Joseph. "Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform." In Political
Reform in Francophone Africa, ed. John F. Clark and David E.
Gardner, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.
Tedga, John Paul M. Enterprise Publique Etats est Crise au Cameroun:Facillite
d'un System. Paris: Edition L'Harmattan, 1990.
Todaro, Michael. Economic Development in the Third World. New York:
Longman, 1989.
Trudeau, Pierre Elliot."Nationalism and Federalism." In Political Ideologies and
Political Philosophies, ed. H.B. McCullough, Toronto: Thompson
Educational Publishing, Inc., 1995.
United Nations. E.M.L. Endeley's Address to the United Nations. February 23,
1959.
United States Energy Information Administration. Cameroon. Washington,
D.C1997.
Van de Walle, Nicolas." Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa with an
Illustration from Cameroon." In Economic Change and Political
286
"The Politics ofNone-Reform in Cameroon
c. Columbia University Press 1993
of Canada Montreal:
vol.18 no.9 29 April, 1977,2.
, January 1976.
aL (203 March 1988):69-72.
Africa Report, May-June 1983.
Series) May ,994, U445
287
Ardener, Edwin. "The Kamenm ,dea,





Cameroon Tiibjaie, II March 1992.





relationships and its effects on Anglophone Cameroon," Journal of
African Studies. 13.2 (Summer 1986).
"Cote d'lvore: Pouvour Presidentiel, Palarbre et Democrati," Afhque
Contemporaire, 44 (1981): 10-12.
Courade, G.J. "Des Complexes Qui Content Chers: La Priorite Agro- Industrielle
dans L'Agriculture Camerounaise," in Politique Africane. 14, 1984,75-
91.
Delancey, Mark W. "Cameroon National Food Policies and Organization: The
Green Revolution and Structural Proliferation," Journal of Modern
African Studies, 7(2): 109-122.
Doran, Charles F." Thoughts on the Different Tomorrow," In The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science (Marchl995): 9.
Doran, Charles F. And Ellen Reinsman Baby. "Being and Becoming in Canada,"
The Annals ofAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science
(March 1995): 9.
Dos Santos, Than." The Structure of Dependency," American Economic
Review. 60 (May 1970).
L'Effort Camerounaise. 29 Juin 1958, 4.
Frank, Andre Under. "The Development of Underdevelopment," Monthly
Review. 18 (September 1996): 17-31.
"Fru Ndi Goes to Washington," West Africa. 15-21 February 1993, 21.
Gaining, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." Journal of Peace Research.
no.2(1971):155.
Ghandi, Hansi Tamfu. "Ayissi Mvodo:L'Ennemi dans la Maison," The Pilot. Vol.
1 December 1996, 36.
Gros, Jean Germain." The Hard Lessons of Cameroon," Journal of Democracy,
vol 6. (1995): 3.
289
Gwellem, Sylvester. "What makes the Bamenda Man Tick?" The Pilot Vol.1
December 1996, 19.
The Herald. 10-12 October 1997.
The Herald, 14-15 April 1995.
Jeune Afiique Economic 1987, 96.
Krieger, Milton. "Cameroon Democratic Crossroads, 1990-1994," Journal of
African Studies. 32 (1994): 618.
LeVine, Victor T. "Leadership Styles and Political Images: Some Preliminary
Notes," Journal of Modern African Studies. 15 (1981).
"Making Ends Meet," West Africa. 27 December 1987, 2534.
Le Messaeer. 7 March 1992.
Ndifor, Akwanka Joe. "A Political Turning Point," Africa Report. 6 No.4. July-
August 1991, 8.
Ndiva, Kofele-Kale. "Cameroon: Checks and Balances," West Africa. December
1983, 3871-3872.
Ndongko, Wilfred A. "A Comparative Analysis of French and British Investment
Policies in Cameroon," Pan African Journal VI1, No. 2. 1974.
Ngong, Yindo M. "The Northwest is Not Quilty," The Pilot Vol. 1 December
1996, 21.
Nkemeleke, Asonglefac. "Democratic Pursuits," West Africa. 1 November 1987,
2205.
Nyamboli, Keyeka R.N. "Potrait of a grasslander," The Pilot. Vol.1 December,
1996, 7.




AYUK,AUGUSTINE ENOW B.B.A., Georgia College and State University,
1990
M.P.A., Georgia College and State University,
1991
CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL
REFORMS IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF CAMEROON (1972-1997)
Advisor: Professor Hashim Gibrill
Dissertation dated: May 2001
In recent years, West Cameroonians (Anglophones) have expressed deep concern
regarding their relative deprivation in the political, social and economic realities in
Francophone dominated Republic of Cameroon, particularly the widening gap which
continues to manifest itself between the two entities since integration in 1972. This study
examines the factors and circumstances (internal and external) responsible for fusion of
the two polities, and the implications of such a union for the life experiences of
Anglophone Cameroonians, particularly in the political, economic, social, and
infrastructural domains. A case study analysis approach was utilized to analyze data
gathered from Cameroonians at home and in the United States, as well as personal
interviews. The researcher found that successive Francophone regimes used varied
policies and strategies to reinforce the hegemonic nexus ofEast Cameroon
(center) over West Cameroon (periphery). The conclusions drawn from the findings
suggests that although Francophone policies and strategies are paramount in hindering
Anglophone progress in Francophone dominated Cameroon, there are, never the less,




*""" C°Ue8e and ** University,
P A., Georgia College and State University
Dissertation dated: May 2001
